BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

Impact Evaluation of the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme

(From its inception in 2004 to February 2013)

Prepared by:

- **Business Enterprises at University of Pretoria (Pty) Ltd**

Prepared for:

THE PRESIDENCY
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
DEPARTMENT: PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND EVALUATION

agriculture, forestry & fisheries
Department:
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Date:

29 June 2015

PO Box 14679
Hatfield 0028
Enterprise Building,
140 Lunnon Road,
Hillcrest,
0083
T: +27 (12) 420 4245
F: +27 (12) 362 5270
info@be.up.ac.za
www.be.up.ac.za

This report has been independently prepared by Business Enterprises at University of Pretoria. The Evaluation Steering Committee comprises the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation in the Presidency, Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform and others. The Steering Committee oversaw the operation of the evaluation, commented and approved the reports.

Submitted by:

Business Enterprises at University of Pretoria
PO Box 14679
Hatfield 0028
Enterprise Building,
140 Lunnon Road,
Hillcrest,
0083
Tel: +27 (12) 420 4245
Fax: +27 (12) 362 5270
Email: info@be.up.ac.za
www.be.up.ac.za

Submitted to:

Ian Goldman
DDG: Evaluation and Research
The Presidency
Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation
Private Bag X944
Pretoria, 0001, South Africa
Tel: +27 12 312 0155
Fax: +27 86 686 4455
Email: ian@po-dpme.gov.za

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ..... **iv**

LIST OF FIGURES ..... **v**

GLOSSARY ..... **vi**

Policy Summary ..... **vii**

Executive summary ..... **ix**

1 Introduction **1**

1.1 Background to the intervention 1
1.2 Background to the evaluation 3
1.2.1 Purpose of the evaluation 3
1.2.2 Focus of the evaluation 3
1.2.3 Key evaluation questions 3
1.2.4 Scope of the evaluation 3
1.2.5 Methodology 4

2 Findings from the literature review **9**

2.1 Introduction 9
2.2 Background on agricultural support 9
2.3 Overview of South Africa's agricultural support programmes 10
2.4 Agricultural support programmes in other countries 11
2.4.1 Africa 11
2.4.2 Asia 14
2.4.3 Latin America 15
2.5 Lessons from agricultural support efforts of other countries 17
2.6 Summary and conclusion 18

3 Case studies **20**

3.1 Mbatha Fruit and Vegetables (Gauteng) 20
3.2 Cotina Farm (Western Cape) 21
3.3 Saringwa Estate (Mpumalanga) 22
3.4 Baphalane Ba Sesobe CPA (North West) 23
3.5 Mariveni Farmers' Cooperative (Limpopo) 24
3.6 Ncube Wool Growers' Association (Eastern Cape) 25
3.7 Lofdal Ostrich (Northern Cape) 25
3.8 Gotswametseng Aquaculture (Free State) 26
3.9 Ixopo Commonage Farm (KwaZulu-Natal) 27
3.10 Emerging issues from the case studies 27
3.10.1 Challenges and factors contributing to failure 27
3.10.2 Accomplishments and success factors 28

4 Findings of the evaluation **30**

4.1 Reaching the target population 30
4.2 CASP support and appropriateness 34
4.3 Development of farmers' sense of self-reliance 45
4.4 Impact on agricultural production 49
4.5 Impact on market access 54
4.6 Impact on livelihoods 58
4.7 Impact on farmer development 63

4.8 Factors affecting achievement or non-achievement of CASP objectives 64

5 Conclusions 69

5.1 Reaching the target population 69
5.2 CASP support and appropriateness 69
5.3 Capacity building for on-going management and resilience (self-reliance) 70
5.4 Impact on agricultural production 70
5.5 Impact on livelihoods 70
5.6 Impact on market access 70
5.7 Impact on farmer development (commercialisation) 70
5.8 Achievement of objectives 70
5.9 Factors influencing achievement of objectives 71

6 Recommendations 72

6.1 Retention of CASP 72
6.2 Database 72
6.3 Organisational structure 72
6.4 Funding arrangements 73
6.5 Employment creation 73
6.6 Implementation guidelines 74
6.7 Scope and coverage 74
6.8 Needs and demand driven support 74
6.9 Marketing 74
6.10 Participation of women, youth and people with disabilities 74
6.11 Human resources 75
6.12 Monitoring and evaluation 75
6.13 Common understanding 75
6.14 Alignment with other support programmes 75
6.15 Farmer-to-farmer exchange visits 75
6.16 Focus on employment and income 75
6.17 Theory of change 75

Annexure 1: Evaluation results tables 78

Annexure 2: References 86

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Projects selected and visited by province 5
Table 2: Size of projects visited by province (ha) (n=451) 6
Table 3: Details of key informant interviews 6
Table 4: Projects selected for case study 7
Table 5: Age of respondents/project managers and proportion of youth 30
Table 6: Number and proportion of youth beneficiaries in project ownership 31
Table 7: Number and percentage of females in project management and ownership 31
Table 8: Number and percentage of project owners (beneficiaries) by gender, youth and disability before and after CASP participation 33
Table 9: Number and percentage of projects by type of land ownership/tenure (n=451) 33
Table 10: Number and percentage of subsistence, emerging/commercial farmers targeted by CASP (n=451) 34
Table 11: Number and proportion of farmers indicating why their project needed CASP support 35
Table 12: Number and proportion of farmers indicating the nature of support they requested per business plan 36
Table 13: Percentage of farmers with access to agricultural information and those indicating the usefulness and sufficiency of information received since CASP participation 37
Table 14: Number and proportion of farmers indicating the type of information received since participation in CASP 38
Table 15: Number and proportion of farmers indicating their level of satisfaction with information received 38
Table 16: Number and proportion of farmers receiving extension advice before and after CASP 39
Table 17: Number and proportion of farmers receiving training before and after CASP participation 40
Table 18: Number and proportion of farmers who received input assistance from CASP 40
Table 19: Number and percentage of farmers with social infrastructure on their projects before and after CASP 44
Table 20: Mean area cultivated by crop grown before and after CASP (hectares) 50
Table 21: Mean crop production before and after CASP (kilogrammes) 52
Table 22: Total number of livestock before and after CASP participation 53
Table 23: Growth in livestock numbers by province on CASP supported farms 54
Table 24: Number and proportion of farmers acknowledging CASP's contribution to food security compared 60
Table 25: Mean number of people employed before and after CASP 61
Table 26: Number and percentage of respondents acknowledging contribution of their projects to employment among rural dwellers before and after CASP 63
Table 27: Percentage of farmers selling products in various markets by province 64

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Proportion of people with disabilities in project ownership 32
Figure 2: Proportion of farmers who considered input availability as good (n=277) 41
Figure 3: Proportion of farmers who indicated that CASP facilitated market access (n=451) 42
Figure 4: Proportion of farmers indicating how CASP facilitated market access (n=59) 42
Figure 5: Proportion of projects with on-farm production infrastructure before and after CASP 43
Figure 6: Proportion of CASP-funded on-farm production infrastructure 44
Figure 7: Proportion of projects that benefitted from CASP's skills and knowledge transfer activities (n=451) 46
Figure 8: Proportion of beneficiaries who received skills through CASP by type of skill (n=285) 46
Figure 9: Proportion of employees who received skills through CASP by type of skill (n=285) 47
Figure 10: Mean area cultivated before and after CASP (hectares) 49
Figure 11: Proportion of farmers who kept livestock since acquisition of the farm (n=451) 53
Figure 12: Proportion of farmers indicating ease of market access since CASP participation (n=451) 55
Figure 13: Percentage of farmers who indicated facing marketing challenges before and after CASP participation by province 56
Figure 14: Percentage of farmers facing marketing challenges by type of market and type of challenges before and after CASP participation 56
Figure 15: Project management's mean monthly salaries (R) 58
Figure 16: Project beneficiaries' mean monthly salaries 59
Figure 17: Growth in employment on CASP funded projects 62
Figure 18: Proposed theory of change 77

GLOSSARY

ACB	Agricultural Credit Board
ASDP	Agricultural Sector Development Programme
ASDS	Agricultural Sector Development Strategy
ASDSP	Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme
ASSP	Agricultural Support Services Project
ATEC	Agrotechnical Centre
BATAT	Broadening Access to Agriculture Thrust
CASP	Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme
DAFF	Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DoA	National Department of Agriculture
DPME	Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation
DRDLR	Department of Rural Development and Land Reform
EC	Eastern Cape Province
FS	Free State Province
FSP	Farmer Support Programme
GP	Gauteng Province
IFSS	Integrated Food Security and Nutrition Programme
ISRDS	Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal Province
LP	Limpopo Province
LRAD	Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development sub programme
MAFISA	Micro-Agricultural Financial Institutions of South Africa
MP	Mpumalanga Province
NC	Northern Cape Province
NW	North West Province
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PSE	Producer Support Estimate
RECAP	Recapitalisation and Development Programme
TSE	Total Support Estimate
WC	Western Cape Province

Policy Summary

An impact evaluation of the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) was commissioned by the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) in partnership with the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). The main purpose of the evaluation was to determine whether CASP is achieving its policy goals. In particular, the evaluation was required to assess the impact of the Programme on livelihoods (including incomes, food security, employment, etc.), market access, commercialisation and agricultural production. In addition to the above, the evaluation was supposed to make recommendations for strengthening CASP.

Key policy findings are as follows:

- **CASP has made progress towards achieving some of its intended objectives (e.g. enhancing access to support services, increasing agricultural production, increasing income for beneficiaries, etc.), but insufficient progress has been made in promoting commercialisation, market access, employment and achieving food security.** Only about 33% of all farms included in the evaluation are considered to be commercial. The majority of CASP farmers do not find it easier to access formal markets than prior to CASP, and some of them believe that their market access actually declined since their participation in CASP. In almost all the provinces, the indicators of food security suggest that the food security situation of the farmers and their households has not improved since their participation in CASP. Employment has increased after CASP participation on most projects: the average number of full-time employees per project before and after CASP was 11 and 16, respectively, while the average number of part-time workers rose from 6 to 14.
- **CASP is reaching most of the target groups but relatively few youth and disabled persons are involved in the programme.** These sections of the target population constitute only 14% and 3% of all participants in CASP, respectively.
- **Agricultural production, both crop and livestock, has increased after CASP.** However, the increase occurred only in certain products and parts of the country. Average production per farm for major crops such as maize, wheat and sugarcane increased in less than half the number of provinces covered in the evaluation. Significant increases were largely in vegetable and livestock production.
- **Although CASP has contributed to capacity building through skills transfer, the programme has made little contribution to building the capacity of the projects to be self-reliant.** Case studies reviewed in this evaluation suggest that capacity building has not been adequate as some of the projects are still dependent on support from CASP despite many years of being assisted. Furthermore, some of the projects have experienced problems in finding markets for their products due to limited marketing skills and knowledge.
- **Access for farmers to support services, such as agricultural information, inputs, extension advice and training has increased after CASP**. However, some beneficiaries find the support inadequate, expenditure-led and not driven by the real needs of the farmers.
- **There is limited coordination of CASP within DAFF and the provincial departments of agriculture and the programme is not aligned to other government programmes (e.g. those of Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Department of Water and Sanitation, etc.).** Within DAFF, there is lack of buy-in from key directorates.
- **The scope and coverage of CASP are too wide, resulting in resources being thinly spread.** This limits the effectiveness of the programme in achieving its intended objectives.

Recommendations for strengthening CASP are presented below. We wish to preface the recommendations by stating that **the most effective and efficient way to support farmers in South Africa is to overhaul and redesign all farmer support programmes and do away with existing silos of farmer support**. This should entail the establishment of a single programme of farmer support to replace the numerous programmes which currently exist.

The following are recommended:

- CASP should be institutionalised or mainstreamed within DAFF to inter alia ensure proper coordination and participation of directorates that should be playing key roles in the implementation of the programme.

- The current CASP funding approach of a wholesale grant should be discontinued.
- The scope and coverage of CASP should be reduced to increase its effectiveness, with special emphasis on the commercialisation of small-scale agriculture.
- DAFF and provincial departments of agriculture should increase their efforts to promote market access and commercialisation.
- CASP support should be extended to role players other than farmers within the agricultural value chain (e.g. local agro-processing).
- DAFF should endeavour to improve the involvement of youth, women and people with disabilities in CASP-supported projects, particularly in project management.

Executive summary

Background

The Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) was launched in 2004 to provide post-settlement support to targeted beneficiaries of land reform and other previously disadvantaged producers who acquired land through private means and engaged in value-adding enterprises. CASP is a schedule 4 conditional grant that seeks to enhance the provision of support services to promote and facilitate agricultural development with the emphasis on women, youth and the people with disabilities. CASP also targets improving the productivity and livelihoods of individuals in the following groups:

- the hungry (to improve food security);
- previously disadvantaged subsistence, emerging and commercial farmers (to reduce poverty and increase incomes); and
- entrepreneurs (to establish agribusinesses to increase sustainable employment).

CASP has six pillars, which aim at delivering comprehensive services to subsistence, smallholder and previously disadvantaged commercial farmers. They include:

- Information and knowledge and management;
- Technical and advisory assistance, and regulatory services;
- Marketing and business development;
- Training and capacity building;
- On- and off-farm infrastructure and production inputs; and
- Financial support, through the Micro-Agricultural Financial Institutions of South Africa (MAFISA).

CASP contributes to the achievement of the government's Outcome 7 of "comprehensive rural development and land reform"; outcome 4 of "decent employment through economic growth; and outcome 10 of "sustainable natural resources management".

An impact evaluation of CASP was commissioned towards the end of 2013 and undertaken in all nine provinces of South Africa during the first half of 2014. This report is based on the outcome of the impact evaluation undertaken in these provinces. In particular, the report focuses on addressing the following key evaluation questions:

- To what extent were the objectives of CASP achieved?
- What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
- To what extent did the programme reach its appropriate target population?
- What impact has CASP had on livelihoods of the farmers and their households (food security, nutrition, income, skills, poverty)
- What impacts has CASP had on agricultural production, on production efficiency, and on access to markets by smallholder farmers?
- What impacts has CASP had on farmer development? How many farmers graduated (in increments) from subsistence to commercial?
- To what extent do beneficiaries receive an appropriate package of CASP and other agricultural services?
- To what extent do CASP services develop farmers' sense of self-reliance (not dependent on government grants) and capacity for on-going management and resilience?
- How can the results inform how CASP can be strengthened?

Methods

To address the above questions, data were gathered from 451 out of 4890 CASP projects/farms (project managers), 74 government officials (provincial and national levels) and nine case studies (both 'successful' and 'not successful' projects). A structured questionnaire was used to gather data from the projects (project managers) and open-ended questionnaires were used in the case of government officials and case studies. In addition to interviews, a literature review of agricultural support programmes in five countries (Brazil, China, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania) and one region (Asia) was carried out to draw lessons for CASP.

Findings

Reaching of target population

Although CASP is reaching most of its target groups, relatively few youth and disabled persons are involved in the programme. The situation has remained the same before and after CASP. With regard to the management of projects assisted by CASP, it is dominated by males and older citizens. About 71% of the 451 beneficiary project managers are male and only 7% fall within the youth category. The average age of project managers is 52 years. Youth and females are better represented in project ownership than in project management – 15% of project owners are in the youth category and 42% of project owners are female. All the 451 projects included in the evaluation are engaged in primary agricultural production. Participants in the agricultural value chain beyond farming, who are part of the primary target population for CASP, are not benefitting from the programme. As regards the type of farmers assisted through CASP, the majority (70%) are emerging or commercial farmers. This is not unexpected as subsistence farmers were initially not part of CASP's target group.

CASP support and appropriateness

The evaluation considered CASP support in the following areas related to the pillars of the programme: agricultural information, extension advice, training, infrastructure, agricultural inputs, and market access.

Access to **agricultural information** increased after CASP. About 70% of the respondents indicated that they had access to agricultural information before CASP whilst the proportion after CASP was 81%. As regards the appropriateness of the information, it was established that agricultural information tended to focus on production issues and less attention was paid to other types of information, such as marketing information. About 77% of the project managers are satisfied with the quality of information provided. However, only 58% of them indicated that the information provided was sufficient. Access to services, such as **extension** and **training**, improved after CASP. About 84% of the project managers included in the evaluation indicated that they received extension services after CASP. This figure is 17% higher than the number of project managers who indicated receiving extension services before CASP. About 60% of the project managers mentioned that they received training before CASP compared to 77% after CASP.

The availability of both on-farm and social **infrastructure** improved after CASP. In the case of on-farm infrastructure, the largest improvement was recorded for chicken houses (8% before and 21% after CASP) whilst electricity infrastructure showed the largest improvement for social infrastructure (58% before and 75% after CASP). Therefore, provision of infrastructure is one of the areas in which CASP has made a significant contribution. However, there are many complaints related to the process of appointment of service providers and the quality of the infrastructure provided.

Overall, the availability of the various **inputs** increased after CASP. However, the difference between the proportion of respondents indicating input availability as good before and after CASP is small (ranges from 2% for electricity and 9% for seed). This suggests a slight improvement in the availability of the various inputs after CASP, although timeliness of their delivery and sufficiency are still a problem. The problem of receiving inputs late was also highlighted in the case studies and by government officials. Whilst 83% of the project managers were satisfied with the quality of the inputs, 43% found them insufficient. It is worth noting that some of the respondents (26%) receiving inputs never asked for them, although they found them useful for their farming operations.

A significant proportion of farmers who experienced problems with **market access** before CASP continue to experience these problems after CASP. About 67% of the respondents mentioned that accessing product markets is not easier after CASP. Therefore, market access facilitation is one area in which CASP performance is weak. In one of the case studies included in the evaluation, it was mentioned that market access actually decreased after participating in CASP. However, this does not mean that CASP was responsible for the decrease. Government officials also identified lack of market access as a constraint.

Impact on farmer development (commercialisation)

CASP has achieved little progress in terms of promoting commercialisation of the farms/projects. Using participation in the formal market as a proxy for commercialisation, only 33% of the farms can be considered to be commercial. The limited progress in commercialisation is linked to the failure of the programme to promote market access as indicated above. Furthermore, the programme's failure to include role players in the value chain beyond primary production has not helped to promote market access and commercialisation.

Impact on agricultural production

Agricultural production, both crop and livestock, has increased after CASP. However, the increase occurred only in certain products and parts of the country. The average area cultivated for crops increased after CASP (from 8 ha to 14 ha). However, average production per farm for major crops such as maize, wheat and sugarcane only increased in less than half the number of provinces covered in the evaluation. Vegetables showed an increase after CASP in six provinces. As regards livestock production, the number of animals kept on CASP-supported projects increased significantly (by 296%) after CASP. The increase in livestock numbers occurred in all nine provinces but varied significantly.

Impact on livelihoods

Employment on the projects included in the evaluation has increased after CASP: the average number of full-time employees per project before and after CASP was 11 and 16, respectively, while the average number of part-time workers rose from 6 to 14. The increase in employment is mainly among part-time employees and is concentrated in a few provinces (e.g. Western Cape).

CASP's contribution to **food security** is limited in almost all the provinces. Based on the indicators of food security emphasising access to food, between 40% and 57% of the project managers indicated that food security improved after CASP.

As regards **income**, the evaluation considered incomes of project managers and other beneficiaries within CASP. The income of both project managers and beneficiaries generated from CASP-supported projects has increased since their participation in CASP.

The nominal monthly income of a project manager-beneficiary was 44% higher after CASP whilst that of an owner-beneficiary had risen by 36%.

Capacity building for on-going management and resilience (self-reliance)

CASP has made a positive but insufficient contribution to capacity building for on-going management and self-reliance through skills and knowledge transfer. The programme has imparted technical and farm management skills and knowledge to project managers and employees on the projects. The skills and knowledge are diverse and vary according to province. Project managers have benefitted more from skills and knowledge transfer than employees. On average, 64% of the project managers have benefitted from skills and knowledge transfer whilst employees on only 25% of the projects also benefitted. Areas in which capacity building is most insufficient include cultivar selection, livestock marketing, livestock disease control and produce marketing.

Achievement of objectives

Whilst the programme has made progress in certain areas (e.g. enhancing access to support services, increasing agricultural production, increasing income for beneficiaries, etc.), insufficient progress has been made in achieving the intended objectives of promoting commercialisation, market access, food security and employment.

Factors influencing achievement of objectives

The failure of CASP to achieve its intended objectives is attributable to several factors. However, the following were identified as key:

- There is limited coordination of CASP within DAFF and the provincial departments of agriculture and the programme is not aligned to other government programmes (e.g. those of DRDLR, Water and Sanitation, etc.). Within DAFF, there is lack of active participation of key directorates.
- Programme scope and coverage are too wide, resulting in support being thinly spread.
- Insufficient attention is given to marketing and commercialisation issues by DAFF and provincial departments of agriculture and the programme focuses on only one component of the value chain, agricultural production.

Recommendations to strengthen CASP

A number of recommendations are made in this report to strengthen CASP. However, it is important to state that **the most effective and efficient way to support farmers in South Africa is to overhaul and redesign all farmer support programmes and do away with existing silos of farmer support**.

Some of the key recommendations are as follows:

- CASP should be institutionalised within DAFF to *inter alia* ensure participation of directorates that should be playing key roles in the implementation of the programme.
- The implementation of the various pillars of CASP should be entrenched within the various directorates responsible for such services and supported with the necessary budgets and human resources.
- CASP should focus more on actions driving performance towards achieving outcomes, such as increasing employment and incomes. The current approach is expenditure-driven. This will require integration of strategic programmes within DAFF and those of other actors within the agricultural sector.

- National Treasury should facilitate the planning, alignment, coordination and integration of farmer support programmes between DAFF and other government departments, such as the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform to avoid duplication and/or wastage of public resources.
- The current CASP funding approach of a wholesale grant should be discontinued as it (a) encourages dependency and, thus, works against the objective of achieving sustainability; and (b) promotes an entitlement mentality and limited commitment on the part of beneficiaries.
- DAFF should endeavour to improve the involvement of youth, women and people with disabilities in CASP-supported projects, particularly in project management.
- The scope and coverage of CASP should be reduced to increase its effectiveness. CASP support should focus on the viability of the projects instead of the number of people assisted.
- DAFF and provincial departments of agriculture should increase their efforts to promote market access. This should involve provision of support to components of the agricultural value chain beyond production (e.g. agro-processing) and collaboration/partnerships with the private sector.
- DAFF should encourage provincial departments of agriculture to exchange lessons on their experiences in implementing CASP. This can involve good performing provinces extending support to poor performing ones through farmer-to-farmer exchange visits and exchange of management or business models.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background to the intervention

Soon after attaining democracy in 1994, the Department of Agriculture (now, Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) attached great importance to delivering effective agricultural support services to the agricultural community, particularly previously disadvantaged subsistence, emerging and commercial farmers. Its vision was to have a united and prosperous agricultural sector in South Africa.

Policy reforms formulated in the White Paper on Agriculture, the Broadening Access to Agriculture Thrust (BATAT) document, the Strauss Commission Report into the Provision of Rural Financial Services and the Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture reshaped the agricultural sector over the years and resulted in *inter alia:*

- the termination of a range of agricultural services and grants, largely due to the deregulation of agriculture and the virtual collapse of support services in communal areas; and
- a growing backlog between access to land and the delivery of services as the government's land reform programme gained momentum through redistribution and restitution (Department of Agriculture, 2001).

The reforms were implemented, often in an uncoordinated manner, through the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (ISRDS), the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development sub-programme (LRAD), the Integrated Food Security and Nutrition Programme (IFSS) and the National Landcare Programme. The Department of Agriculture and its major partners designed the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) in order to ensure access to agricultural support and service delivery to the beneficiaries of land reform, farmers in communal areas and other vulnerable groups. CASP was introduced in 2003 (FAO, 2009) and launched in KwaZulu-Natal in 2004.

To prevent the beneficiaries of land reform, farmers in communal areas and other vulnerable groups from being denied access to agricultural support and service delivery, the Department of Agriculture and its major partners designed the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP). CASP was introduced in 2003 (FAO, 2009) and launched in KwaZulu-Natal in 2004.

CASP initially focused on land reform beneficiaries (a narrower clientele than that of BATAT). The programme was designed "To enhance the provision of support services to promote and facilitate agricultural development, targeting beneficiaries of the land and agrarian reform" (Department of Agriculture, 2004). The scope of CASP was later widened to include other previously disadvantaged producers who acquired land through private means and were engaged in value adding enterprises domestically or export.

CASP support was organised according to six 'pillars' (Department of Agriculture, 2004) as follows:

a) Information, knowledge and management;
b) Technical advice and assistance;
c) Marketing and business development;
d) Training and capacity building;
e) On- and off-farm infrastructure; and

f) Financial and input support.

Subsequently, the six pillars of CASP were modified slightly as follows:

- Information and knowledge management;
- Technical and advisory assistance, and regulatory services;
- Marketing and business development;
- Training and capacity building;
- On- and off farm infrastructure and production inputs; and
- Financial assistance (branded MAFISA).

CASP's target groups were also modified to include improving the productivity and livelihoods of individuals in the following categories (Department of Agriculture, 2004):

- The hungry and vulnerable;
- Household food producers;
- Beneficiaries of land and agrarian reform programmes; and
- Those operating within the macroeconomic environment.

CASP is a schedule 4 conditional grant that seeks to enhance the provision of support services that can promote and facilitate agricultural development, with emphasis on women, youth and people with disabilities (Department of Agriculture, undated).

CASP also contributes to the achievement of the government's Outcome 7 of "comprehensive rural development and land reform"; Outcome 4 of "decent employment through economic growth; and Outcome 10 of "sustainable natural resources management" (Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, 2013).

To ensure effective delivery of services, CASP emphasises the following in its implementation (Department of Agriculture, 2004):

- Cooperation between partners and alignment of strategies;
- Clear definition of roles and responsibilities; and
- Clear analysis of the spending pressures and cost drivers.

Although CASP, as the name suggests, is supposed to be a comprehensive programme, its implementation efforts in the past have focused mainly on infrastructure provision (Department of Agriculture, 2007; Public Service Commission, 2011). Among the challenges experienced in the implementation of CASP were (a) aligning budgets and systems between the then Department of Land Affairs, Department of Agriculture and provincial departments of agriculture; (b) implementing priorities with regard to infrastructure in the communal areas; (c) stepping up capacity building and technical advice for land reform beneficiaries; and (d) integrating the Agriculture Starter Pack into the Household Food Production Programme (Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2006).

Since its inception in 2004/5 to 2012/13, CASP has supported 7448 projects and 408 467 beneficiaries, with a total budget allocation of R5.84 billion of which R5.08 billion was spent. The budget allocation for CASP for 2012/13 was R1.534 billion of which R1.26 billion was spent, covering 536 projects and 59286 beneficiaries. This translates to an annual average spending of R2.35 million per project and R21 253 per beneficiary for 2012/13 (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2013).

1.2 Background to the evaluation

1.2.1 Purpose of the evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation is to assess whether CASP is achieving its policy goals. The evaluation further establishes the effects of CASP on the beneficiaries. This includes assessing the impact of CASP on food production and livelihoods of rural communities. The outcome of the evaluation will inform the strengthening of CASP.

1.2.2 Focus of the evaluation

The evaluation focuses on the impact of CASP on its targeted beneficiaries in terms of the effects of the programme on production, marketing development, farmer development and livelihoods of the farmers and their households.

1.2.3 Key evaluation questions

The evaluation addresses the following questions:

- To what extent were the objectives of CASP achieved?
- What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
- To what extent did the programme reach its appropriate target population?
- What impact has CASP had on livelihoods of the farmers and their households (e.g. food security, nutrition, income, skills and poverty)?
- What impacts has CASP had on agricultural production, production efficiency, and access to markets for smallholder farmers?
- What impacts has CASP had on farmer development? How many farmers graduated from subsistence to commercial?
- To what extent do beneficiaries receive an appropriate package of CASP and other agricultural services?
- To what extent do CASP services develop farmers' sense of self-reliance (not dependent on government grants) and capacity for on-going management and resilience?
- How can the results inform how CASP can be strengthened?

In addition to the above key evaluation questions, the evaluation is supposed to recommend a theory of change for CASP, based on the findings.

1.2.4 Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation covers the period from the inception of the programme in 2004 to the end of the 2012/13 financial year. The assessment of CASP's impact is limited to beneficiaries within the agricultural sector, excluding forestry and fisheries. The evaluation covers all the nine provinces of South Africa.

1.2.5 Methodology

This section outlines the methods and procedures adopted for the evaluation.

Data collection instruments

The respondents/stakeholders were classified into various categories, depending on their roles and responsibilities, and a data collection instrument was designed for each category. The categories and types of data collection instruments were as follows.

a) **Project/farm management**: A structured questionnaire was administered to the managers of the farms/projects. (The 'managers' are beneficiaries who bear primary responsibility for management of the CASP-support projects or farms, as opposed to all beneficiaries whom we designate 'owners'.) The focus was on gathering data to enable a detailed analysis of the impact of CASP on the beneficiaries and their farming operations.
b) **Provincial government officials:** An open-ended questionnaire was used for interviews with DAFF provincial government officials responsible for CASP. These included officials responsible for project facilitation and coordination. The main purpose of the interviews with provincial government officials was to gather information on process-related issues of CASP and to obtain their views on what can be done to enhance the effectiveness of the programme from a provincial perspective.
c) **National government officials:** These included both DAFF and National Treasury officials. DAFF officials included those responsible for CASP and others senior officials familiar with CASP. The purpose of the interviews with DAFF national government officials was to gather information similar to that obtained from provincial government officials, but from a national perspective. Interviews with National Treasury officials focussed on the financial aspects of CASP. An open-ended questionnaire was used for both categories of national government officials.
d) **Case studies**: An open-ended questionnaire was specifically designed for interviews with managers of nine projects selected as case studies to gather additional data on the impact of CASP and to identify challenges experienced by farmers.

Project/farm selection

Stratified sampling and purposive sampling were used to select the projects and respondents. Firstly, projects were stratified according to year of funding in each province. Each funding year was treated as a sub-population and random sampling was done independent of projects funded in other years. The number of funded projects in each province was converted to a percentage of the total number of projects implemented in each year. These proportions were then used to determine the actual number of projects to be selected in each year for each province, considering the original sample size of 440 projects. The projects were randomly selected within the sub-populations. Secondly, to ensure that the sample reflects the diversity of farm enterprises, the CASP pillars and the geographical distribution of projects within the district municipalities, purposive sampling was done. To facilitate this, maps showing district municipalities were printed and projects were located within the maps. The type of project ownership was also taken into consideration to ensure that the different types of ownership are reflected in the sample. These methods ensured that projects from each sub-group/sub-population were included in the final sample.

In essence, the following criteria were used for selecting the projects:

(i) *Geographic distribution*, to ensure that regional climatic variations are taken into consideration;
(ii) *Type of enterprise*, to ensure that both livestock and crop projects are included;
(iii) *Size of project*, to ensure that small and large projects are included in the sample;
(iv) *Number of CASP* projects per province, to ensure that the sample reflects the number of projects in each province; and
(v) *Type of project ownership/tenure* (e.g. private, individual, group, etc.).

Based on the above sampling methodology and criteria, all nine provinces were included for fieldwork. A total of 451 (i.e. 11 more projects than the original sample of 440) were included, representing 9% of the 4890 projects that were identified as having been assisted by DAFF through CASP during the period 2007/08 to 2011/12. This period was selected because it was the only period for which DAFF records on CASP projects were complete. Information on CASP projects before this period had many gaps. Therefore, the inclusion of projects implemented prior to 2007/08 would have complicated the sampling, based on the sampling criteria. Detailed information on the projects selected and included in the sample is provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Projects selected and visited by province

Province	CASP farms	Number of projects selected initially	Number of projects visited
Eastern Cape	639	58	65
Free State	579	52	54
Gauteng	975	88	87
KwaZulu-Natal	900	81	80
Limpopo	720	65	61
Mpumalanga	100	10	12
Northern Cape	170	15	20
North West	343	31	29
Western Cape	464	40	43
Total	**4890**	**440**	**451**

Face-to-face interviews were conducted with managers of the selected projects. The purpose of the interviews was to obtain data to gain a better understanding of the impact of CASP and to solicit the views of the project managers on the implementation of the programme.

Information on the size of the projects included in the evaluation is presented in Table 2.

The majority of the projects fall within the size category of 0.5 to 20 hectares. The smallest and largest project sizes are 0.5 hectare and 15 000 hectares, respectively; the mean project size is 440 hectares, the large size of which reflects the influence of the largest project. The smallest and largest projects are in North West and Northern Cape, respectively.

Table 2: **Size of projects visited by province (ha) (n=451)**

Project size (ha)	EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
	Number of projects									
0.5-20	15	13	49	15	24	6	7	4	22	155
21-50	2	4	13	4	14	0	6	2	9	54
51-100	10	5	12	4	1	2	1	2	2	39
101-500	19	16	8	30	18	3	3	5	5	107
501-1000	7	9	3	12	1	0	5	1	2	40
1001-5000	7	3	0	9	1	0	5	2	2	29
5001 plus	1	0	0	3	0	1	1	2	1	9
Missing data	4	4	2	3	2	0	1	2	0	18
Total	61	50	87	77	61	12	29	18	43	433
Average size (ha)	553	304	63	673	115	556	834	1711	308	440
Maximum size (ha)	11000	2045	850	13000	1489	5700	5889	15000	6445	15000
Minimum size (ha)	1	1	1	3	1	2	0.5	1	1	0.5
Standard deviation	1471	409	144	1658	222	1624	1421	4021	1088	1401

Details of key informant interviews

Key informant interviews were conducted in five provinces, namely, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Gauteng, North West and Western Cape. The purpose of the interviews was to gather information on process related issues (e.g. conceptualisation, design and implementation of CASP) that might have had an effect on the impact of CASP.

The key informant interviews at the national level comprised of DAFF officials fully involved with CASP or those involved partially with some of the pillars. Other national government officials interviewed were from National Treasury. A total of 74 key informants were interviewed. Table 3 provides details of the key informants.

Table 3: Details of key informant interviews

Position	Number interviewed			Total
	Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries	Provincial Departments of Agriculture	National Treasury	
Chief Director	4	2	0	6
Director	3	9	1	13
Deputy Director	1	10	2	13
Assistant Director	0	3	0	3
District Coordinator	0	1	0	1
Extension Officer	0	26	0	26
Local Manager	0	3	0	3
District Manager	0	5	0	5
M&E Specialist	1	0	0	1
Administrative Officer	0	1	0	1
Agric Officer/Manager	0	1	0	1
Project Officer	0	1	0	1
Total	**9**	**62**	**3**	**74**

Data gathered related to key informants' views of the role of CASP, relevance of objectives, selection criteria for projects, programme impact in terms of achieving the intended objectives, as well as its sustainability. In order to ensure a wider representation of views, two categories of respondents were identified at the provincial level. The first level was the departmental leadership, whilst the second level comprised of extension officers. CASP provincial coordinators and at least three other officials dealing with CASP were interviewed to represent the first level per province. The second level of interviews with extension officers included at least three officers per province and one person working with the project identified as a case study for the province. The extension officers were spread across various enterprises, but their selection ensured that those dealing with the main areas of agricultural production in a particular province were included.

Details of case studies

Nine projects were selected, one in each of the nine provinces. The projects were selected to include (a) both 'successful' and 'non-successful' farms; and (b) the different farm enterprises included in the evaluation. The use of a case study methodology enables a deeper understanding of issues which cannot normally be achieved through survey methodologies. Therefore, the main purpose was to gain a deeper insight into the challenges faced by farmers and how they are impacted by CASP. Including both 'successful' and 'non-successful' farms made it possible to obtain unbiased results and to identify factors responsible for failure or success of the projects. In this way, lessons can be drawn from the experiences of both types of project to inform the formulation of recommendations for improving the effectiveness of CASP.

In identifying projects for case studies, the following criteria were used;

- Performance of the projects: poor performing, average performing and good performing projects.
- Enterprises: various enterprises were accommodated.
- Potential of the project to provide lessons of experience for future development.
- Comparative advantage within the province.
- Type of land ownership of the project.
- The method of land acquisition of the project.
- The size of the project or level of production.

The selected case study projects are listed in Table 4.

Table 4: Projects selected for case study

Project	Province	Land acquisition method	Enterprise	Performance category
Baphalane Ba Sesobe	North West	Restitution	Livestock (cattle)	Poor
Cotina	Western Cape	Private	Fruit (deciduous)	Good
Gotswametseng Aquaculture	Free State	Lease (municipality)	Aquaculture (fish)	Poor
Ixopo Common Farm	KwaZulu-Natal	Lease (municipality)	Vegetables	Average
Lofdal Ostrich	Northern Cape	Private	Ostriches	Average
Mariveni Farmers' Cooperative	Limpopo	Redistribution	Fruit (citrus)	Average
Mbatha Fruit and Vegetables	Gauteng	Farmer settlement	Fruit and vegetables	Good
Ncumbe Wool Growers' Association	Eastern Cape	Traditional Authority	Wool	Good
Saringwa Estate	Mpumalanga	LRAD	Fruit (citrus)	Poor

Data processing and analysis

Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to process and analyse the data. The in-depth questionnaires for project managers were analysed through descriptive quantitative analyses, using Excel (and SPSS, where necessary). Data from the questionnaires were captured into Excel databases. After cleaning and verifying the first draft databases, an overall final database was prepared. This database was subjected to extensive descriptive quantitative analysis, including basic statistics (averages, means, standard deviations, etc.), cross-tabs, pivot tables, etc. Data from key informant interviews and case studies were analysed using qualitative methods. This entailed analysing the responses of the interviewees and identifying emerging themes.

Limitations of the evaluation

The initial plan was to select two groups of farmers, namely, CASP participants and non-participants (control group or counterfactual), to total 440 projects/farms. However, this turned out to be a futile exercise as the nature of CASP makes it impossible to identify a control group. For example, when CASP services are provided, other farmers not considered as CASP beneficiaries also receive the services (e.g. training). This means that it is almost impossible to separate 'treated' and 'untreated' farmers as is required when control groups are identified. Furthermore, the maximum sample size of 440 would have made it impossible to generate meaningful and representative evaluation results if it also included a control group. In other words, the sample size would have been too small to enable meaningful comparisons between participants and non-participants. Due to the above, it was not possible to use the analytical technique initially proposed for the evaluation. Hence, the evaluation relied mainly on data relating to the period before and after participation of the farms in CASP. This is one of the shortcomings of the evaluation as the "before and after" comparison makes it difficult to isolate the impact of the programme from that of other interventions. However, additional data gathered from the respondents on what they considered to be the impact of CASP should alleviate the effect of the shortcoming on the outcome of the evaluation.

Another limitation is related to the availability of data on CASP. Data on CASP prior to 2007 had major gaps that would make it impossible to select a representative sample. Hence, the sampled projects do not include those that participated in CASP during the first two years following CASP inception.

2 Findings from the literature review

2.1 Introduction

The terms of reference for the evaluation of the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) include a review of literature on agricultural support programmes similar to CASP in other countries. The literature review in this document focuses on establishing the nature of and lessons from agricultural support programmes in other countries that display characteristics similar to those of South Africa's agricultural support programmes, particularly, CASP. The intention is to understand how the programmes operate and to draw lessons for agricultural support programmes in South Africa, such as CASP.

Although the terms of reference for the evaluation specified four middle-income countries to be included in the literature review, we have covered five countries (Brazil, China, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania) and one region (Asia). The amount of detail provided for each country or region is dependent on the availability of information, relevance of the agricultural support programmes, the country's agricultural sector performance, etc. Hence, the literature review is comprehensive for some countries/regions (Brazil, China, Kenya and Tanzania) and limited for others (Ghana and Asia). The selection of the countries was based on geographic location (Africa, Asia and Latin America), importance of the smallholder agricultural sector and performance of the agricultural sector.

Subsequent sections of this review are organised as follows:

Section 2.2 presents background information on agricultural support services. An overview of agricultural support programmes in South Africa is presented in section 2.3. Section 2.4 is a review of literature on agricultural support programmes implemented in other countries. Lessons for CASP and agricultural support in South Africa from the experiences of other countries are presented in section 2.5. Section 2.6 presents a summary of the literature review and conclusions.

2.2 Background on agricultural support

Many countries support their agricultural sector in different ways and in varying degrees. Such support is largely based on the importance of the agricultural sector as the source of food. However, due to market liberalisation, many countries in the developing world have reduced government involvement in the agricultural sector, leaving many farmers without access to essential agricultural support services. On the other hand, farmers in some developed countries/regions (e.g. United States, Europe, etc.) continue to enjoy government support and this has caused a major outcry from developing countries who complain that the playing field for farmers is not even.

South Africa is among the countries that have reduced their support to farmers over the last three decades and the country's farmers are considered to be among the least supported in the world. For example, an OECD study found that South Africa's Producer Support Estimate (PSE) for 2000-2003 was 5% compared to 20% in the United States, 31% in OECD countries and 58% in Japan (OECD, 2009).

Considering total transfers to the agricultural sector in South Africa, the OECD study found that producer support constituted 55% of the Total Support Estimate (TSE) and the rest was in the form of general services which were increasingly focused on land reform beneficiaries.

2.3 Overview of South Africa's agricultural support programmes

Access to agricultural support services is essential for increasing agricultural production and productivity, particularly in smallholder agriculture. In South Africa, lack of access to agricultural support services or post-settlement after-care has been identified as a major reason for the poor performance of many land reform projects. It is also reasonable to suggest that poor access to farmer support services has negatively affected agricultural productivity and production in the former homelands. Therefore, it is not surprising that numerous efforts have been made by government and others over the last two decades to improve access to agricultural support services, particularly for land reform beneficiaries. However, these efforts have been criticised for shifting away from supporting the poor and more vulnerable farmers towards a focus on better-resourced and more commercially oriented farmers (Hart and Aliber, 2012).

Post-apartheid farmer support started with the launch of BATAT (Broadening Access to Agriculture Thrust) in 1994 as an implementation strategy of the Reconstruction and Development Programme within the agricultural sector. BATAT was intended to "kick-start a shift away from white dominance in agriculture and attempted to assess the needs of black agriculture, existing and new black farmers, and identify development priorities and strategies to improve their access to agriculture" (Oettle et al. cited in Vink et al., 2013). Although there is a view that BATAT succeeded in terms of influencing future policies in the agricultural sector, overall it is considered to have failed, mainly because of design related problems: it was a national strategy, but provision of farmer support services was largely a provincial responsibility. Furthermore, it is argued that the strategy was driven by a few people at the national level and was not widely supported (Oettle et al. cited in Vink et al., 2013). As it became evident that BATAT was not working, the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme was introduced in 2003 and launched in 2004.

CASP design has benefited from the experience gained in the implementation of BATAT. In particular, challenges encountered in the implementation of BATAT were addressed in CASP by ensuring that the actual implementation occurred in the provinces. Hence, although CASP funding is made to the national Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the funds are channelled to the various provinces. However, lessons from other agricultural support programmes implemented in South Africa do not seem to have been incorporated in the design of CASP and other programmes implemented in post-apartheid South Africa (Vink et al., 2013). For example, (Vink et al., 2013) argue that valuable lessons could have been drawn from the implementation of the Farmer Support Programme (FSP) of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) implemented in the 1980s.

The FSP was designed to provide support to farmers in the former homelands. The design of the FSP was based on the philosophy that people who lived in the former homelands faced many constraints and could not farm successfully without access to farmer support services.

The components of the FSP were as follows (Vink et al., 2013):

- Supply and funding of inputs and production assets;
- Mechanisation services;
- Marketing services;
- Extension services, demonstration and research;
- Training; and
- Policy formulation, including access to *de facto* production rights, and bulk infrastructure.

Although it cannot be claimed that the FSP was a successful programme, there are positive lessons that emerged from its implementation and they are as follows (Vink et al., 2013):

- Farmer support services should be comprehensive;
- Provision of farmer support services need to be coordinated; and
- Sequencing of provision of farmer support services should be focused on the needs of particular areas and groups of farmers.

2.4 Agricultural support programmes in other countries

This part of the literature review focuses on agricultural support programmes in other countries. The purpose is to understand the nature of these programmes, identify any similarities/differences to South Africa's agricultural support programmes (in particular, the CASP) and draw lessons for CASP with regards to its design and implementation. Five countries (Brazil, China, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania) and one region (Asia) were selected for the review. Apart from the fact these are some of the countries whose agricultural support programmes have been widely examined in the literature, we believe that their experiences are relevant for South Africa's agricultural support programmes and CASP, in particular.

2.4.1 Africa

Tanzania

Tanzania developed an Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) in 2004 and implemented the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) to operationalize the strategy. The objective of the ASDS was to "achieve a sustained agricultural growth rate of five percent per annum primarily through the transformation from subsistence to commercial agriculture" (The United Republic of Tanzania, undated). The transformation from subsistence to commercial agriculture was to be private sector driven, with the public creating an enabling environment for enhancing productivity and profitability of agriculture. The priorities of the ASDS were (a) to create a favourable environment for commercial agricultural activities; ((b) improve the delivery of agricultural support services with clearly defined roles for public and private sectors; (c) improve the functioning of input and output markets; and (d) strengthen the institutional framework governing the agricultural sector.
The ASDP had the following objectives:

a) To improve farmers' access to and use of agricultural knowledge, technologies, marketing systems and infrastructure; and
b) To promote private (sector) investment in agriculture by improving the regulatory and policy environment.

The above objectives were to be achieved through the following interventions aimed at:

a) Improving the capacity of farmers to articulate their demand for agricultural support services and to build partnerships with service providers;
b) Reforming and improving the capacity of public and private agricultural service providers to respond to the demand for services;
c) Improving the quantity and quality of public investment in physical infrastructure; and
d) Improving market institutions.

The key principles of the ASDP design were as follows:

- Increasing control of resources by beneficiaries;
- Pluralism in the provision of services;
- Results-based transfer of resources;
- Integration with government systems; and
- National in scope.

The ASDP had a 15-year horizon and was implemented in phases, with two components: local level support and national level support. Local level support had the following components: agricultural investments, agricultural services, and agricultural capacity building and reform. The components of the national level support were agricultural services, irrigation development, marketing and private sector development, food security, and co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation.

As regards institutional arrangements, the ASDP was organised under two levels: (a) local level, including district, ward and village levels, which are targeted by component 1 (local level support) of the programme; (b) regional level, involving regional secretaries; (c) zonal level, involving provision of agricultural support services, especially research and development, according to agro-ecological zones; and (d) national level, involving provision of policy guidance and coordination by and Inter-ministerial Co-ordinating Committee; national permanent secretaries and directors; fund steering committee; agricultural services team; secretariat; and local government capital development grant steering committee (The United Republic of Tanzania, undated).

Ghana

This section does not review a specific agricultural support programme in Ghana, but provides an overview of the performance of the agricultural sector and the support services which accounted for its remarkable performance.

Agricultural growth in Ghana has averaged more than five percent over the past 27 years and the country is ranked among the five top performers in the world (Overseas Development Institute, 2011). Growth in the agricultural sector has been accompanied by a significant reduction in poverty and a rise in food availability per capita. Ghana is self-sufficient in staple foods. Ghana's success is attributed to the restoration of incentives to agricultural production, partial liberalisation of the cocoa marketing system, introduction of improved varieties for cocoa and staple crops, improved access to credit, an increase in the number of village-based processing plants and an expansion in the land area under harvest (Breisinger et al., 2008; Overseas Development Institute, 2011).

Kenya

Agriculture is a key sector in the economy of Kenya and contributes 26% of the Gross Domestic Product. Despite the sector's importance, levels of agricultural productivity and production are low. The country has developed the Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme (ASDSP) to "transform Kenya's agricultural sector into an innovative, commercially oriented, competitive and modern industry that will contribute to poverty reduction, improved food security and equity in rural and urban Kenya" (Government of Kenya, 2011, p. xi).

The programme aims to achieve the development objective of increased and equitable incomes, employment, and improved food security by increasing production and productivity in the rural smallholder farm and off-farm sectors. The ASDP is aligned with Kenya's Agricultural Sector Development Strategy 2010-2020 (ASDS).

The ASDP places emphasis on improvements in the business environment through the value chain approach, climate change adaptation and mitigation, and improved sector-wide coordination. The programme has three components: (i) Sector-wide Coordination; (ii) Natural Resource Management; and (iii) Value Chain Development.

Sector-wide Coordination

This involves creating an inclusive institutional framework for implementing the programme. A secretariat manages the programme "in line with the ASDS framework of using a sector wide approach, and establishing joint management and implementation structures for the mutual benefit of all programmes in the sector" (Government of Kenya, 2011, p. xii). An important function of the secretariat is to create linkages and platforms for all stakeholders to participate and contribute to the development of the agricultural sector.

Natural Resource Management

This component provides an enabling environment for the value chain and also builds ecosystem resilience. Thus, value chain activities are not only supposed to do no harm to the environment but should also upgrade degraded ecosystems.

Value Chain Development

This component should promote commercialisation of the agricultural sector and involves (i) analyzing and upgrading value chains that can contribute to employment, ensure food security and nutrition, and increase incomes; (ii) promoting equitable market access by improving infrastructure and other trade-related interventions; (iii) improving access to financial services through a credit guarantee fund and other means; (iv) strengthening organization within the value chain; and (v) identifying and up-scaling promising, innovative and inclusive value chains and pilot them.

The ASDP will be implemented countrywide over a five-year period. It will focus on selected value chains and related groups and organisations. Funding of the programme is provided by the Government of Kenya, the Swedish Government and the private sector.

2.4.2 Asia

China

Growth in the value of total agricultural production in China has averaged about 13% since 2010. This increase is attributed mainly to an increase in the production of major agricultural commodities and food prices. China is the world's largest producer of rice, wheat, cotton and potatoes (FAO, 2013).

China's policies have shifted from taxing agriculture to supporting agriculture through direct subsidies to grain farmers. The commitment to strengthen support to agriculture is reaffirmed in the country's 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015).

In terms of the plan, more benefits are to be provided to farmers, the environment will be protected, agricultural modernisation will be promoted and living standards of farmers will be improved. Various policy instruments are used to support agriculture, including market price support measures and budgetary expenditures. Market price support measures include tariffs, state trading, minimum guaranteed prices for rice and wheat, etc. Budgetary transfers include direct payments per unit of land, input subsidies, agricultural insurance schemes and payments for returning farmland to forests.

<u>The Agricultural Support Services Project (ASSP)</u>

To address weaknesses in crop and livestock support services to farmers, China established a national Agricultural Support Services Project in the early 1990s. The project was aimed at strengthening the agricultural services provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and its provincial and lower level affiliates. The services improved by the project included agrotechnical extension, seed supply and livestock field services. The project was implemented in selected provinces of the country.

The focus of the project was on strengthening institutions that provide support services to farmers. The project was designed to increase the efficiency of the operation of the institutions and the effectiveness of their research, extension and other support programmes. The expected result was an increase in productivity and intensity of crop and livestock production.

The project consisted of seven major components as follows:

- Agriculture Management and Information. Involved restructuring of public extension services to improve their management capability and establish information, networking and evaluation systems.
- Agricultural Extension Services. Entailed reorganization of the Agrotechnical Centre (ATEC), strengthening its physical resources, improve human resources, strengthen ATEC's ability to tailor general recommendations to local needs though adaptive research and technology testing, and strengthen extension linkages with research institutes, agricultural universities and colleges, and farmers.
- Seed Supply Services. This focused on strengthening county-level seed companies to increase the quantity and quality of seed.
- Livestock Services. This involved strengthening of livestock field services, i.e. direct services to farmers, and investing in institutions engaged in livestock support activities (e.g. veterinary centres, vaccine units, etc.).
- National Animal and Plant Quarantine Services.
- Quality Control and Regulatory Services.

- Project Management.

The outcome of the evaluation of the project was that it succeeded to achieve the intended objectives. However, there were some challenges related to the scope and coverage of the project. The project had too many components and covered many provinces.

Region

This section is not a review of agricultural support programmes in Asia. Rather, it provides a summary of the conclusions reached at a workshop which reviewed agricultural support programmes in Asia.

The conclusions were as follows (Asian Productivity Organization, 2004):

- The group approach as a strategy to enhance the effectiveness of agricultural support services should be strengthened;
- Government's role in the provision of farmer support services should shift from that of being an implementer to that of a facilitator and enforcer of laws;
- More public-private sector partnerships should be promoted to deal with the problem of diminishing public resources for funding agricultural support services;
- The application of information technology to benefit smallholder farmers should be increased; and
- Networking and sharing of experience, especially about success stories, would be an effective way to disseminate innovation and new ideas regarding agricultural support services provision.

2.4.3 Latin America

Brazil

Brazil has been successful in increasing agricultural production and is a major source of food for countries such as China. Much of this success is attributable to growth in total factor productivity, which has averaged 4.3% per annum during 2001-2010. The growth in total factor productivity is largely due to large investments in agricultural research and technology, complemented by economic reforms and infrastructure improvements (Global Harvest Initiative, 2013).

Significant investments in agricultural research and application of innovation technology, administered by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embraba), over four decades have resulted in significant growth in total factor productivity. This, in turn, accounted for more than 76% of output growth since 1991.

Economic reforms were adopted, which entailed trade liberalisation, improved regulatory environment for business and technology and strengthening market signals. This also contributed to increased agricultural production in Brazil.

Brazil also brought about improvements in physical infrastructure and this lowered transportation costs, making it possible for agricultural products (e.g. soybean) to be transported at lower cost. This contributed to an increase in agricultural production, but balancing this with conservation of the natural resource base. According to the U.S. International Trade Commission (2012), low on-farm production costs are a major reason for Brazil to become a competitive exporter of soybean, grains, and meats.

Brazil has become a global leader in tropical agriculture mainly because of the strong partnership between public and private sectors and the comprehensive approach involving agricultural research, education and extension, investments in infrastructure and new laws, technology and practices to protect and restore fragile tropical soils.

Brazil, like South Africa, has a dualistic agricultural economy, with commercial and smallholder agriculture co-existing. The discrepancies between these two components of the agricultural sector are similar to those existing in South Africa. To narrow the gap between these two agricultures, Brazil has implemented policies that are oriented to the needs of family farms.

A new Ministry for Agricultural Development was established in 2000 to represent the interests of family farms at the highest political level. This ministry co-exists with the Ministry of Agriculture catering to the needs of large and highly competitive agribusinesses.

New approaches in agricultural policy in the early 2000s were geared toward promoting the agricultural sector, linking this to social and regional development. New programmes entailed facilitation of credit, reconstruction of the extension service, hedging against risk (crop insurance) and promoting the sale of smallholder agriculture products.

Crop insurance. A largely state subsidised crop insurance was introduced in 2002 that encompassed crops typically grown on family farms. The insurance covered risks related to droughts and floods. The targeted group are the poorest farmers in the country and they are required to pay only one percent of the insurance amount. This has stimulated agricultural production on the family farms.

Public purchasing. A public purchasing programme for agricultural products was introduced in 2002. The programme involves giving farmers a purchase guarantee for specific quantities of products at specific prices. To ensure that the programmes are accessible even to the smallest farm, farmers deliver the products even if the quantities are small. For example, farmers deliver their products directly to public social institutions (e.g. schools). The institutions process the products on-site and, this helped to eliminate the need to comply with the requirements of wholesalers (e.g. volumes, etc.). In some cases (e.g. milk), the state indirectly provides a purchasing guarantee for certain quantities – there is a state guaranteed contract between producers and buyers.

School meals. An existing national school meal programme was modified to ensure that 30% of the funds from the national education endowment are used to purchase food from family farms. Farmers participate in the programme via tenders issued by local authorities.

Price guarantee. A price guarantee was introduced, which reduced the monthly payment obligation of farmers to banks if the price of the product for which the loan was issued falls below a certain threshold. The state becomes responsible for the difference between the reduced payment and the interest owed.

In short, Brazil's agricultural policy has enabled disadvantaged family farms to participate in the market while safeguarding their subsistence. The programmes have boosted agricultural production and facilitated market access, both of which are essential for sustained improvement in the livelihoods of smallholder farmers. The target population was clearly defined to avoid abuses (by larger commercial farmers).

2.5 Lessons from agricultural support efforts of other countries

This section presents lessons drawn from the experiences of other countries in implementing agricultural support services.

- *The effectiveness of agricultural support services can be limited if attention is not given to improving the performance of other role players in the value chain.*

Successful commercialisation of the smallholder agricultural sector is not only dependent on adequate access to farmer support services but is also affected by the performance of input suppliers and buyers/processors of farm produce. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the entire value chain operates effectively if the effectiveness of farmer support services is to be enhanced.

- *Agricultural support programmes often emphasise increasing production and pay less attention to facilitating market access*

While increasing agricultural production is desirable, if smallholder farmers cannot market their products at low cost and receive good prices for their products, agricultural support services will not have the desired impact on incomes and living standards. Hence, facilitating market access for smallholder farmers is just as important as increasing their production.

- *A balance is needed between increasing agricultural production and conserving the natural resource base (environment).*

Some of the agricultural support programmes reviewed have emphasised conservation of the natural resource base as agricultural production increased resulting from improved access to agricultural support services.

- *Successful agricultural support programmes involved increased investment in research and technology and establishment of strong linkages between research and extension*

In nearly all the programmes reviewed, technology adoption has been the driving force in increasing agricultural productivity and production. This emphasises the need to invest in research and technology and ensuring that the link between research and extension is strong.

- *Provision of agricultural support services which lead to increased production without making provision for risk mitigation threatens the sustainability of production gains*

Implementing measures to reduce price risk and risk related to droughts and floods is an important element of successful provision of farmer support services. Although the state tends to be the main source of funds for crop insurance schemes, credit guarantee schemes, price guarantee schemes, etc., farmers are often required to make a small contribution and measures are taken by the state to avoid abuse by non-deserving farmers.

- *Implementation of agricultural support programmes and projects can be made successful by limiting their scope and coverage*

Programmes that have an ambitious scope and coverage tend to experience implementation challenges. Therefore, it is sometimes advisable to limit the scope in terms of the components of the programme and geographic coverage. Some of the countries included in this review have focused on specific commodities and agro-ecological zones rather than covering all commodities and regions in a particular country.

- *Although many agricultural support programmes often emphasise the involvement/participation of the private sector, this is often hardly achieved in practice*

In almost all the programmes reviewed, the role of the private sector in enhancing the provision of farmer support services is recognised. However, establishing good public-private sector collaboration in the provision of farmer support services has not been easy.

- *Agricultural support which involves subsidies seems to be gaining popularity and has resulted in significant increases in agricultural production in some countries*

Some countries (e.g. China and Brazil) have provided subsidies to smallholder farmers and this has contributed to significant increases in agricultural production.

- *Agricultural support services that lower on-farm production cost can enhance the global competitiveness of the agricultural sector*

Countries like Brazil have become major competitors in the international market by implementing agricultural support services that lowered on-farm cost of production.

- *Coordination of agricultural support services is crucial if they are to have the desired impact on productivity and production*

Effective coordination in the provision of agricultural support services is emphasised in nearly all the programmes reviewed. In many cases, such coordination is between agriculture and other sectors/departments, but coordination within the agricultural sector is more common.

- *Active participation and coordination of all spheres of government (local, provincial and national) in agricultural support programmes is important.*

Involvement of the different levels of government in the implementation of programmes and projects aimed at providing agricultural support is likely to result in better outcomes. Tanzania's ASDP is a good example in this regard.

2.6 Summary and conclusion

The purpose of this literature review was to provide a detailed review of agricultural support programmes in South Africa and elsewhere in order to understand their nature and to draw lessons for CASP. Although the programmes reviewed cannot be considered to be the same as CASP, they display many characteristics found in CASP. These relate to how the programmes were designed and the types of agricultural support services provided. The review shows that where countries have made a concerted effort to support their agricultural sector, the response of farmers, especially smallholder farmers, has been positive.

Both agricultural production and productivity have increased, leading to agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction in some instances. In almost all cases where remarkable progress was achieved in terms of higher agricultural growth, significant investments were made in research and technology and farmers adopted new varieties. Investments were also made in other areas, such as infrastructure, improving access to credit, reforming the public extension service, irrigation, and facilitating market access for smallholder farmers. In some countries, these investments were accompanied by changes in the business environment to make it attractive for the private sector to invest in agriculture and to form partnerships with government. Trade liberalisation also played a major part in some of the countries, resulting in increases in agricultural exports.

The review shows that countries that want to transform and commercialise their smallholder agricultural sector must be prepared to make large investments in key areas (e.g. research and technology, infrastructure, irrigation, credit, extension, etc.). Furthermore, the commitment to support the smallholder agricultural sector should be long term as benefits from investments are realised only after a long period. Although the review could not establish how the agricultural support programmes affected the livelihoods of smallholder farmers, the little information available suggests a positive relationship between agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction.

3 Case studies

Nine projects, one from each province, were selected for detailed analysis. The analysis was aimed at assessing the impact of CASP on the selected projects and an open-ended questionnaire designed specifically for the case studies was used to gather data. The case studies were selected to represent 'successful' and 'non-successful' projects and to represent the various farm enterprises covered in the evaluation. The interviewees were asked to indicate whether they considered their farms a success and why. In the process of gathering the data, the interviewees were also asked to share their challenges.

3.1 Mbatha Fruit and Vegetables (Gauteng)

Mbatha Fruit and Vegetables is a 2.5-hectare farm/plot located in Zuurbekom, in the western part of Gauteng Province. The farm started operating in 1991 and engaged in the production of maize and raising of goats. Prior to the acquisition of the farm, only horses were raised and no crop production took place. The farm continued to produce maize and to raise goats until 1998 when the farm started producing vegetables.

The farm was initially rented from the state and a monthly rental was payable. Currently, no rent is payable and the farmer was promised to be issued with a title deed. However, this has not yet happened, but there have been a few visits by government officials to the farm recently and indications are that the title deed will be issued before the end of the year. Initially, the farm employed one full-time person but now has two full-time employees. In the summer season, an additional six casual workers are employed.

Currently, the farm produces various types of vegetables, including tomatoes, green pepper, spinach, cauliflower, chili and onions. These are sold to hawkers and at the Johannesburg Fresh Produce Market. The farm does not have its own vehicles to transport the vegetables and has to hire transport. Transport costs are quite high and tend to increase by large amounts annually. This has a negative effect on the profitability of the business.

The market for the vegetables (i.e. the Johannesburg Fresh Produce Market) was identified by the local extension officer. The extension officer also organized study groups to equip emerging farmers with production and marketing skills regarding vegetables. The study groups also address other issues raised by the farmers themselves and are organized monthly.

The farm has ten 'tunnels' provided by government: three were provided by CASP in 2007, another three by 'Farmer Settlement' in 2009, and the remaining four by CASP in 2013. Some of the tunnels were damaged by hail in the last year and have not been repaired due to lack of money. According to the farmer, the tunnels are not insured as insurance companies are not keen to provide insurance to emerging farmers. Obtaining formal loans from institutions such as Land Bank is also a problem because the farmer does not own the farm (no title deed). The fact that CASP assistance is only for a single enterprise (vegetables) prevents the farm from diversifying to include enterprises such as poultry which would help to deal with risk and uncertainty. The farmer considers the farm a success and, in her opinion, the farm would have long collapsed without CASP assistance.

3.2 Cotina Farm (Western Cape)

Cotina Farm is located in Vyeboom in the Western Cape Province. The farm is 54 hectares in size, and was bought in 2000 at an auction after the previous owner experienced financial problems. Initially owned by two brothers, who financed the deal with a loan of R5.1 million, the farm is now being run by the one brother who is assisted by his son after the co-owner passed away. The main crops on the farm are apples (35 hectares) and pears (5 hectares). The remaining 14 hectares are being utilised for houses, packing shed, cold storage facility roads, and two dams. The farm is also engaged in the transport business. Currently, the farm is fully developed with no more planting space.

In terms of job creation, the farm employs 30 full-time workers for production and 50 seasonal workers for harvesting or picking. The pack house also keeps an average of 30 workers on a full-time basis, but does from time to time take up to 15 seasonal assistants who mainly provide extra labour on the transportation side.

Soon after the farm was acquired, the new owners had to embark on the re-planting of the orchards as the existing orchards were either too old or in a bad state for any meaningful production. As part of the total farm re-building, new tractors and implements were bought and a new irrigation system was installed. Workers' houses were upgraded and new controlled atmosphere rooms as well as a cold room were constructed. A new export packing machine has also been installed, although direct export marketing has not yet started pending certification of full compliance with export standards. A roof has also been put over the loading zone to facilitate operations during bad weather conditions and new bins also secured. A total of eight new big trucks (26 wheelers) have been bought to do long-distance transportation with four smaller trucks secured to handle farm-based transport requirements. A concrete slab has been put around the pack shed and the entrance joining the main road to the pack shed also tarred. A total of six forklifts were bought to handle the farm's loading and off-loading requirements, and surveillance cameras installed around the packing shed to monitor operational activities.

In order to keep the packing shed operating throughout the year, the farm buys fruit from other farms. The transport business is sub-contracted to Sasol to bring in their goods from Sasolburg when the trucks are on their way from making deliveries in Gauteng.

The farm received CASP assistance in 2013 in the form of packing shed upgrades, putting up of three cold rooms and bins. Financial support to purchase fertilizers, tractor, spray cart and trees was also received from CASP. The total CASP funding provided to the farm is estimated at R5 million. The assistance was beneficial to the farm as it needed to upgrade operations.

The assistance from CASP, apart from giving a much needed contribution to the on-going upgrading programme on the farm, also benefitted the workers as the improved production activities made it possible to keep them in their jobs throughout the year. The upgrading of the cooling facilities also made it possible to keep different varieties of apples as they have varying temperature requirements and shelve life.

The farm has achieved reasonably high levels of productivity with yields ranging from 40 to 80 tons per hectare and average production of 55 tons per hectare. The pack out percentage is 80%, 15% of apples are sold as second grade and 5% are sold to the juice factory.

The farmer considers the farm as being very successful and would like to secure additional farm land. Currently, the farm is said to be generating an annual income of about R4 million and a profit of about R1.6 million. The owner attributes the main success of the project to passion and personal involvement in the day-to-day management of the farm. He assists with the driving of the trucks and forklifts and keeps the workers informed and happy. The owner highly appreciates CASP's contribution and believes it took the farming operation to the next level by improving its cash flow position.

3.3 Saringwa Estate (Mpumalanga)

The Saringwa Estate is situated in the Bushbuckridge Local Municipality of the Ehlanzeni District, Mpumalanga Province. Farming activities started in 1982 when a group of 30 members organised themselves into a cooperative. The initial funding for the project was secured from the then Gazankulu Development Corporation (GDC). Each member was provided with a loan facility of about R95 000, which also served as a revolving credit facility. During the initial years before the orchards came into production, the farmers were provided with a living stipend or living allowance of R80 per month. These allowances were capitalised as part of the loan facility. As soon as the orchards started coming into production in 1985, the allowances were adjusted to between R500 to R1000 per month, depending on the level of production. In terms of the loan agreements, the allowances were to be off-set as part of the loan repayment. A cession over the crop was signed to secure the loan, with the farmer receiving his income from sales after the loan deductions.

Of the 30 members of the cooperative, 20 were farming with citrus whilst the other 10 were farming with mangoes. The farmers were all allocated a plot of 8 hectares each. In order to minimize expenses before the orchards came into production, the farmers had to personally provide own labour, and sometimes assisted by their spouses and other family members. During that period, the farmers did not own assets as all the machinery belonged to GDC.

After the collapse of the homeland system, GDC's agricultural division was absorbed into the Agricultural and Rural Development Corporation (ARDC) of the Limpopo Province before the incorporation of the area into the Mpumalanga Province. As the successor in title, the ARDC continued with the services to the farmers until its withdrawal. Since the ARDC withdrawal, the loan facilities have not been serviced and the farmers have not been informed of their financial status.

There are still 30 farming units on the estate, although two farmers have since left the cooperative to stand on their own. Of the original members, 10 have since passed away and their units are now being operated by family members.

CASP assistance is regarded as little and, in the chairperson's words, "CASP did not help us with anything, except two tractors in 2007, fencing material which was of poor quality, fertilizers, mango seedlings for 50 hectares, as well as citrus seedlings". The planting of citrus has since stopped at 20 hectares due to a shortage of diesel.

Despite the negative comments about CASP assistance, the farmers acknowledge that they benefitted from the material provided through CASP as well as the assets left behind by the ARDC. They concede that, in the absence of CASP intervention, the project would have collapsed. Although the intervention was beneficial, production is currently low and this is mainly attributed to lack of fertilizers, pest control and erratic irrigation because of high electricity bills. Low production levels are resulting in poor incomes of about R4000 per annum per farmer.

When the ARDC withdrew from the project, the farmers were left with six tractors and implements. However, as the farmers 'got hungry', due to the collapsing farming operations, they sold off two tractors. They shared the proceeds amongst themselves, with each farmer getting about R1200. The collapse of the operations is attributed mainly to the farmers' lack of marketing knowledge, a service initially rendered by the ARDC and its predecessor.

Since the breaking down of their tractors, the farmers are relying on tractors provided by the Buyela eMasimini programme. However, the hiring of these tractors is proving to be very expensive as the farmers pay up to R1050 per hectare.

The farmers regard the project as not being successful mainly due to lack of finance. CASP is associated with the failure of the project as the support provided is too little. Farmers believe that they can be successful if they are assisted with water pumping costs, labour costs and loan facilities to buy enough chemicals for spraying their orchards to ensure good quality crops.

3.4 Baphalane Ba Sesobe CPA (North West)

Four members from the Sesobe community approached government in 2000 to get compensation for their farming land taken over by a group of 29 people from another community. At the same time, another restitution land claim from the same community was in progress. In response, government made available some 4500 hectares in 2003 to deal with the two requests. This resulted in people from different communities being settled on the same farm, Tweekoppiesfontein, a situation which eventually resulted in friction. Only portions 1, 2 and 3 were transferred whilst portions 4 and 5 portion were left out. Eventually the four members who applied for the replacement or compensation of their farming land formed themselves into Baphalane Ba Sesobe CPA.

Baphalane Ba Sesobe CPA was promised R2 million, of which R0.5 million was to be used for fencing. The CPA was also promised tractors, renovation of the irrigation system livestock and additional land, but the promise was not fulfilled. Two of the original CPA members have since passed away, living only two members.

The northern sections of the transferred portions were leased out to a white farmer by a "traditional leader" without the consent or knowledge of the CPA members. Although the CPA did open a case against the white farmer, little has been achieved due to lack of money to cover legal fees and some legal technicalities.

The CPA received initial CASP assistance in 2005 with the provision of fencing, although the contractor did not complete the work. The construction of a reservoir and water distribution system was also not completed. The water supply system can handle a maximum of only 200 herds of cattle and this forces them to cull their livestock. A complete lack of a water reservoir would however have made it impossible for CPA members to keep livestock.

The situation on the farms is currently bad as there is no proper control due to frictions with everybody just introducing livestock at will. This results in overstocking and overgrazing. Everybody believes that they are entitled to do as they wish as this is communal property. The white farmer also drives around the farms at will to hunt animals.

The project is not considered a success as the only income generated from the lease rental is paid the royal family. CPA members can only get income through forced sale of livestock due to shortage of grazing. Livestock farmers are battling to keep good quality animals due to lack of control and inter-breeding.

However, the CPA believes that the project can be a success if the white farmer can be removed from their land and portions 4 and 5 of the farm, together with unit 134 KP transferred to them. The provision of funding and a solution to the community infighting would contribute greatly towards making the project a success.

3.5 Mariveni Farmers' Cooperative (Limpopo)

Mariveni Farmers' Cooperative is situated in Tzaneen Local Municipality of the Mopani District, Limpopo Province. The project is the initiative of 26 members who originate from Mariveni, Mothapo and N'wa-Makena villages. Nine of the 26 members are female. Conceptualized in 2001, after the withdrawal of ARDC, the cooperative was subsequently registered in 2002. A production loan of R24 000 was received from the Land Bank. A shortage of funds forced the cooperative to enter into a partnership with Du Roi Precision Farming in 2003. However, the contract was terminated in 2009 due to some misdeeds. The members were left to operate the farm on their own from 2010, with assistance from Lona Citrus Export in terms of finance and general farm management. Two of the original members have since left the cooperative whilst, of those remaining, only 15 are active in the cooperative.

Mariveni is a 100% black-owned cooperative on a 320-hectare farm, with 145 hectares allocated to citrus and 65 hectares to bananas. Whereas the citrus crop is mainly for export markets, the banana crop is sold to local and national markets in Gauteng Province. The project still wants to develop a further 24 hectares of bananas and 50 hectares of citrus, but the plans are still pending due to a shortage of funds. However, CASP has provided the project with some 28 000 citrus plantings to develop 8 hectares. The original idea of also farming with vegetables has not yet materialised.

A disaster occurrence in 2012 forced the project to sell the whole crop of 2013 to the juice factory. Crop yield dropped to 45 tons per hectare of citrus instead of the average of 80 tons per hectare. To spread the risk and to improve farm cash flow management, the project has planted four different citrus cultivars.

The project started receiving support from CASP in 2013, after the compilation of a disaster damage report which reflected a R9 million loss. The 2012 natural disaster negatively affected farm production levels as the citrus income decreased from about R12 million to R5 million whilst the banana income also decreased from R4 million to R2.5 million. The project received R3 million from CASP, of which R0.5 million was for electricity and R0.5 million for seedlings. Of the R2 million worth of fertilisers that the project was supposed to receive, only 700 bags were delivered and no explanation was given for the shortfall. Despite a dire need to spray the crops to improve crop quality, no chemicals have been delivered to the project so far. Despite these setbacks, the project has benefitted from the items already made available (e.g. fencing materials). The erection of the fence also benefitted at least 50 community members who were employed to assist. The fencing of the project also assisted in reducing the level of crop theft.

Without any assistance from CASP, the project would not be where it is today. The subsidisation of the electricity bill did not only improve the farm cash flow, but also enabled the proper irrigation of the orchards and resulted in higher crop yields. Due to improved cash flow, the project was able to buy some spraying chemicals, and this enabled the farm to

generate an income of R9 million in the previous season. The project is currently exporting fruit to the European Union, UK, Thailand, Korea and Japan.

The beneficiaries regard their project as a success despite the financial challenges they had to deal with after the withdrawal of the ARDC and the subsequent disaster in 2012. However, according to them, the success is attributed to the commitment of the members as well as a dedicated management team. They do not attribute the success to CASP intervention as this only started in 2013 in response to the 2012 natural disaster.

3.6 Ncube Wool Growers' Association (Eastern Cape)

Situated in Mhlontlo (Ntabankulu) Local Municipality of the O.R. Tambo District Municipality in the Eastern Cape, Ncumbe Wool Growers Association started in 1988 with a membership of 12 farmers. The membership has increased to 31 farmers.

The intention was to commercialise wool production without the involvement of the middleman. Before the formation of the association, the farmers used to sell their wool to a middleman who sold it to processors. The association was, therefore, regarded as a vehicle for the farmers to sell directly to the processors.

In 2006, the farmers applied for government assistance in a form of a shed to improve wool production. The shed was finally built in 2011 on the land the association acquired from the traditional authority. The shed and four shearing scissors were provided by government as a grant. However, the quality of the flooring was bad, resulting in the association lodging a complaint immediately after its completion by the service provider. Unfortunately, the complaint and poor workmanship were never attended to.

The members of the wool association have benefitted from the provision of the shed as they previously had to do wool shearing at their homes, which resulted in poor wool quality. Despite the fact that the assistance was a once-off event, wool production has improved. The project produces and sells about 10 bales of wool and members received incomes ranging from R1 900 to R8 000 in the last season.

Members of the association regard the project as successful as their incomes increased and are now able to better support their families. They attribute their success to the dedication of the members as well as the provision of the shed. They do however believe that further assistance with modern shearing technology would further improve the quality of their wool and result in higher incomes.

Overall, members of the association regard CASP's contribution to have had a positive impact on their wool farming activities and believe that their production levels and incomes would be lower were it not for the assistance.

3.7 Lofdal Ostrich (Northern Cape)

Lofdal Ostrich is an 18-hectare farm, situated in Waterdal in the Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality of the Northern Cape. The project is owned by a lady who purchased it in 2007 for R280 000 from the proceeds of the sale of her two houses.

At the time of the purchase, the farm had no infrastructure except a shed. However, significant improvements have been made since acquisition as the farmer has built houses and feeding structures for small birds. The capacity of the farm has also been increased to accommodate up to 1 200 birds. As at end July 2014, the age of the birds ranged from five to nine months.

The project benefitted from a CASP once-off support in 2011 when she was supplied with 600 birds, feed, medicines, overalls and boots, cleaning materials and three chicken houses. This assistance was supplied over a period of six months and was highly beneficial to the project.

Due to CASP intervention, the project has been able to increase the size of the labour force from one to four permanent staff. The farm also employs six temporary workers for two months in a year to assist with the plucking of feathers to sell to Klein Karoo International in Oudshoorn, Western Cape. The project currently has a stock of 754 birds valued at R2.2 million.

The farmer regards the project as a success and credits this to her dedication, the information provided by the provincial department of agriculture and the material support provided through CASP.

3.8 Gotswametseng Aquaculture (Free State)

Gotswametseng Aquaculture is situated in Letsemeng Local Municipality of the Xhariep District Municipality, Free State Province. A group of six potential aquaculture farmers started organising the project in 2006, with a company finally registered in 2008. In 2009, the group approached the provincial department of agriculture with the idea of catching fish in the Koffiefontein dam and this was not supported. The group also had another idea of farming with fish, using open earth dams. The idea was discouraged and they were advised to consider indoor aquaculture in ponds.

The building of infrastructure started in 2011 and was completed in 2012. The infrastructure consists of an office block, fish slaughtering and packaging facility, production plant with 13 fish tanks or ponds, fencing and solar panels for electricity supply to assist with the heating of fish ponds during cold seasons.

The first batch of 23 fish was supplied in October 2012, with the rest of the stock of 20 000 fingerlings delivered in March 2013. This quantity could however not be verified and the beneficiaries are highly sceptical of this claim. However, as at end July 2014, the beneficiaries' records reflected only 1 200 catfish. There were only 19 of the original stock of 23 fish, supplied in October 2013, at a weight of 650g. This, they claim, is a far cry from the original promise that the fish would be ready for sale in six months at a weight of 1kg. The project has apparently not sold any stock since it started, except for two fish sold at R40. The only income they receive is from a small vegetable garden of about 16 square metres to they established to raise money transport.

The project members are however not informed of the duration of the CASP support as everything is being done through a service provider (Econofish). The members regard Econofish as the biggest beneficiary as they provided everything, from building the structures, supplying of fish (fingerlings) and the feed. They do not see any benefit for themselves except for the structures.

The beneficiaries regard the project as a failure and blame the service provider. They believe the service provider supplied them with fish species not adapted to temperatures averaging 19 degrees Celsius and feed not meant for catfish. According to them, this has resulted in the project not making any profits as there are no sales. The provincial department of agriculture is also blamed for not monitoring the project's progress, resulting in some project members losing interest and no longer participating in project activities. The project manager, who is also a member, has since resigned to concentrate on other

business interests, but intends to stay on as an ordinary member in case the situation improves.

3.9 Ixopo Commonage Farm (KwaZulu-Natal)

Ixopo Commonage Farm is a 5.3-hectare farm, situated in Buhlebezwe Local Municipality of the Harry Gwala District Municipality, KwaZulu-Natal Province. As a commonage, the land on which the project is situated is owned by the municipality. This project started in 2000, with about ten members. The intention of the project was to produce vegetables to supply the local market, after having secured a contract to use the land from the municipality. After five years, with the group's effort to get the project operational to no avail, the municipality cancelled the contract with the initial project owners, paving the way for a new group of five members to start using the project on a small scale in 2007/8. The process of finalising the new group of farmers as the official users of the project was only finalised in 2012.

The farm is equipped with an irrigation system, which the new members are not able to use due to an outstanding electricity account of R14 000 accumulated by the previous users. The current members are not able to settle this account due to a lack of funds. There has not been any additional investment on the project since the new members of the project took over. They are worried that the irrigation system may be deteriorating due to non- use.

The beneficiaries do not regard CASP assistance as having been beneficial to their operations. This is because the assistance was only a once-off intervention in 2012 when they were provided with 2000 cabbage seedlings, which ended up dying due to irrigation problems. CASP is, therefore, regarded as not having benefited the project in any way as the members continue to struggle to fund everything on their own.

The project is currently able to supply Spar Supermarket with 2000 head of cabbages, 200 bunches of spinach to Boxer Supermarket, and 400kg of maize to the informal market. Due to the challenges that the project faces with regard to irrigation, the produce from the project is not able to meet the demand. Despite these challenges, the project is reported to generate an income of up to R7 000 during good seasons, and R1 000 to R3 000 during poor seasons.

The beneficiaries regard the project as a success as they are able to produce better than previous members who tried to operate the project and also sell their produce to Spar and Boxer supermarkets. This success is, however, attributed to their own dedication to the project and not any CASP intervention.

3.10 Emerging issues from the case studies

This section outlines issues emerging from the nine case studies. The issues are categorised into challenges experienced by the farmers and factors contributing to failure, and accomplishments and factors contributing to the success of the projects.

3.10.1 Challenges and factors contributing to failure

- **Poor quality inputs and infrastructure.** Farmers raised complaints about what they regard as poor quality inputs or infrastructure supplied by service providers. This means that the real beneficiaries are the service providers rather than the farmers.
- **Lack of monitoring**. Farmers have apportioned blame to the provincial departments of agriculture for not monitoring progress and activities of service providers on the farms. They stated that this has contributed significantly to the failure of service

providers to complete the installation of infrastructure and to ensure that it is of good quality.

- **Incorrect or insufficient support**. Farmers have asked for certain support but received something else or quantities supplied were insufficient. For example, farmers at Gotswametseng Aquaculture requested CASP support for equipment but ended up receiving on-farm infrastructure. They were also supplied with wrong fish species. Where correct inputs were provided, the quantities were sometimes lower than what they were promised by provincial departments (e.g. Mariveni Farmers' Cooperative received less fertiliser than promised). In some cases, provincial departments made promises to provide inputs but these were never provided. Some of the less successful projects attributed their failure to insufficient support and believe that more CASP support would greatly enhance the performance of their projects. However, some of the beneficiaries have unrealistic expectations as they expect CASP assistance to continue indefinitely.
- **Lack of marketing skills and knowledge.** Some of the projects have experienced problems due to the lack of marketing skills and knowledge. Consequently, they could not find markets for their products.
- **Uncoordinated support.** CASP support has been provided in an uncoordinated fashion and this has resulted in poor performance of the projects. For example, one of the projects was provided with cabbage seedlings which ended up dying due to lack irrigation water.
- **Lack of transparency.** Farmers complained about lack of transparency on the part of service providers regarding the service and infrastructure provided on the farms. They indicated that decisions were made regarding services and infrastructure provided without their involvement.
- **Restrictions on diversification.** Limitations imposed on farmers in terms of the number of enterprises funded by CASP limits their ability to diversify as a way of dealing with risk and increasing their incomes. The problem of not being able to manage risk is exacerbated by the inability of farmers to obtain insurance against natural disasters.
- **Lack of sustainability.** Some CASP-supported farmers hardly succeed to become independent despite many years of receiving support. Beneficiaries are often not made aware of the duration of CASP support and, therefore, continue to expect support indefinitely. As a result, they do not prepare for their projects to eventually become independent (of CASP support).
- **Conflicts on the projects.** There were instances where the success of CASP-supported projects was limited by factors beyond CASP (e.g. conflicts among beneficiaries and problems related to ownership of land). It has been demonstrated in other studies (e.g. Kirsten and Machethe, 2005) that projects with many beneficiaries often experience conflict and are more prone to failure. Land-related conflicts have negatively affected the performance of CASP-supported projects.
- **Lack of access to credit.** Access to loans from formal sources is a problem for some farmers and this is exacerbated by the lack of title to the land they occupy.

3.10.2 Accomplishments and success factors

- Some of the successful projects are employing more labour, making more money and even selling their products to big supermarkets and large factories. Some are also exporting their products.
- A number of project managers considered their projects successful. They attributed this to CASP support, dedication of the project owners to their projects and a good working environment for staff.
- It has emerged from the case studies that successful projects tend to be those where the owners have made a significant contribution over and above what was provided

through CASP. Furthermore, the level of dedication to the farms tends to be higher where the owner(s) have made a substantial investment.

- Successful projects tend to have a single or few owners. This supports the observation that projects with many owners tend to experience conflict, which contributes to their poor performance.
- Support received from provincial departments of agriculture in terms of marketing is a key success factor in some of the CASP-supported projects.
- Active involvement of owners in the running of their farms is one of the reasons for their success.

4 Findings of the evaluation

This section presents the findings of the impact evaluation study. The findings are organised according to the key evaluation questions.

4.1 Reaching the target population

Evaluation question: To what extent did the programme reach its appropriate target population?

An important aspect addressed in the impact evaluation involved determining the extent to which CASP reached its appropriate target population. The target population is described as the hungry and vulnerable, previously disadvantaged subsistence, emerging and commercial farmers, and entrepreneurs, with emphasis on women, youth and people with disabilities. The target population includes only those who are in agriculture, excluding aquaculture and forestry.

a) Youth involvement

Youth involvement in the projects included in the evaluation was assessed on two levels: project management (only project managers) and project ownership (all beneficiaries, including project managers).

Table 5 provides information on the age of the respondents (project managers) and the proportion of youth involved in management.

The age of project managers ranges from 22 to 85 years whilst their average age is about 52 years. This suggests an aging population of project managers. Indeed, only about 7% of the respondents fall within the youth category (i.e. age 35 and below).

Table 5: Age of respondents/project managers and proportion of youth

	Minimum (years)	Maximum (years)	Mean (years)	Share of managers who are youth (%)
Eastern Cape (n=65)	25	81	55.2	4.6
Free State (n=54)	29	73	51.7	3.7
Gauteng (n=85)	22	77	52.9	9.5
KwaZulu-Natal (n=79)	26	83	51.6	7.6
Limpopo (n=61)	25	81	54.1	9.8
Mpumalanga (n=12)	37	64	46.8	0.0
North West (n=29)	30	76	54.1	10.3
Northern Cape (n=20)	33	85	51.7	5.0
Western Cape (n=43)	23	85	53.5	7.0
Total (n=448)*	22	85	52.4	7.2

*Missing data=3

At provincial level, the proportion of project managers within the youth category ranges from 0% in Mpumalanga Province (i.e. there were no youth included in the sample) to 10.3% in North West Province. This suggests little variation in the proportion of project managers in the youth category among the provinces.

Table 6: Number and proportion of youth beneficiaries in project ownership

	Total number of beneficiaries	Number of youth beneficiaries	Share of owners who are youth (%)
Eastern Cape	1820	232	12.7
Free State	648	102	15.7
Gauteng	567	85	15
KwaZulu-Natal	1297	122	9.4
Limpopo	516	76	14.7
Mpumalanga	471	43	9.1
North West	296	69	23.3
Northern Cape	1640	144	8.8
Western Cape	4008	806	20.1
Total (n=451)	11263	1679	14.9

As regards the proportion of project beneficiaries/owners, Table 6 shows that about 15% of all beneficiaries fall within the youth category, which is almost double the proportion of the youth in project management. **This suggests that the youth are better represented in project ownership than in project management.** The proportion of youth beneficiaries ranges from 8.8% in Northern Cape Province to 23% in North West Province.

b) Female representation

Information on the number and proportion of females involved in project management and ownership is presented in Table 7.

Only 29% of the project managers are female. This means that project managers are predominantly male. At provincial level, the proportion of female respondents/project managers ranges from 8.3% in Mpumalanga to 42.5% in Gauteng.

Table 7: Number and percentage of females in project management and ownership

		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
Project management	n	11	16	37	15	21	1	12	7	11	131
	%	16.9	29.6	42.5	18.8	34.4	8.3	41.4	35	25.6	29
Project ownership	n	627	232	214	539	209	166	88	1027	1526	4703
	%	34.5	47.4	37.7	41.6	40.5	35.2	29.7	62.6	38.1	41.8

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

As regards female representation in project ownership, Table 7 indicates that the proportion of female beneficiaries is about 42%, on average, and ranges from 29.7% in North West Province to 63% in Northern Cape Province. This suggests that, on average, there are more male beneficiaries than female. Furthermore, there is a large variation in the proportion of female project owners among the provinces. **The above figures suggest that, whilst the majority of project owners are male, females are better represented in project ownership than in project management.**

c) Representation of people with disabilities

People with disabilities constitute about 3% of project owners (Figure 1). This is 4.5% lower than the average proportion of people with disabilities in South Africa of 7.5% (Statssa, 2011). Provincially, the proportion of people with disabilities in project ownership ranges from 0.1% in Northern Cape Province to 7.3% in Western Cape Province. **The above figures suggest that people with disabilities are not adequately represented in project ownership as their proportion is lower than the national average of people with disabilities.**



Figure 1: Proportion of people with disabilities in project ownership

d) Changes in composition of project ownership by gender, youth involvement and people with disabilities

Information on the number and proportion of youth, female and beneficiaries with disabilities before and after participation in CASP is presented in Table 9 (see Table A1).

The proportion of beneficiaries within the youth category before CASP participation was about 16% and this dropped slightly to about 15% after CASP participation. Before CASP participation, females constituted about 43% of the beneficiaries and the proportion was about 42% after CASP participation. As regards the proportion of beneficiaries with disabilities, they constituted about 3% before and after CASP participation.

The above suggest that the representation of youth, females and people with disabilities in project ownership has remained almost the same before and after participation in CASP.

Table 8: Number and percentage of project owners (beneficiaries) by gender, youth and disability before and after CASP participation

	Male Owners	Female Owners	Youth Owners	Disabled Owners	Total	% Male	%Female	%Youth	%Disabled
Before CASP	4983	5604	2098	404	13089	38.1	42.8	16.0	3.1
After CASP	4510	4703	1679	371	11263	40.0	41.8	14.9	3.3

e) Subsistence, emerging and commercial farmers

Table 9 provides information on the projects/farms included in the evaluation by type of land tenure. This is meant to provide an indication of the type of farmers assisted through CASP (i.e. whether CASP is reaching subsistence, emerging and commercial black farmers).

About 30% of all projects included in the evaluation are on traditional (permission to occupy) land. The rest of the farms are either privately owned (40%) or leased from the state (18.8%), leased from private owner (8.9%) or the land tenure status is unknown (0.2%).

Permission to occupy is the dominant form of tenure in Eastern Cape (60%), Limpopo (46%) and Free State (33%). This is linked to the historical past of having homelands where land was predominantly under traditional leadership in the above provinces. Leasing of state land was most predominant in Gauteng (33%), Free State (31%) and Northern Cape (25%).

Table 9: Number and percentage of projects by type of land ownership/tenure (n=451)

		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
Freehold/ Private ownership	n	17	16	46	37	18	8	14	10	15	181
	%	26.2	29.6	52.9	46.3	29.5	66.7	48.3	50	34.9	40.1
Permission to occupy	n	39	18	6	34	28	2	5	5	0	137
	%	60	33.3	6.9	42.5	45.9	16.7	17.2	25	0	30.4
Leased from the State	n	9	17	29	6	11	2	6	5	7	92
	%	13.8	31.5	33.3	7.5	18	16.7	20.6	25	16.3	18.8
Leased from private owner	n	0	3	6	2	4	0	4	0	21	40
	%	0	5.6	6.9	2.5	6.6	0	13.8	0	48.8	8.9
Do not know	n	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	%	0	0	0	1.3	0	0	0	0	0	0.2
Total	n	65	54	87	80	61	12	29	20	43	451
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

Based on information in Table 9, the proportions of subsistence and emerging/commercial farmers were estimated and outlined in Table 10.

On average, 30% of all the farmers included in the evaluation may be classified as subsistence farmers. The remaining 70% of the farmers may be categorised as emerging or commercial farmers. The proportion of subsistence farmers ranges from zero in Western Cape Province to 60% in Eastern Cape Province.

Therefore, it can be concluded from the above that most of the farmers (70%) covered in the evaluation are either emerging or commercial farmers. It is worth noting that this goes against the suggestion by some stakeholders who participated in the stakeholder consultation workshop that CASP assists mainly subsistence farmers. However, the suggestion is not supported by the information in official CASP documents as these documents do not specify the proportions of the various farmer categories to be supported by CASP.

Table 10: Number and percentage of subsistence, emerging/commercial farmers targeted by CASP (n=451)

Type of farmers		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
Subsistence farmers	n	39	18	6	34	28	2	5	5	0	137
	%	60	33.3	6.9	42.5	45.9	16.7	17.2	25	0	30.4
Emerging/Commercial farmers	n	26	36	81	46	33	10	24	15	43	314
	%	40	66.7	93.1	57.5	54.1	83.3	82.8	75	100	69.6
Total	n	65	54	87	80	61	12	29	20	43	451
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

4.2 CASP support and appropriateness

<u>Evaluation question:</u> To what extent do beneficiaries receive an appropriate package of CASP and other agricultural services?

This section addresses one the terms of reference regarding the appropriateness of support provided by CASP. The section starts with the presentation of the findings regarding the respondents' need for CASP support. This is followed by a discussion of the findings on the support actually provided by CASP. An indication of whether the support provided improved after CASP and the level of satisfaction among project managers is also presented.

a) Support requested by beneficiaries

To get an indication of the type of services required by beneficiaries, project managers were requested to provide reasons for asking for CASP support. The results are presented in Table 11. The reasons most frequently cited by project managers for requesting CASP support were to obtain funding (45%) and inputs (44%). Capacity building and acquisition of infrastructure were identified by about 18% and 19% of the respondents, respectively, as the main reasons for requesting CASP support. Gaining access to product markets was mentioned by only 2.7% of the respondents as the main reason for requiring CASP support. This is surprising as the majority of farmers included in the evaluation are categorised as emerging or commercial and the fact that market access is often cited by these farmers as one of their main constraints.

Capacity building among the farmers is not a high priority as indicated by the relatively low proportion (18%) of the respondents citing it as the reason for asking for CASP support (i.e. acquisition of skills = 5.8%, acquisition of knowledge = 7.6% and obtaining extension services = 4.4%).

Table 11: Number and proportion of farmers indicating why their project needed CASP support

Reason		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
Get funding	n	28	34	31	28	29	3	19	11	21	204
	%	43.1	63	36.1	35	47.5	25	65.5	55	48.8	45.3
Obtain inputs	n	22	20	30	54	26	6	12	7	22	199
	%	33.8	37.1	34.9	67.5	42.7	50	41.3	35	51.2	44.3
Acquire infrastructure	n	25	8	21	3	11	3	4	8	4	87
	%	38.5	14.9	24.4	3.8	18	25	13.7	40	9.3	19.3
Capacity building	n	7	3	20	20	14	5	10	0	1	80
	%	10.7	5.7	23.2	25.1	22.9	41.7	34.4	0	2.3	17.8
Expand project and diversify farming activities	n	1	6	27	0	10	0	4	0	1	49
	%	1.5	11.1	31.4	0	16.4	0	13.8	0	2.3	10.9
Access markets	n	0	1	2	1	5	1	2	0	0	12
	%	0	1.9	2.3	1.3	8.2	8.3	6.9	0	0	2.7
Other	n	3	2	3	10	3	1	1	0	4	27
	%	4.6	3.8	3.5	12.6	4.9	8.3	3.4	0	9.3	6.0
Total	n	65	54	86	80	61	12	29	20	43	450

Missing data = 1
EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

The respondents were also requested to specify the nature of support requested according to their business plan and the responses are outlined in Table 12. This was meant to *inter alia* establish whether there was congruence between what the respondents mentioned as the main reasons for requesting CASP support in Table 11 and support requested in the business plans.

On-farm infrastructure was identified as the most important area of CASP support (81%), followed by production inputs (45%), financial support (17%) and mechanisation (17%). Only 13% of the respondents indicated that training and capacity building was included in their business plans as an area in which they needed CASP support. Marketing support was mentioned by 11% of the respondents as the most important area of CASP support included in their business plans.

Table 12: Number and proportion of farmers indicating the nature of support they requested per business plan

Type of support		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
On-farm infrastructure	n	17	24	30	15	37	7	18	7	9	164
	%	100	82.8	88.2	46.9	84.1	77.8	90	100	81.8	80.8
Production inputs	n	5	18	11	21	20	1	13	1	1	91
	%	29.4	62.1	32.4	65.6	45.5	11.1	65	14.3	9.1	44.8
Financial support	n	0	3	6	9	7	4	5	0	1	35
	%	0	10.3	17.6	28.1	15.9	44.4	25	0	9.1	17.2
Mechanisation	n	0	5	2	8	11	2	5	1	0	34
	%	0	17.2	5.9	25	25	22.2	25	14.3	0	16.7
Business development	n	0	3	7	10	3	3	1	2	1	30
	%	0	10.3	20.6	31.3	6.8	33.3	5	28.6	9.1	14.8
Training and capacity building	n	0	3	4	6	5	3	3	2	0	26
	%	0	10.3	11.8	18.8	11.4	33.3	15	28.6	0	12.8
Marketing support	n	1	2	2	2	9	1	2	2	1	22
	%	5.9	6.9	5.9	6.3	20.5	11.1	10	28.6	9.1	10.8
Off-farm infrastructure	n	0	1	2	3	2	1	0	3	0	12
	%	0	3.4	5.9	9.4	4.5	11.1	0	42.9	0	5.9
Don't know	n	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	5
	%	0	0	0	15.6	0	0	0	0	0	2.5
Total	n	17	44	20	29	9	34	32	7	11	203

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

The proportion of project managers mentioning on-farm infrastructure as the main reason for requiring CASP support, according to their business plans was 81%. This ranged from 47% in KwaZulu-Natal to 100% in both the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape.

In the case of production inputs, the proportion of project managers citing it as the main reason for requiring CASP support in their business plans was 45% and ranged from 9% in Western Cape to 66% in KwaZulu-Natal.

As regards mechanisation, the proportions of project managers indicating it as the reason for CASP support in their business plans was 17% and ranged from zero in both the Eastern Cape and Western Cape to 25% in Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal and North West.

Financial support was mentioned by 17% of the project managers as the reason for requiring CASP support in their business plans. The proportions ranged from zero in both the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape to 44% in Mpumalanga.

Whilst financial support was identified as the main reason for asking for CASP assistance by the respondents, it was the third most important reason according to the business plans. Acquisition of infrastructure was the third most important reason for requesting CASP support according to the respondents but the most important reason as per business plans.

Obtaining production inputs was identified as the second most important reason for asking for CASP support by the respondents and in their business plans. Marketing support and capacity building were not high on the list of reasons for asking for support in both the business plans and responses of project managers interviewed.

Therefore, it may be concluded that acquisition of infrastructure (particularly, on-farm infrastructure), obtaining production inputs and financial support are the most important reasons for asking for CASP support. Capacity building and marketing support are not a high priority for most beneficiaries.

b) Support provided to beneficiaries and its appropriateness

Agricultural information

Through one of its pillars, CASP seeks to improve the beneficiaries' level of information and knowledge management. Table 13 provides information on access to agricultural information before and after CASP. Overall, access to agricultural information improved after CASP. About 70% of the respondents indicated that they had access to agricultural information before CASP whilst the proportion after CASP was 81%. The increase in the proportion of respondents indicating that they received agricultural information after CASP ranged from 10% in Northern Cape to 25% in Mpumalanga.

Table 13: Percentage of farmers with access to agricultural information and those indicating the usefulness and sufficiency of information received since CASP participation

		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
Received agricultural information	Before CASP	63.1	75.9	75.9	50	85.2	66.7	79.3	70	67.4	69.6
	After CASP	75.4	88.9	87.4	67.5	85.2	91.7	75.9	80	88.4	81.2
Found information useful		83.7	85.4	90.8	90.7	82.7	81.8	100	87.5	97.4	88.8
Found information sufficient		61.2	60.4	56.6	53.7	55.8	45.5	54.5	37.5	76.3	57.9

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

There was no improvement in access to agricultural information after CASP in Limpopo as the before and after CASP participation proportions were the same. In North West Province, access to agricultural information decreased slightly as the proportion of farmers with access to agricultural information decreased from 79% before CASP participation to 76% after CASP.

Agricultural information was found useful for farming operations by most respondents (89%). The proportion of respondents who found agricultural information useful ranged from 82% in Mpumalanga to 100% in North West. Despite the usefulness of agricultural information received by beneficiaries, such information was considered sufficient by only 58% of the respondents (Table 13).

As regards the type of information received after CASP, the majority of the respondents (89%) indicated that they received production-related information. This was followed by marketing information which was mentioned by 56% of the respondents (Table 14). The next most important types of information mentioned by the respondents were extension (48%), finance (37%) and mechanisation (25%) related.

Table 14: Number and proportion of farmers indicating the type of information received since participation in CASP

Type of information		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
Production	n	48	39	73	42	46	5	19	15	35	322
	%	100	81.3	97.3	80.8	85.2	50.0	86.4	93.8	92.1	88.7
Marketing	n	23	32	53	29	17	5	9	11	24	203
	%	47.9	66.7	70.7	55.8	31.5	50.0	40.9	68.8	63.2	55.9
Extension	n	17	25	36	24	19	5	15	7	26	174
	%	35.4	52.1	48.0	46.2	35.2	50.0	68.2	43.8	68.4	47.9
Mechanisation	n	6	13	16	14	13	2	9	6	11	90
	%	12.5	27.1	21.3	26.9	24.1	20.0	40.9	37.5	28.9	24.8
Finance	n	13	18	29	15	16	3	9	6	24	133
	%	27.1	37.5	38.7	28.8	29.6	30.0	40.9	37.5	63.2	36.6
Book keeping	n	0	3	2	1	0	2	1	0	1	10
	%	0.0	6.3	2.7	1.9	0.0	20.0	4.5	0.0	2.6	2.8
Other	n	0	2	3	0	1	1	0	0	0	7
	%	0.0	4.2	4	0.0	1.9	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
Total	n	48	48	75	52	54	10	22	16	38	363
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

In terms of the level of satisfaction with agricultural information received, more than 77% of the respondents indicated that their satisfaction level was medium (3) to high (5) on a scale of low to high (1-5) (Table 15). Although the majority of respondents indicated that their level of satisfaction was medium to high, it is important to note that in some provinces (Limpopo and Mpumalanga) 36% and 50% of the respondents, respectively, indicated that their level of satisfaction was low (1-2).

Table 15: Number and proportion of farmers indicating their level of satisfaction with information received

Satisfaction level		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
Low	n	8	10	11	13	14	3	5	3	3	70
	%	17	24.4	18.7	24.1	35.9	50	23.8	23.1	9.4	22.5
Medium	n	26	19	31	30	18	3	11	5	18	161
	%	55.3	46.3	52.5	55.5	46.1	50	52.4	38.5	56.3	51.6
High	n	13	12	17	11	7	0	5	5	11	81
	%	27.7	29.3	28.8	20.4	17.9	0	23.8	38.5	34.4	26
Total	n	47	41	59	54	39	6	21	13	32	312
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

It can be concluded from the above that access to agricultural information improved after CASP and most respondents have found the information useful. Furthermore, most of the information provided was production-related and less emphasis was given to the provision of market-related information. A large proportion (77%) of the respondents indicated that their level of satisfaction with the information received was medium to high. However, only 58% of the respondents indicated that the information provided was sufficient, indicating a large unmet need for further information.

Extension and advisory services

An important aspect of CASP involves capacity building through the provision of extension services and training on various aspects of farming. This section provides an assessment of what has been done to capacitate farmers through extension advice.

CASP seeks to empower beneficiaries through the provision of technical and advisory services. To assess CASP's performance and contribution towards this goal, project managers were asked to indicate whether they received extension services before and after CASP, and their responses are presented in Table 16. Although the responses varied from province to province, overall, the proportion of respondents receiving extension advice was higher after CASP. About 67% of the farmers received extension advice before CASP and the proportion was 84% after CASP.

The proportions of respondents receiving extension advice in all the provinces were higher after CASP. These proportions exceeded those before CASP by between 3% in Limpopo and 30% in Western Cape. **These figures suggest that more farmers/projects received extension advice after CASP, although there were variations among the provinces.**

Table 16: Number and proportion of farmers receiving extension advice before and after CASP

		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
Before CASP	n	37	36	73	45	50	4	23	11	25	304
	%	56.9	67.9	83.9	56.3	82	33.3	79.3	55	58.1	67.4
After CASP	n	54	50	78	59	52	7	25	17	38	380
	%	83.1	92.6	89.7	73.8	85.2	58.3	86.2	85	88.4	84.3

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

Training

Table 17 provides information on training received by farmers before and after CASP. Overall, a higher proportion of farmers received training after CASP than before. About 60% of the project managers indicated that they received training before CASP compared to 77% after CASP. The increase in the proportion of project managers receiving training after CASP varied from 3% in Limpopo to 40% in Free State.

Table 17: Number and proportion of farmers receiving training before and after CASP participation

		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
Before CASP	n	28	30	64	45	41	5	22	10	24	269
	%	43.1	43.3	73.6	56.3	67.2	41.7	75.9	50.0	55.8	59.8
After CASP	n	46	45	71	64	43	4	24	17	35	349
	%	70.8	83.3	81.6	80.0	70.5	33.3	82.8	85.0	81.4	77.4

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

It can be concluded from the above that, despite variations among provinces, training provided to farmers increased after CASP

Agricultural inputs

Through the on-farm and off-farm infrastructure pillar, CASP seeks to provide production inputs to beneficiaries. The availability of inputs to beneficiaries has a major effect on agricultural production. Therefore, it is worth looking at the impact of CASP on the availability of agricultural inputs prior to considering the impact of the programme on agricultural production.

Table 18 provides information on the number and proportion of beneficiaries who received assistance from CASP in the form of inputs. On average, about 61% of the respondents indicated that they received input assistance from CASP.

Table 18: Number and proportion of farmers who received input assistance from CASP

		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
Request for input support (n=277)	n	28	29	34	37	19	2	12	11	33	205
	%	93.3	80.6	52.3	68.5	70.4	50.0	80.0	91.7	97.1	74.0
Receipt of input support (N=451)	n	30	36	65	54	27	4	15	12	34	277
	%	46.2	66.7	74.7	67.5	44.3	33.3	51.7	60.0	79.1	61.4
Necessity of inputs (n=277)	n	29	32	58	53	24	2	14	12	34	258
	%	96.7	88.9	89.2	98.1	88.9	50.0	93.3	100.0	100.0	93.1
Sufficiency of inputs (n=277)	n	22	16	42	29	9	1	7	7	26	159
	%	73.3	44.4	64.6	53.7	33.3	25.0	46.7	58.3	76.5	57.4
Satisfaction with input quality (n=277)	n	24	31	49	47	20	2	13	12	31	229
	%	80.0	86.1	75.4	87.0	74.1	50.0	86.7	100.0	91.2	82.7
Timely availability of inputs(n=277)	n	24	23	39	33	16	2	8	12	29	186
	%	80.0	63.9	60.0	61.1	59.3	50.0	53.3	100.0	85.3	67.1

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

Of those CASP beneficiaries who received production inputs, about 74% of them indicated that such inputs were asked for. Although 26% of the respondents indicated that they never asked for the inputs received, about 93% of them found the inputs necessary for their farming operations.

In terms of **sufficiency** of the inputs received, about 57% of the respondents indicated that the inputs were sufficient.

The respondents were asked to indicate whether the **quality** of inputs received was satisfactory. About 83% of the respondents were satisfied with the quality of inputs received.

As regards **timeliness** of input availability, about 67% of the respondents received the inputs on time. This means that, for 33% of the respondents, inputs arrived late. The late arrival of inputs has a negative impact on farming operations, particularly for grain farmers.

To get an indication of whether the availability of specific production inputs improved after CASP, the respondents were requested to provide an assessment of their availability before and after CASP. The results are presented in Figure 2 (see Tables A2).



Figure 2: Proportion of farmers who considered input availability as good (n=277)

Overall, 3% of the respondents indicated that **fertiliser** availability was good prior to CASP and the proportion increased to 12% after CASP. The respondents were also asked to express their views on the availability of **seed** before and after participation in CASP. About 3% of the respondents indicated that seed availability was good prior to CASP whilst the proportion of respondents indicating that seed availability after CASP was good was about 13%. As regards **labour** availability before and after participation in CASP, the proportions of respondents indicating that it was good are 12% and 18%, respectively. The respondents were asked to indicate how they considered **water** availability before and after CASP. About 11% of the respondents mentioned that water availability before CASP was good and the figure increased to 17% after CASP. As regards availability of **electricity**, the proportion of beneficiaries indicating that its availability was good before CASP was about 9% and increased to about 12% after CASP. In terms of availability of **mechanisation**, the proportions of beneficiaries mentioning that mechanisation availability was good before and after CASP were 3% and 6%, respectively. As regards availability of **animal feed,** 0.2% of the respondents mentioned that animal feed availability was good before CASP and this proportion increased to 3% after CASP.

Overall, the availability of the various inputs increased after CASP. However, the difference between the proportion of respondents indicating input availability before and after CASP is small. This suggests a slight improvement in the availability of the various inputs after CASP, although timeliness of their delivery and sufficiency are

still a problem. It is worth noting that some of the respondents (26%) receiving inputs never asked for them, although they found them useful for their farming operations.

Market access facilitation

When asked if CASP facilitated access to markets for their products, the project managers responded as in Figure 3 (see Table A3). Only 13% of the respondents indicated that CASP facilitated their access to output markets. The proportions ranged from 5% in KwaZulu-Natal to 25% in Northern Cape.



Figure 3: Proportion of farmers who indicated that CASP facilitated market access (n=451)

Facilitation of access to output markets can take many forms. Figure 4 outlines the views of farmers on whether CASP did facilitate their access to markets through the various initiatives (e.g. transport, market identification, farmer linkages to markets, exposure to export various types of markets, maintenance of access roads and integration into value chains).



Figure 4: Proportion of farmers indicating how CASP facilitated market access (n=59)

Of the respondents who indicated that CASP facilitated their access to markets, 75% indicated that the facilitation was in terms of market identification while 59% mentioned it was through linkage to markets.

Figure 4 shows that only 5% of the farmers exporting their products were linked to these markets by CASP. These farmers were in Northern Cape and Free State. There were no farmers linked to export markets by CASP in the other provinces. In terms of market facilitation through maintenance of access roads, only 8% of the respondents mentioned that they were assisted by CASP. These farmers were in Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. Although CASP seeks, amongst other things, to integrate beneficiaries into value chains, only 7% of the respondents indicated that they were assisted in this regard. As regards CASP facilitation in the protection of local markets (e.g. anti-dumping), only 12% of the beneficiaries attributed the protection of their local markets to CASP facilitation.

The above indicates that CASP has not achieved much success in terms of facilitating access to output markets as only 13% of the respondents indicated that the programme assisted them to access markets. This is a serious shortcoming of the programme, especially when it is considered that the literature review in this study emphasises the importance of market access for the success of agricultural support programmes.

Infrastructure

Information on **on-farm production infrastructure** before and after CASP is presented in Figure 5 (see Table A4). The proportion of respondents having on-farm production infrastructure was higher after CASP than before for the following infrastructure categories: chicken houses, piggery structures, hydroponic tunnels and shade nets. The largest increase in the proportion of respondents with on-farm production infrastructure after CASP was for chicken houses, rising from 8% before to 21% after CASP.



Figure 5: Proportion of projects with on-farm production infrastructure before and after CASP



Figure 6: Proportion of CASP-funded on-farm production infrastructure

In addition to determining whether there was a change in the existence of on-farm production infrastructure after CASP, the respondents were requested to indicate which infrastructure was funded through CASP. The responses are presented in Figure 6. It is clear from Figure 6 that CASP has made a significant contribution to on-farm infrastructure on the farms included in the evaluation. Between 76% and 92% of the projects with the following infrastructure after CASP participation indicated that the infrastructure was provided through CASP: sheds and storage places, pack houses, dairy and piggery infrastructure, hydroponic tunnels, chicken houses, fencing, and shade netting.

The provision of **social infrastructure** on the farms contributes directly to the livelihoods of the beneficiaries as well as the workers on the farm. An assessment of the availability of such infrastructure on CASP-assisted farms before and after CASP is presented in Table 19.

Table 19: Number and percentage of farmers with social infrastructure on their projects before and after CASP

		Sanitation	Electricity	Domestic water
Before CASP	n	288	263	276
	%	63.9	58.3	61.2
After CASP	n	340	340	340
	%	75.4	75.4	75.4

About 75% of the respondents mentioned that they had **sanitation**-related infrastructure on their farms compared to 64% before CASP. In the case of **electricity** infrastructure, 58% of the respondents had electricity before CASP and the proportion increased to 75% after CASP. The proportion of projects with **domestic water** before CASP was 61% compared to 75% after CASP.

The above figures suggest an improvement in the availability of both on-farm and social infrastructure after CASP. In the case of on-farm infrastructure, the largest improvement was recorded for chicken houses whilst electricity infrastructure showed the largest increase for social infrastructure. Therefore, provision of

infrastructure is one of the areas in which CASP has made a significant impact. However, there are many complaints related to the process of appointment of service providers and the quality of the infrastructure provided. This was also one of the findings of the 2007 review of CASP (Department of Agriculture, 2007). Improved access to infrastructure also arises from the fact that CASP initially focused on provision of infrastructure.

4.3 Development of farmers' sense of self-reliance

Evaluation question: To what extent do CASP services develop farmers' sense of self-reliance (not dependent on government grants) and capacity for on-going management and resilience?

Capacity building for farmers is one of the prerequisites for good farm management and development of self-reliance. It is against this background that training and capacity building has been adopted as one of the pillars of CASP. Capacity building for farmers on CASP projects occurs largely through skills transfer. Extension services and training are important vehicles for transferring skills to farmer. Skills and knowledge transferred through extension services and training are supposed to help farmers farm and manage their farms better. This should eventually enable them to be self-reliant and manage risks related to farming.

To determine whether CASP has contributed to knowledge and skills transfer to beneficiaries, the project managers were asked to indicate whether they benefitted from any skills and knowledge transfer provided through CASP. Figure 7 presents the responses (see Table A5).

About 64% of the respondents indicated that they benefitted from skills and knowledge activities provided through CASP. The proportion of farmers benefitting from skills and knowledge transfer in the various provinces ranges from 49% in Limpopo to 81% in Western Cape. The Public Service Commission evaluation of CASP also found that 72% of the beneficiaries in the four provinces covered in the evaluation received training (Public Service Commission, 2011).

Skills transfer needs to occur among both project managers (beneficiaries) and employees for the project to be successful. Therefore, the respondents were also requested to indicate whether both project managers and employees on the projects benefitted from skills transfer in specific areas of farming and farm management. The results are outlined in Figures 8 and 9 (see Table A5).



Figure 7: Proportion of projects that benefitted from CASP's skills and knowledge transfer activities (n=451)



Figure 8: Proportion of beneficiaries who received skills through CASP by type of skill (n=285)



Figure 9: Proportion of employees who received skills through CASP by type of skill (n=285)

In the area of **farm planning**, about 73% of the respondents indicated that they received skills whilst 32% of them mentioned that the skills were also transferred to employees on their projects. In most of the provinces, the proportion of the respondents benefiting from skills transfer in the area of farm planning was 70% or more.

About 62% of the respondents benefitted from skills transfer through CASP in the area of **project finance management**. Nineteen per cent of the respondents also mentioned that employees on their farms benefitted from skills transfer in this area.

Whilst it is important to ensure that farmers have the necessary equipment to undertake farming activities, it is also essential that they and their employees are properly **skilled to operate the equipment**. To determine whether such skills were imparted as part of CASP, respondents were requested to indicate whether they and their employees benefitted from skills transfer in respect of operating of equipment from CASP.

About 61% of the farmers mentioned that they benefitted from **skills transfer to operate farm** equipment. The proportion of farmers indicating that such skills were also imparted to employees was only 38%. The proportion of farmers mentioning that employees also benefitted from skills transfer to operate farm equipment ranged from 17% in Mpumalanga to 66% in Western Cape. The results with regard to skills transfer to maintain farm equipment are similar to those for skills transfer to operate equipment.

Regarding skills transfer in respect of **fertiliser and herbicide application** for both the farmers and their employees, 59% and 36% of the respondents indicated they and their employees benefitted, respectively.

Proper **skills to select cultivars** are essential for farmers engaged in crop husbandry and horticulture. To establish whether such skills were provided as part of CASP, respondents were asked to indicate whether they and their employees benefitted from such skills transfer.

About 43% of the respondents indicated that they benefitted whilst only 18% of them mentioned that their employees also benefitted from such skills transfer.

Farmers engaged in animal husbandry require **skills to control animal diseases** to succeed. About 48% of the respondents indicated that they benefitted from skills transfer to control animal diseases whilst the proportion of farmers mentioning that their employees also benefitted was 24%. Neither farmers nor their employees benefitted from skills transfer to control animal diseases in Mpumalanga.

As commercialising smallholder agriculture is an important objective of CASP, it is essential to ensure that farmers are equipped with **skills and knowledge to market their products**. About 51% of the farmers indicated that they did benefit from skills transfer to market their products whilst only 15% of them mentioned that their employees also benefitted in this regard.

The responses of farmers to the issue of whether they and their employees were equipped with marketing skills related to livestock indicate that only 39% of the farmers benefitted from such skills transfer whilst only 13% of them indicated that their employees also benefitted.

In terms of overall **project/farm management skills**, about 67% of the respondents indicated that they acquired such skills as part of CASP and 19% mentioned that their employees also benefitted from such skills. The proportion of farmers indicating that they benefitted from these skills ranged from 43% in Limpopo to 94% Western Cape.

In the area of **bookkeeping**, about 64% of the respondents indicated that skills were transferred to them as part of CASP. About 20% of all respondents indicated that their employees also benefitted from bookkeeping skills.

Conflict resolution is an important aspect of project/farm management. To determine whether this aspect is accorded high priority within CASP, farmers were requested to indicate whether they and their employees benefitted from skills transfer related to internal conflict resolution. Overall, 62% of the respondents mentioned that they benefitted whilst the proportion for employees also benefiting was 27%.

CASP has imparted technical and farm management skills and knowledge to project managers and employees on the projects. The skills and knowledge are diverse and vary according to province. Based on the above figures, it is clear that project managers have benefitted more from skills and knowledge transfer than employees. On average, 64% of the project managers have benefitted from skills and knowledge transfer whilst employees on only 25% of the projects also benefitted.

It can be concluded that CASP has made a positive contribution to capacity building for on-going management and self-reliance through skills and knowledge transfer, however, there are some areas in which capacity building has been insufficient, such as cultivar selection, livestock marketing, livestock disease control and produce marketing. Case studies reviewed in this evaluation also suggest that capacity building has not been adequate as some of the projects are still dependent on support from CASP despite many years of being assisted.

4.4 Impact on agricultural production

Evaluation question: What impacts has CASP had on agricultural production and production efficiency?

This section focuses on the impacts of CASP on agricultural production. The impact of CASP on production efficiency could not be assessed due to insufficient data. The impact of CASP on agricultural production is assessed in terms of area cultivated and quantity of crops and livestock before and after CASP.

a) Crop production

Figure 10 provides information on area cultivated before and after CASP for farmers who indicated having cultivated a crop and were able to provide the requested information. Some of the farmers who cultivated crops did not know the land area cultivated and, therefore, were excluded from the analysis.

The average area cultivated before CASP in all nine provinces was about eight hectares and this increased to 14 hectares after CASP. Before CASP, the average area cultivated ranged from 0.1 hectare in Gauteng to 16.7 hectares in Mpumalanga. After CASP, the average area cultivated was between 3.4 hectares in Limpopo and 28 hectares in Free State. These figures suggest that the average area cultivated increased after CASP.



Figure 10: Mean area cultivated before and after CASP (hectares)

Table 20 provides information on the average area cultivated according to crop in the various provinces before and after CASP. The average area cultivated before and after CASP for most crops was generally small and did not change much after CASP. The only crops with a relatively large average area cultivated before and after CASP were maize in the Free State (12.3 ha before and 18.7 ha after CASP), sugar cane in KwaZulu-Natal (13 ha and 13.5 ha before and after CASP) and vegetables in Mpumalanga (16.7 ha before and after CASP).

Table 20: Mean area cultivated by crop grown before and after CASP (hectares)

Province		Maize	Sorghum	Soybean	Avocados	Sugar cane	Apples	Citrus	Banana	Macadamia	Beans	Vegetables	Sunflower	Lucerne	Wheat
EC	Before CASP	2.9	0.5	0.5	-	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	-	1.1	-	0.9	-
	After CASP	7.1	0.3	0.0	-	-	0.9	0.2	-	0.8	-	2.9	-	1.7	-
FS	Before CASP	12.3	-	1.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.9	0.2	-	0.6	0.0
	After CASP	18.7	-	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.1	0.5	-	1.1	1.1
GP	Before CASP	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.1	0.0	-	-
	After CASP	1.4	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	0.3	1.0	-	-
KZN	Before CASP	1.4	-	0.6	-	13.0	-	0.2	0.4	-	-	0.2	-	-	-
	After CASP	1.1	-	0.6	-	13.5	-	0.3	0.4	-	-	0.8	-	-	-
LP	Before CASP	0.0	-	-	0.0	-	-	-	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.1	-	-	-
	After CASP	1.5	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	0.2	0.7	0.1	0.4	-	-	-
MP	Before CASP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.7	-	-	-
	After CASP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.7	-	-	-
NC	Before CASP	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	-	-	0.3	0.0	-	-	0.0	2.3	-
	After CASP	0.9	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	-	-	0.0	0.2	-	-	0.3	1.5	-
NW	Before CASP	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.0	-	-
	After CASP	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	2.4	-	-
WC	Before CASP	-	-	-	-	-	3.2	0.8	-	-	-	0.8	-	0.2	8.4
	After CASP	-	-	-	-	-	4.2	0.8	-	-	-	1.4	-	0.3	13.7

Table 21 provides information on crop production before and after CASP in the various provinces (see Table A6). Although there were difficulties in quantifying production, the figures provide some indication of the changes that occurred in agricultural production since participation in CASP.

As regards maize production, in three of the provinces (Mpumalanga, North West and Western Cape) the production situation before and after CASP did not change. There was no maize production in the two periods in these provinces. The figures for KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo indicate a decrease in maize production after CASP. The average maize production per farm for KwaZulu-Natal before and after CASP was 1177 kg and 1157 kg, respectively. In Limpopo, the average maize production per farm before and after CASP was 574 kg and 455 kg, respectively. The only provinces where average maize production per farm increased after CASP were Eastern Cape (92 kg to 10 615 kg), Free State (1852 kg to 65 982 kg), Gauteng (74 kg to 5843 kg) and Northern Cape (0 kg to 50 000 kg). There was an increase in the production of wheat per farm after CASP in the Free State (0 kg to 5926 kg) and a decrease in the Western Cape (223 581 kg to 23 140 kg). In the case of sugarcane, there was a significant increase in production per farm in KwaZulu-Natal after CASP (422 209 kg to 5 354 487 kg).

In the case of vegetable production, Table 21 (see Table A6) shows an increase in production per farm after CASP in six provinces, namely, Eastern Cape (615 kg to 7892), Gauteng (576 kg to 6988 kg), KwaZulu-Natal (0 kg to 3125 kg), Limpopo (36 kg to 1554 kg), North West (2963 kg to 6372 kg) and Western Cape (930 kg to 4651 kg). As regards fruit production, average apple production per farm was higher after CASP in Eastern Cape (0 kg to 62 185 kg) and Western Cape (28 372 kg to 37 767 kg).

Table 21: Mean crop production before and after CASP (kilogrammes)

Province		Maize	Sugarcane	Citrus	Macadamia	Beans	Vegetables	Sunflower	Lucerne	Wheat
EC	Before CASP	92	-	-	-	-	615	-	-	-
	After CASP	10615	-	-	123	-	7892	-	-	-
FS	Before CASP	1852	-	-	-	1852	19	-	0	0
	After CASP	65982	-	-	-	0	19	-	588	5926
GP	Before CASP	74	-	3648	17	1	576	0	-	-
	After CASP	5843	-	3606	0	32	6988	1	-	-
KZN	Before CASP	1177	422209	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
	After CASP	1157	5354487	-	-	-	3125	-	-	-
LP	Before CASP	574	-	-	3279	86	36	-	-	-
	After CASP	455	-	-	1279	88	1554	-	-	-
MP	Before CASP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	After CASP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NC	Before CASP	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	6850	-
	After CASP	50000	-	-	-	-	-	-	5850	-
NW	Before CASP	-	-	-	-	-	2963	0	-	-
	After CASP	-	-	-	-	-	6372	172	-	-
WC	Before CASP	-	-	-	-	-	930	-	0	223581
	After CASP	-	-	-	-	-	4651	-	426	23140

b) Livestock production

Figure 11 presents information on keeping of livestock since the acquisition of the farms included in the evaluation. Overall, about 43% of the respondents indicated that they have kept livestock since acquiring their farms.



Figure 11: Proportion of farmers who kept livestock since acquisition of the farm (n=451)

The largest proportions of farmers who kept livestock since acquiring the farms are in Eastern Cape (57%), Gauteng (60%), Northern Cape (60%) and Free State (74%).

Table 22 provides an indication of the number of various types of livestock owned by CASP beneficiaries before and after CASP intervention (see Table A7). Livestock numbers of all types increased by 296% after CASP participation. The largest increases were in sheep (508%), broilers (377%), ostriches (267%), goats (143%) and other livestock (1782%).

Table 22: Total number of livestock before and after CASP participation

	Cattle	Goat	Sheep	Broiler	Layer	Pig	Ostrich	Other	All
Before CASP	8691	2103	4476	41855	7113	2560	505	62	67365
After CASP	14601	5108	27198	199558	12749	4658	1855	1167	266894
% Increase	68	143	508	377	79	82	267	1782	296

Information on the total number of animals kept before and after CASP according to province and growth in livestock numbers is presented in Table 23. The number of livestock increased in all provinces after CASP. Provinces showing significant increases are Mpumalanga (7492%), Limpopo (908%), Eastern Cape (598%) and Free State (308%).

Table 23: Growth in livestock numbers by province on CASP supported farms

	Before CASP	After CASP	% Change
Eastern Cape	6499	45340	598
Free State	7034	28721	308
Gauteng	20543	36193	76
KwaZulu-Natal	18868	23379	24
Limpopo	9214	92465	904
Mpumalanga	400	30368	7492
North West	1054	1453	38
Northern Cape	1846	5155	179
Western Cape	1907	3820	100
Total	**67365**	**266894**	**296**

Based on the above figures, it can be concluded that the area cultivated for crops increased after CASP (from 8 ha to 14 ha). However, average production per farm for major crops such as maize, wheat and sugarcane only increased in some of the provinces covered in the evaluation. Vegetables showed an increase after CASP in six provinces. As regards livestock production, the number of animals kept on CASP-supported projects increased significantly (by 296%) after CASP. The increase in livestock numbers occurred in all nine provinces but varied significantly.

4.5 Impact on market access

Evaluation question: What impacts has CASP had on access to markets for smallholder farmers?

As one of its pillars, CASP seeks to improve beneficiaries' access to markets. This is to ensure that the viability of the various enterprises on CASP-supported farms is improved and to increase their level of commercialisation. This section aims at establishing whether farmers participating in CASP have better access to markets (than before their participation) for their produce and to gain an understanding of some of the challenges experienced in marketing their products.

Figure 12 provides an indication of whether farmers have had easier access to markets since their participation in CASP. Overall, 37% of all respondents mentioned that access to markets has been easier since their participation in CASP. The proportion of the respondents indicating that marketing of their produce has been easier after CASP ranged from 25% in Mpumalanga to 56% in Western Cape. These figures imply that, for most farmers (63%), marketing their products has not improved after CASP.



Figure 12: Proportion of farmers indicating ease of market access since CASP participation (n=451)

Despite this evidence that CASP has contributed to beneficiaries' ease of market access, many farmers participating in CASP still experience problems with the marketing of their products. Figure 13 provides information on the proportion of respondents experiencing marketing challenges before and after CASP by province. Overall, the proportion of respondents experiencing marketing challenges was lower after CASP. About 47% of the respondents mentioned that they experienced marketing challenges after CASP. The proportion of respondents who experienced marketing challenges before CASP is 53%. This is a decrease of six per cent in the proportion of respondents who experienced marketing challenges after CASP. All provinces, except Mpumalanga, experienced a decrease in the proportion of respondents who experienced marketing challenges after CASP. North West and Northern Cape experience the largest decrease in the proportion of respondents experiencing marketing challenges after CASP (17% and 15%, respectively).



Figure 13: Percentage of farmers who indicated facing marketing challenges before and after CASP participation by province

Figure 14 provides information on the types of markets where farmers experience marketing challenges and the type of challenges experienced before and after CASP.



Figure 14: **Percentage of farmers facing marketing challenges by type of market and type of challenges before and after CASP participation**

In terms of challenges related to accessing **informal local markets**, 23% of the respondents indicated that they experienced these challenges prior to CASP. The proportion of respondents indicating that they experienced challenges in accessing informal local markets after CASP is 20%, suggesting a slight improvement.

As regards challenges in accessing **local formal markets**, about 38% of the respondents experienced these challenges before CASP compared to about 30% after CASP. This suggests a slight improvement in access to local formal markets after CASP.

The proportion of farmers indicating that they experienced challenges in accessing **local formal markets** decreased in all provinces after CASP, with the exception of Mpumalanga (where there was no change) and Free State (where the proportion increased). The largest decreases in the proportion of farmers experiencing challenges in accessing local formal markets occurred in Northern Cape (65% to 30%) and North West (55% to 31%).

Regarding challenges related to accessing **national markets**, about 26% of the respondents mentioned that they experienced these challenges prior to CASP whilst the figure increased slightly to 27% after CASP. The largest decrease in the proportion of farmers experiencing challenges in accessing national markets was in Northern Cape, where the before and after CASP proportions were 70% and 45%. The respective proportions in the other provinces either remained the same or decreased slightly.

In terms of challenges related to **produce loss**, the before and after CASP proportions of farmers experiencing these challenges were 20% and 19%, respectively. In most provinces, the proportion of farmers experiencing challenges related to produce loss either decreased or remained unchanged after CASP participation. Provinces that experienced an increase in the proportion of farmers incurring produce losses were Eastern Cape, Free State and North West, suggesting a worsening of the situation.

Contract farming is one way of promoting access to markets as the market for produce is guaranteed. Therefore, the respondents were asked to indicate whether they experienced challenges with contract farming before and after CASP. About 18% of the respondents experienced these challenges before CASP compared to about 19% after CASP. In most of the provinces (Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, Limpopo and North West), the after CASP proportion of farmers experiencing challenges related to contract farming increased slightly. Provinces in which the proportion after CASP decreased were Northern Cape (45% to 35%) and Western Cape (16% to 14%). In the case of Mpumalanga, the before and after CASP proportions were the same.

Figure 14 also presents the responses of the beneficiaries to the question asking whether they experienced challenges related to **cooperative marketing** of their products before and after CASP. In four of the nine provinces (Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng and North West), the proportion of farmers indicating that they experienced these challenges increased after CASP. In the remaining four provinces (Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern Cape and Western Cape), the proportion of respondents experiencing cooperative marketing related challenges after CASP decreased whilst that for Mpumalanga did not change.

It can be concluded that a significant proportion (47%) of farmers who experienced problems with market access before CASP continue to experience these problems. Case studies reviewed in this evaluation also indicate that farmers still experience marketing challenges.

4.6 Impact on livelihoods

Evaluation question: What impact has CASP had on livelihoods of the farmers and their households (e.g. food security, nutrition, income, skills and poverty)?

This section aims to determine the impact of CASP on the livelihoods of beneficiaries (project managers and other project owners) and their households. This was addressed by considering (i) the incomes (salaries) of beneficiaries before and after CASP; (ii) the views of project managers on changes in indicators of household food security from before to after CASP; and (iii) the number of employees on the projects before and after CASP.

a) Income

CASP is supposed to have a positive impact on the income levels of beneficiaries on the supported projects. Higher incomes from the projects should also benefit their households and surrounding communities through spill-over effects.

Figure 15 provides an indication of CASP's contribution to the incomes of project managers included in the evaluation (see Table A8). The mean nominal salary of a project manager before CASP was R1035 and rose to R1488 after CASP. The corresponding maximum salaries for a project manager for the two periods were R45000 and R53345 per month. Incomes of project managers were higher in all provinces after CASP, except in Mpumalanga. **These figures suggest that incomes of project managers increased after CASP, although the figures do not take inflation into account.**



Figure 15: Project management's mean monthly salaries (R)

Information on the salaries of project beneficiaries other than project managers is presented in Figure 16 (see Table A9). The average nominal monthly salary of a project beneficiary has increased by 36% after CASP (before- and after-CASP monthly salaries were R497 and R672, respectively). The average monthly salary of a beneficiary after CASP ranged from R153 in Northern Cape to R1338 in Western Cape. In all provinces, except Northern Cape, the average monthly salary of a beneficiary was higher after CASP.

Overall, monthly incomes of beneficiaries increased after CASP, although there is a large variation between provinces.



Figure 16: Project beneficiaries' mean monthly salaries

b) Food security

As one of its objectives, CASP seeks to improve the food security situation of the beneficiaries. Table 24 provides an indication of the programme's contribution towards this objective. This indication is largely in terms of whether the project managers and their households have adequate access to food and its diversity. Other components of food security such as utilisation and safety of the food were not addressed.

Overall, 57% of the respondents indicated that they produced more food since their participation in CASP. About 49% of the respondents indicated that they produced more food and eat more regularly. The proportion of respondents indicating that they can afford more food and support poor families is about 43%. Less than 40% of the respondents indicated that they eat more meat, have a more diverse diet and surplus food to sell since participating in CASP.

It can be concluded from the above that CASP has made a positive contribution to the food security situation of about half of its beneficiaries.

Table 24: Number and proportion of farmers acknowledging CASP's contribution to food security compared to the situation before CASP

		PROVINCE									
		EC (n=65)	FS (n=54)	GP (n=87)	KZN (n=80)	LP (n=61)	MP (n=12)	NW (n=29)	NC (n=20)	WC (n=43)	Total (n=451)
Beneficiaries produce more food	n	38	29	62	30	31	5	10	11	41	257
	%	58.5	53.7	71.3	37.5	50.8	41.7	34.5	55	95.3	57.0
Beneficiaries produce more food and eat regularly	n	24	28	56	21	33	4	11	11	33	221
	%	36.9	51.9	64.4	26.3	54.1	33.3	37.9	55	76.7	49
Beneficiaries produce a greater variety of food	n	21	25	44	13	23	2	9	9	31	177
	%	32.3	46.3	50.6	16.3	37.7	16.7	31.0	45	72.1	39.2
Beneficiaries can afford more food	n	23	33	52	17	22	3	13	8	35	206
	%	35.4	61.1	59.8	21.3	36.1	25	44.8	40	81.4	45.7
Beneficiaries have more diverse diet	n	23	23	40	15	20	2	10	8	36	177
	%	35.4	42.6	46	18.8	32.8	16.7	34.5	40	83.7	39.2
Beneficiaries eat more meat now	n	22	30	40	13	18	2	9	10	33	177
	%	33.8	55.6	46	16.3	29.5	16.7	31.0	50	76.7	39.2
Beneficiaries have surplus food to sell	n	16	26	42	11	22	4	8	10	34	173
	%	24.6	48.1	48.3	13.8	36.1	33.3	27.6	50	79.1	38.4
Beneficiaries can support poor families	n	18	26	49	20	31	4	7	7	32	194
	%	27.7	48.1	56.3	25.0	50.8	33.3	24.1	35	74.4	43

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

c) Employment

Employment is an important source of income and contributes to improved livelihoods. Therefore, it is important for CASP to contribute to job creation, whether directly or indirectly. To assess the contribution of CASP to employment, the project managers were requested to indicate the number of full- and part-time employees (both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) on their projects before and after CASP. The responses are presented in Table 25.

Table 25: Mean number of people employed before and after CASP

Province	Before CASP				After CASP			
	Beneficiaries		Non-beneficiaries		Beneficiaries		Non-beneficiaries	
	Full-Time	Part-Time	Full-Time	Part-Time	Full-Time	Part-Time	Full-Time	Part-Time
EC	8	8	2	2	9	8	2	4
FS	8	2	2	4	9	3	2	6
GP	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2
LP	10	2	7	12	6	3	7	14
KZN	4	1	8	4	7	2	9	7
MP	32	2	3	2	35	2	3	3
NC	15	0	0	1	14	1	2	0
NW	6	1	2	1	5	1	3	3
WC	6	1	2	2	43	46	6	8
All	7	2	4	4	11	8	5	6

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

The average number of beneficiaries employed on a full-time basis annually before CASP was 7. This number increased to 11 after CASP. On the other hand, the number of part-time beneficiaries employed on the farms averaged two before CASP participation and increased to eight after CASP.

The projects also employed non-beneficiaries on a part- and full-time basis. This can be considered a contribution of the projects to employment creation in neighbouring communities. The average number of full-time non-beneficiary employees per project was four prior to CASP and increased to five after CASP per annum. With regard to part-time non-beneficiary employees, the average number employed before CASP was four and this increased to six after CASP participation.

The employment figures above indicate that the average number of employees of all types after CASP participation was higher than the average number of employees before CASP. **Thus, there has been a small increase in the number of employees on the projects included in the study after CASP participation.**

Growth in the total number of employees (i.e. the difference between the number of employees before and after CASP) of all types on the projects in the various provinces is shown in Figure 17.

Employees include both project beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries employed on CASP-funded projects. The number of both full-time and part-time employees increased after CASP, with the largest increase occurring in the number of part-time employees. Western Cape experienced the largest growth in the number of both full-time and part-time employees after CASP participation (485% and 1520%, respectively). Northern Cape experienced significant growth in the number of part-time employees after CASP participation (110%). In Gauteng, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and North West, the number of full-time employees declined after CASP participation. Only Mpumalanga experienced a decline in the number of part-time employees.

It can be concluded that employment on the projects increased after CASP, although the increase in employment was mainly among part-time employees. Furthermore, the increase in employment is concentrated in a few provinces, particularly Western Cape.



Figure 17: **Growth in employment on CASP funded projects**

To further confirm the role of CASP in employment creation, the respondents were asked to indicate whether neighbouring rural communities benefitted from the projects in terms of employment before and after CASP participation. The responses are outlined in Table 26. Overall, the proportion of respondents indicating that the projects contributed to employment creation for neighbouring rural communities was higher after CASP. About 45% of the respondents agreed that the projects contributed to employment creation for neighbouring communities before CASP compared to about 53% of the respondents after CASP. **This indicates that CASP has contributed to employment creation in the neighbouring communities.**

Table 26: Number and percentage of respondents acknowledging contribution of their projects to employment among rural dwellers before and after CASP

	EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
Before CASP										
n	44	25	32	27	33	2	6	14	18	201
%	67.7	46.3	36.8	33.8	55	16.7	20.7	70	41.9	44.7
After CASP										
n	52	29	33	30	34	2	10	14	36	240
%	80	53.7	38.4	37.5	56.7	16.7	34.5	70	83.7	53.5

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

4.7 Impact on farmer development

Evaluation question: What impacts has CASP had on farmer development? How many farmers graduated (in increments) from subsistence to commercial?

The terms of reference required the evaluation to determine the proportion of farmers who graduated from subsistence to commercial in increments. This was not possible due to data limitations. Instead the evaluation resorted to using participation in formal markets as a proxy for commercialisation.

To get an indication of the degree of commercialisation among the projects/farms included in the evaluation, the respondents were asked to indicate whether they sold any products in formal, informal, national and international markets. The responses are presented in Table 27.

Of the 451 projects included in the evaluation, 382 (85%) indicated that they sold some products. Of the 382 projects, about 5% sold their products in foreign markets whilst 15% sold in national markets. Of those who sold their products, about 30% sold livestock in local formal markets whilst 35% sold fresh produce. Corresponding figures for those who sold products in informal markets were 35% and 32%. If selling in formal markets is used as an indicator of commercialisation, it can be concluded that between 30% and 35% of all the projects included in the evaluation are commercial.

Table 27: Percentage of farmers selling products in various markets by province

Type of market	EC (n=56)	FS (n=51)	GP (n=80)	KZN (n=55)	LP (n=51)	MP (n=8)	NW (n=24)	NC (n=18)	WC (n=39)	Total (n=382)
International	1.8	2.0	2.5	5.5	2.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	17.9	4.5
National	5.4	9.8	12.5	12.7	31.4	25.0	4.2	22.2	20.5	14.7
Local formal livestock auctions	44.6	39.2	32.5	18.2	21.6	12.5	37.5	33.3	20.5	30.4
Local informal livestock	35.7	52.9	53.8	18.2	27.5	12.5	41.7	16.7	17.9	35.3
Local formal fresh produce	21.4	17.6	41.3	45.5	41.2	50.0	20.8	22.2	51.3	34.8
Local informal fresh produce	25.0	21.6	48.8	18.2	49.0	50.0	33.3	0.0	28.2	31.9
Local formal grain	5.4	7.8	5.0	14.5	3.9	0.0	4.2	27.8	17.9	8.9
Local informal grain	5.4	2.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	4.2	0.0	2.6	1.8

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

The impact on farmer development was assessed in terms of the proportion of farmers who have graduated to the commercial farmer category. The proportion of farmers selling their products in formal markets was used as a proxy for commercialisation. Based on this, the proportion of the respondents who can be classified as commercial is between 30% and 35%, which averages about 33%. Therefore, it can be concluded that about 33% of the respondents graduated to commercial farmers after CASP. This suggests a relatively low degree of commercialisation among CASP-supported projects. However, it is difficult to determine whether the proportion of commercial farmers has increased since CASP inception as there is no baseline information.

4.8 Factors affecting achievement or non-achievement of CASP objectives

Evaluation question: What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?

In addressing this evaluation question, it was decided to focus on process-related issues of CASP. Interviews were conducted with project managers and government officials to obtain their views on the factors considered to influence the performance of CASP and, hence, the achievement or non-achievement of the programme's objectives.

Project managers

The respondents/project managers included in the evaluation were asked to express their views on CASP process-related issues. This section provides a summary of their views.

According to the project managers, **the programme is not well coordinated**, and its monitoring is weak. The project managers mentioned that CASP **infrastructure is of poor quality**, and sometimes the installation thereof is not even completed.

They attribute this to lack of proper monitoring of the service providers by the provincial departments of agriculture. The departments are also blamed for appointing incompetent contractors, and for lack of participation of project owners in the appointment of such contractors. Some of the contractors are accused of deliberately using poor quality materials to minimise costs at the expense of the beneficiaries. These issues were also raised in previous evaluations and reviews (Department of Agriculture, 2007; Public Service Commission, 2011).

The quality of inputs and their usefulness have also been identified as a problem. Some project managers indicated that they were provided with inputs they did not need for their operations. These issues were also highlighted in the case studies included in this evaluation.

The management of **CASP is said to take too long to respond to challenges** on the farms. Delay in supplying inputs has been identified as a significant factor negatively affecting farm production levels as beneficiaries are forced to miss planting seasons, resulting in low or no production at all. The late arrival of CASP-provided tractors has been identified. In certain instances, the approval for requested services is said to take too long to enable a profitable operation of a farm enterprise. The slow response in addressing the needs of farmers has also been mentioned in previous evaluations and reviews of CASP.

The project managers also indicated that **lack of trust between farmers and the provincial departments of agriculture** is negatively affecting the effectiveness of CASP. The situation is said to be worsened by the **lack of openness on the part of the department**s, especially with regard to finances. The project managers argue that officials never disclose amounts spent on their farms and they are not involved in the appointment of service providers and authorisation of payments. They are also of the view that their budget allocations are usually transferred to other projects without their knowledge.

There is also a concern that the **selection of the beneficiaries is poor** and CASP needs to develop proper selection criteria. Poor selection of beneficiaries is blamed for the poor performance of projects, especially in cases where there are many beneficiaries. In such projects, it is stated that some beneficiaries are not committed to farming, and only join to the projects to benefit from government grants. This is said to lead to poor or lack of participation in project related activities.

Lack of a well-defined CASP exit strategy at the project level has also been identified as a challenge; with some beneficiaries suggesting that CASP support should continue until the farm is viable. Once-off interventions are regarded by project managers as setting beneficiaries up for failure, especially when the programme is not comprehensive enough at the project level.

Project managers also believe that **CASP support is biased towards LRAD projects** and does not necessarily focus on dedicated and progressive farmers. They suggest that the programme should give more support to farmers who are committed to their farming business. The reported bias is not surprising when considering that CASP was initially meant to assist land reform projects.

The transfer of skills has also been identified as a challenge and it is felt that this aspect should be given more attention in order to improve the long-term sustainability of the enterprises. The project managers believe that extension should also place more emphasis on the quality of the service instead of focusing on its quantity (i.e. the frequency of the contact).

Project managers also believe that the provincial departments of agriculture should improve people's understanding of the role of CASP and what it stands for as some beneficiaries expect the programme to do everything for them, including the maintenance of CASP-provided infrastructure.

National government officials

National government officials believe that **CASP is not well understood** by those involved in its implementation. This is mainly attributed to a lack of proper documentation regarding programme policies and implementation guidelines. They suggest that CASP implementation guidelines should be developed within a well-defined institutional policy framework. Such implementation guidelines should also address issues such as the programme's exit strategy.

The **absence of national policy directives** has also been identified by national government officials as negatively affecting CASP's effectiveness as it is difficult to ensure programme implementation in a coordinated manner, with different role players emphasising different aspects of the programme. National government officials argue that clarity on policy directives would ensure that the various directorates design and develop coordinated and complementary programmes. They believe that this would contribute positively to the effectiveness and efficiency of CASP.

Another view expressed by national government officials is that **DAFF does not have adequate human resources** with appropriate skills to manage CASP. They attribute this largely to CASP not having been institutionalised within the departmental structures. Hence, they argue that institutionalisation of the CASP coordinating unit and the programme as a whole will empower the programme with adequate and skilled human resources. However, there is also a view expressed by some national government officials that such institutionalisation would lead to the disappearance of CASP and more bureaucracy.

Limited participation of some of the directorates within DAFF has also been identified by national government officials as a factor negatively affecting CASP implementation. According to them, the emphasis on the infrastructure pillar leaves little funding available for the other pillars and this limits the involvement of other directorates in the implementation of CASP. This is considered to result in an imbalanced implementation of CASP, which threatens its sustainability.

According to national government officials, **CASP does not have an information management system** and this makes reliable reporting on CASP implementation difficult. This also affects CASP monitoring and evaluation negatively. This matter has also been raised in the Public Service Commission's evaluation of CASP.

National government officials contend that **provincial departments of agriculture are not properly resourced to implement CASP**. This manifests itself in poor project planning as well as poor project selection at the provincial level.

As regards the funding of CASP projects, national government officials believe that **insufficient attention is paid to financial analysis** (e.g. return on investment). Provincial departments of agriculture are also considered to be **spreading the available funds for CASP projects too thinly** in a bid to include more beneficiaries, sometimes at the expense of project viability.

National government officials have also identified the tendency for some provincial departments of agriculture to divert funds from approved projects and business plans without consultations with DAFF as a factor negatively affecting the implementation of CASP.

Provincial government officials

The general view amongst provincial government officials is that **CASP is an essential programme with the potential to make a difference** amongst emerging farmers. However, they believe the programme needs improvement in certain areas.

According to provincial government officials, **CASP is not sufficiently resourced financially**. They believe that CASP funds are too little in relation to the many deserving cases. As a result, the provinces are forced to spread the funds too thinly to render CASP intervention meaningful and effective. Provincial government officials also believe that the pressure to cover more beneficiaries is due to political interference and the need to show more numbers.

Lack of capacity at the provincial level has also been identified by provincial government officials as a factor negatively affecting CASP's effectiveness. They argue that the provinces do not have enough staff and relevant skills to deal with the implementation of the various pillars of CASP. This situation is said to be affecting the ability not only to do proper project planning but also to monitor the implementation of projects. **Lack of skills in technical areas**, such as agricultural engineering, has been identified as the cause of poor quality physical structures provided by service providers as provincial departments of agriculture do not have the capacity to do quality assurance.

It is the view of provincial government officials that **poor programme monitoring and evaluation** is negatively affecting the performance of CASP as mistakes are usually realised when it is already too late to rectify them. Provincial government officials recommend that provinces should have dedicated and properly resourced units to monitor and coordinate CASP implementation. They further suggest that such units should have a leadership with enough authority to make meaningful decisions.

Provincial government officials also believe that **lack of stability and continuity of top leadership and management structures** in both provincial and national departments of agriculture is negatively affecting CASP implementation. They argue that this situation does not only affect the understanding of and commitment to CASP but also results in continuous organisational restructuring. This creates uncertainty amongst staff and leads to organisational paralysis.

Provincial government officials argue that **the grant approach of CASP discourages self-reliance** on the part of the beneficiaries and encourages a dependency and entitlement mentality that leads to continuous conflicts with government officials. The lack of commitment on the part of beneficiaries, resulting from the grant approach, is also said to be leading to poor maintenance and safeguarding of CASP-provided infrastructure.

The grant approach is, therefore, considered to be in direct conflict with attempts to promote self-reliance amongst beneficiaries.

According to provincial government officials, CASP's response is slow in some areas and they have mentioned the **late arrival of funding** in relation to planting seasons as one of these areas. They believe that this situation is negatively affecting production levels. The approval processes are also regarded as a bottleneck as all acquisitions go through the supply chain, which takes too long to address farming emergencies.

Some provinces are said to be **focusing on big projects without a proper analysis of market viability**, usually leading to project failures. This problem has been identified as being more prevalent with broiler projects where a few multi-million Rand projects are said to have shut down or were forced to be at the mercy of a few big operators.

The funding structure of CASP has been considered as encouraging **biased support toward certain enterprises**. According to provincial government officials, the need to spend money within a given financial year compels them to focus on short-term enterprises and infrastructure projects at the expense of long-term enterprises, such as subtropical crops. This situation is said to lead to unintended wasteful expenditures in order to achieve spending compliance.

Provincial government officials also believe that **CASP is placing too much emphasis on the infrastructure pillar** at the expense of the other programme pillars. They suggest that a balance in budget allocation between the pillars should be established to ensure the programme's success. They recommend that the programme should also pay attention to skills transfer-related pillars to ensure its long-term sustainability. The issue of focusing on the infrastructure pillar has also been highlighted in previous evaluations and reviews of CASP.

5 Conclusions

5.1 Reaching the target population

- The programme has succeeded in reaching most of the target groups. However, relatively few youth and disabled persons are involved in the programme and the situation has remained the same before and after CASP.
- All the projects included in the evaluation are engaged in primary agricultural production. Participants in the agricultural value chain beyond farming, who are part of the primary target population for CASP, are not benefitting from the programme.
- Project management is dominated by males and older citizens, whose average age is 52 years --- 71% of project managers are male and only 7% of the project managers fall within the youth category.
- The majority (70%) of farmers assisted by CASP are emerging or commercial farmers. This is not unexpected as subsistence farmers were initially not part of CASP's target population.

5.2 CASP support and appropriateness

- Support is not comprehensive on project level. The survey results clearly indicate that capacity building services emphasise provision of production-related skills and knowledge with little attention paid to marketing aspects. Government officials pointed out that CASP places too much emphasis on the infrastructure pillar at the expense of other pillars.
- CASP has done a good job of identifying markets for beneficiaries' products, but it has not achieved much success in terms of linking the beneficiaries to markets.
- The programme focuses on quantity (wide coverage) rather than quality and comprehensiveness of support, resulting in the support being thinly spread among a large number of beneficiaries. This view was expressed mainly by national government officials.
- Although beneficiaries are generally satisfied with the quality of the services provided, they consider the quantity thereof as being inadequate.
- The support received from private service providers (contractors) is considered by both beneficiaries and government officials to be either incomplete or of poor quality. This is also supported by case study findings.
- Support is often received too late. This was emphasised by project managers, provincial government officials and in case studies. Late delivery of support often results in farmers missing their planting seasons and affects the quality of the crop negatively (e.g. in cases where chemicals must be applied for disease control at a certain time).
- Support is not always based on the needs of beneficiaries. Project managers indicated that inputs are often provided even though they were not asked for.
- On-farm infrastructure provision is one area in which CASP has made progress. There is an improvement in the availability of both on-farm and social infrastructure after CASP. However, cases of infrastructure that was provided even though it was not needed by farmers were identified in the case studies. Furthermore, there were complaints related to the process of appointment of service providers and the quality of the infrastructure provided.

5.3 Capacity building for on-going management and resilience (self-reliance)

- CASP has made a positive but insufficient contribution to capacity building for on-going management and self-reliance through skills and knowledge transfer. Project managers have benefitted more from skills and knowledge transfer than employees. Areas in which capacity building is most insufficient include cultivar selection, livestock marketing, livestock disease control and produce marketing.

5.4 Impact on agricultural production

- The area cultivated for most crops increased after CASP but the increase was small.
- The production of major crops such as maize, wheat and sugarcane only increased in less than half the number of provinces covered in the evaluation.
- Vegetable production increased in most (6) provinces included in the evaluation CASP.
- The number of animals kept on CASP-supported projects increased significantly after CASP. The increase in livestock numbers occurred in all nine provinces and affected livestock such as broilers, cattle, goats and sheep.

5.5 Impact on livelihoods

- Employment on the projects increased after CASP, although the increase in employment was mainly among part-time employees, and was furthermore concentrated in a few provinces, particularly Western Cape.
- Most respondents agree that CASP has contributed positively to employment in neighbouring rural communities.
- CASP's contribution to food security is limited in nearly all provinces.
- The income of project managers and beneficiaries generated from their projects has increased since their participation in CASP.

5.6 Impact on market access

- Overall, market access for the farms included in the evaluation has not improved since participating in CASP. A significant proportion of farmers who experienced problems with market access before CASP continue to experience these problems.
- Market access is one of the weakest areas of CASP support.

5.7 Impact on farmer development (commercialisation)

- Little progress has been achieved in terms of promoting commercialisation of the farms/projects – only about 33% of the farms can be considered to be commercial, based on their participation in formal markets.
- Limited progress in commercialisation is linked to failure of the programme to promote market access.

5.8 Achievement of objectives

- CASP has made progress towards achieving some of its intended objectives (e.g. enhancing agricultural support, increasing production, etc.), but insufficient progress has been made in promoting commercialisation, market access, employment and achieving food security.

5.9 Factors influencing achievement of objectives

- There is limited coordination of CASP within DAFF and the provincial departments of agriculture and the programme is not aligned to other government programmes (e.g. those of DRDLR, Water and Sanitation, etc.). Within DAFF, there is lack of buy-in from key directorates.
- The scope and coverage of CASP are too wide, resulting in resources being thinly spread. This limits the effectiveness of the programme in achieving its objectives.
- The programme focuses on only one component of the value chain, agricultural production, to the exclusion of other components beyond production.

6 Recommendations

We wish to preface the recommendations for strengthening CASP by stating that **the most effective and efficient way to support farmers in South Africa is to overhaul and redesign all farmer support programmes and do away with existing silos of farmer support.** This should entail the establishment of a single programme of farmer support to replace the numerous programmes which currently exist in the country. We consider this a logical and lasting solution.

Hence, the following recommendations are meant to strengthen CASP until a lasting solution is found:

6.1 Retention of CASP

- *DAFF should retain and strengthen CASP*. The programme provides a good opportunity for the department to create an institutional framework conducive for a higher rate of agricultural development within the small-scale and emerging agricultural sector, which is predominant among the previously disadvantaged people as well as land reform beneficiaries.

- *The various pillars of CASP should be retained.* However, their implementation should be entrenched within the various directorates responsible for such services within the provincial departments of agriculture. Both the provincial directorates responsible for implementation and national directorates assisting with implementation of the programme should be supported with the necessary budgets and properly skilled human resources.

6.2 Database

- *DAFF should maintain a proper and complete database of all projects assisted through CASP.* This will not only facilitate efficient and effective management of the programme but also ensure proper monitoring and evaluation.

6.3 Organisational structure

- *CASP should be institutionalised or mainstreamed within DAFF as well as in the provincial departments of agriculture.* The current approach of considering CASP as an appendage to the departments (i.e. national and provincial) limits its effectiveness by discouraging directorates and other units that should be playing key roles to participate in its implementation. Furthermore, personnel responsible for implementing CASP in the provinces tend to regard it as a secondary responsibility. The mainstreaming or institutionalisation of the programme should be carefully implemented to avoid any possible bureaucracy that may further limit the effectiveness of the programme.

- *DAFF should retain the overall coordination and facilitation of CASP implementation.* The actual implementation of the programme should continue to be the responsibility of provincial departments of agriculture.

- *The organisational structure of DAFF as well as that of the provincial departments of agriculture should be reviewed to ensure alignment with the institutionalisation of the programme.*

6.4 Funding arrangements

The recommendations in this section are meant to address mainly problems arising from the grant approach of CASP which include (a) funds being thinly spread in order to include more projects; (b) the dependency syndrome among beneficiaries; and (c) inefficiencies in the provision of support.

- *The current CASP funding approach of a wholesale grant for on-farm infrastructure should be discontinued.* The approach not only encourages a dependency syndrome but also promotes an entitlement mentality and limited commitment on the part of beneficiaries. The current approach is also not financially sustainable in the long run.

- *The funding of the infrastructure pillar should clearly differentiate between on-farm and off-farm activities.*

- *CASP grant funding should be limited to off-farm infrastructure and related activities, except in the case of farms leased from the state where DAFF should continue to fund on-farm immovable assets.* This function should be retained within DAFF and its provincial delegates.

- *The funding of all on-farm infrastructure and operation related activities (farm asset book items) should be through a "soft" loan facility, such as that catered for through MAFISA.* This will ensure commitment on the part of the beneficiaries and long-term sustainability of CASP.

- *The responsibility for financing on-farm infrastructure should be delegated to a financial institution and capitalised through CASP funding.*

- *DAFF should monitor the implementation of on-farm infrastructure financing by the delegated financial institution to ensure alignment with and advancement of departmental as well as national policy goals*.

- *The delegated financial institution should create conditions for improving access to its services, appreciating the various challenges under which previously disadvantaged communities operate, and the reality of agricultural production.*

- *CASP spending should be according to the approved business plans, and any deviation from such business plans should be sanctioned by the approving authority.*

- *DAFF should ensure that the disbursement of CASP funds for production purposes is efficient, timely and takes account of production calendars and specificities of the various provinces.*

6.5 Employment creation

- *CASP should focus more on actions driving performance towards achieving outcomes, such as increasing employment and incomes.* This will require integration of strategic programmes within DAFF and those of other actors within the agricultural sector.

- *DAFF should ensure that CASP gives priority to supporting projects/farms with potential to create employment.* This will ensure that the programme contributes to the country's challenges of high unemployment and poverty. The programme should promote the use of labour-intensive technologies and sourcing of materials from local suppliers.

- *CASP support should be extended to role players other than farmers within the agricultural value chain (e.g. local agro-processing).* This will not only ensure enhance the effectiveness of the programme in supporting farmers but also contribute to employment creation and improving market access.

6.6 Implementation guidelines

- *DAFF should develop implementation guidelines and relevant operational manuals for CASP to ensure effective and coordinated implementation throughout the provinces.*

6.7 Scope and coverage

- *DAFF should limit the scope and coverage of CASP to increase its effectiveness, with special emphasis on the commercialisation of small-scale agriculture.*

6.8 Needs and demand driven support

- *DAFF should ensure that on-farm investments are based on the needs and demands of the beneficiaries and on the viability of projects in the context of the whole enterprise.*

- *DAFF should ensure that CASP beneficiaries play a greater role in decision making regarding investments on their farms, including the selection of service providers.*

- *DAFF should ensure that off-farm investments are based on a needs analysis of the entire farming population in a specific agricultural region.* This should take account of existing infrastructure and economic viability of such investments.

6.9 Marketing

- *DAFF and provincial departments of agriculture should increase their efforts to promote market access.* This should include the provision of support to components of the agricultural value chain beyond production (e.g. agro-processing) and collaboration/partnerships with the private sector.

- *DAFF and provincial departments of agriculture should ensure that provision of extension services and training of farmers place greater emphasis on equipping farmers with marketing skills and knowledge.*

6.10 Participation of women, youth and people with disabilities

- *DAFF should endeavour to improve the involvement of youth, women and people with disabilities in CASP-supported projects, particularly in project management*.

6.11 Human resources

- *The provincial departments of agriculture should be resourced with properly skilled professionals to enhance the capacity to execute the objectives of the various pillars of the programme, particularly capacity building related pillars such as marketing, training and extension.*

- *CASP coordination units within DAFF as well as in the provincial departments of agriculture should be strengthened with adequately skilled personnel to manage the programme.*

6.12 Monitoring and evaluation

- *DAFF should ensure that the monitoring and evaluation system for CASP is efficient, effective and that monitoring and evaluation occurs on a more regular basis.* This will help to identify problems early and to take remedial steps before they result in the collapse of projects.

6.13 Common understanding

- *DAFF should ensure a common understanding of CASP by all stakeholders, including those within and outside the national and provincial departments of agriculture and beneficiaries.*

6.14 Alignment with other support programmes

- *DAFF should align CASP with other farmer support programmes within the department.*

- *National Treasury should facilitate the planning, alignment, coordination and integration of farmer support programmes between DAFF and other government departments, such as the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform to avoid duplication and/or wastage of public resources.*

6.15 Farmer-to-farmer exchange visits

- *DAFF should encourage provincial departments of agriculture to exchange lessons on their experiences in implementing CASP.* This can involve good performing provinces extending support to poor performing ones through farmer-to-farmer exchange visits and exchange of management or business models.

6.16 Focus on employment and income

- *CASP should focus more on actions driving performance towards achieving outcomes, such as increasing employment and incomes.* The current approach is expenditure-driven. This will require integration of strategic programmes within DAFF and those of other actors within the agricultural sector.

6.17 Theory of change

As CASP does not have a theory of change, one of the requirements for the impact evaluation was to develop the programme's theory of change. A theory of change was

developed to guide the implementation of the impact evaluation. This theory of change was discussed at a stakeholder workshop and the final proposed theory of change, formulated after the implementation of the impact evaluation, is depicted in Figure 18.

Figure 18: Proposed theory of change



Annexure 1: Evaluation results tables

Table A1: Project ownership before and after CASP

Province		Male Owners	Female Owners	Youth Owners	Disabled Owners	Total	% Male	%Female	%Youth	%Disabled
Eastern Cape	Before CASP	1099	795	217	36	2147	51.2	37.0	10.1	1.7
	After CASP	925	627	232	36	1820	50.8	34.5	12.8	2.0
Free State	Before CASP	276	443	195	10	924	29.9	47.9	21.1	1.1
	After CASP	232	307	102	7	648	35.8	47.4	15.7	1.1
Gauteng	Before CASP	175	151	85	2	413	42.4	36.6	20.6	0.5
	After CASP	264	214	85	4	567	46.6	37.7	15.0	0.7
KwaZulu-Natal	Before CASP	851	683	150	24	1708	49.8	40.0	8.8	1.4
	After CASP	620	539	122	16	1297	47.8	41.6	9.4	1.2
Limpopo	Before CASP	264	484	240	27	1015	26.0	47.7	23.7	2.7
	After CASP	225	209	76	6	516	43.6	40.5	14.7	1.2
Mpumalanga	Before CASP	109	154	107	1	371	29.4	41.5	28.8	0.3
	After CASP	261	166	43	1	471	55.4	35.2	9.1	0.2
North West	Before CASP	182	142	62	2	388	46.9	36.6	16.0	0.5
	After CASP	134	88	69	5	296	45.3	29.7	23.3	1.7
Northern Cape	Before CASP	530	1134	170	3	1837	28.9	61.7	9.3	0.2
	After CASP	467	1027	144	2	1640	28.5	62.6	8.8	0.1
Western Cape	Before CASP	1497	1618	872	299	4286	34.9	37.8	20.4	7.0
	After CASP	1382	1526	806	294	4008	34.5	38.1	20.1	7.3
Total	Before CASP	4983	5604	2098	404	13089	38.1	42.8	16.0	3.1
	After CASP	4510	4703	1679	371	11263	40.0	41.8	14.9	3.3

Table A2: Proportion of farmers who considered input availability as good (n=277)

Input		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
Fertiliser	Before CASP	0	0	7.7	11.1	0	0	13.3	0	2.9	3.3
	After CASP	16.7	16.7	21.5	16.7	29.6	0	26.7	0	26.5	12.3
Seed	Before CASP	0	0	7.7	7.4	11.1	0	13.3	0	2.9	3.3
	After CASP	16.7	13.9	16.9	20.4	25.9	0	26.7	0	38.2	12.5
Labour	Before CASP	0	36.1	26.2	11.1	25.9	50	26.7	0	14.7	12.1
	After CASP	6.7	44.4	33.8	16.7	33.3	75	46.7	0	35.3	17.9
Water	Before CASP	3.3	11.1	33.8	9.3	22.2	0	46.7	0	14.7	11.2
	After CASP	16.7	25	41.5	9.3	33.3	25	60	8.3	32.4	17.2
Electricity	Before CASP	0	2.8	36.9	9.3	11.1	0	26.7	0	11.8	9.2
	After CASP	0	11.1	44.6	11.1	3.7	0	53.3	0	17.6	12.1
Mechanization	Before CASP	0	0	6.2	0	11.1	0	20	0	8.8	2.9
	After CASP	10	5.6	9.2	1.9	14.8	0	40	0	14.7	6.0
Animal feed	Before CASP	0	0	1.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.2
	After CASP	0	16.7	10.8	0	0	0	0	8.3	2.9	3.4

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

Table A3: Number and proportion of farmers indicating CASP facilitation of market access

Market facilitation		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
CASP facilitated market access (n=451)	n	14	4	10	4	10	1	4	5	7	59
	%	21.5	7.4	11.5	5	16.4	8.3	13.8	25	16.3	13.1
Market identification (n=59)	n	12	4	6	1	7	0	3	4	7	44
	%	85.7	100	60	25	70	0	75	80	100	74.6
Linkage to market (n=59)	n	9	2	6	1	3	1	1	5	7	35
	%	64.3	50	60	25	30	100	25	100	100	59.3
Facilitation of transport to markets (n=59)	n	1	1	1	2	3	0	1	4	0	13
	%	7.1	25	10	50	30	0	25	80	0	22
Protecting local markets (n=59)	n	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	3	0	7
	%	0	25	0	25	20	0	0	60	0	11.9
Maintenance of access roads (n=59)	n	1	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	5
	%	7.1	25	0	25	20	0	0	0	0	8.5
Integration into value chains (n=59)	n	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	4
	%	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	60	0	6.8
Access to export markets (n=59)	n	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	3
	%	0	25	0	0	0	0	0	40	0	5.1

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province

Table A4: Percentage of projects with on-farm production infrastructure before and after CASP and proportion of CASP-funded infrastructure

Type of on-farm infrastructure		EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NW	NC	WC	Total
Sheds and stores	Before CASP	9.2	20.4	23	15	16.4	16.7	24.1	25	4.7	16.6
	After CASP	23.1	11.1	9.2	5	26.2	8.3	17.2	15	27.9	15.5
	Funded by CASP	93.3	100	25	75	68.8	100	100	100	66.7	75.7
Workshop	Before CASP	7.7	3.7	5.7	23.8	1.6	16.7	0	0	11.6	8.6
	After CASP	3.1	5.6	0	13.8	0	0	0	5	4.7	4.2
	Funded by CASP	50	100	0	9.1	0	0	0	0	50	31.6
Pack house & grading	Before CASP	1.5	9.3	3.4	5	3.3	8.3	3.4	5	4.7	4.4
	After CASP	1.5	0	5.7	1.3	6.6	8.3	3.4	0	4.7	3.3
	Funded by CASP	100	0	80	100	75	100	0	0	100	80
Dairy	Before CASP	6.2	3.7	0	2.5	4.9	8.3	3.4	0	0	2.9
	After CASP	1.5	5.6	2.3	3.8	0	8.3	0	0	4.7	2.7
	Funded by CASP	100	100	100	100	0	0	0	0	100	92
Piggery	Before CASP	4.6	5.6	5.7	2.5	0	0	3.4	0	2.3	3.3
	After CASP	6.2	0	24.1	1.3	6.6	0	0	5	14	8.2
	Funded by CASP	100	0	81	100	100	0	0	0	83	84
Chicken houses	Before CASP	3.1	9.3	16.1	3.8	14.8	8.3	6.9	0	0	8
	After CASP	10.8	18.5	42.5	12.5	26.2	41.7	17.2	15	2.3	20.8
	Funded by CASP	100	100	89	90	81	100	60	100	100	89
Tunnels	Before CASP	0	3.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.4
	After CASP	3.1	5.6	28.7	3.8	1.6	0	13.8	0	9.3	9.3
	Funded by CASP	100	100	96	100	100	0	75	0	100	95
Shade net structures	Before CASP	0	1.9	1.1	1.3	1.6	16.7	3.4	0	0	1.6
	After CASP	0	5.6	5.7	0	6.6	8.3	13.8	5	0	4
	Funded by CASP	0	100	100	0	75	0	75	0	0	78
Fencing	Before CASP	20	38.9	47.1	26.3	41	25	31	15	18.6	31.9
	After CASP	73.8	50	29.9	47.5	32.8	33.3	65.5	50	48.8	47.2
	Funded by CASP	90	85	73	89	80	50	89	60	81	83

Table A5: Proportion of beneficiaries and employees who received skills through CASP by type of skill (n=285)

Type of skill	EC		FS		GP		KZN		LP		MP		NW		NC		WC		Total	
	Benefi-ciary.	Emplo-yees.	Benefi-ciary.	Emplo-yees.	Benefi-ciary.	Emplo-yees.	Benefi-ciary.	Emplo-yees.	Benefi-ciary.	Emplo-yees.	Benefi-ciary.	Emplo-yees.	Benefi-ciary.	Emplo-yees.	Benefi-ciary.	Emplo-yees.	Benefi-ciary.	Emplo-yees.	Benefi-ciary.	Emplo-yees.
Farm planning	77.5	17.5	69.7	24.2	72.5	41.2	75.4	38.6	60	26.7	33.3	33.3	57.9	21.1	92.9	42.9	88.6	40	73.3	32.3
Project finance management	72.5	7.5	81.8	21.2	60.8	23.5	47.4	15.8	40	13.3	50	33.3	31.6	15.8	85.7	14.3	88.6	34.3	62.5	18.9
Equipment operations	75	25	66.7	36.4	56.9	43.1	49.1	31.6	53.3	40	0	16.7	42.1	21.1	85.7	50	85.7	65.7	61.4	38.2
Equipment maintenance	70	25	75.8	42.4	54.9	33.3	43.9	31.6	50	30	16.7	16.7	47.4	26.3	100	57.1	88.6	68.6	61.8	37.2
Fertiliser and herbicide application	55	22.5	51.5	27.3	70.6	39.2	59.6	36.8	43.3	26.7	50	16.7	42.1	31.6	64.3	42.9	74.3	62.9	58.9	35.8
Cultivar selection	45	2.5	42.4	27.3	49	21.6	42.1	17.5	30	13.3	16.7	16.7	31.6	21.1	57.1	21.4	51.4	22.9	43.2	17.9
Livestock disease control	70	22.5	69.7	27.3	62.7	33.3	36.8	15.8	33.3	20	0	0	52.6	15.8	78.6	35.7	34.3	28.6	51.6	23.9
Project produce marketing	52.5	2.5	66.7	18.2	52.9	23.5	33.3	10.5	26.7	13.3	16.7	16.7	52.6	10.5	78.6	21.4	74.3	25.7	50.9	15.4
Livestock marketing	50	2.5	60.6	9.1	49	17.6	17.5	8.8	26.7	16.7	50	50	15.8	15.8	71.4	21.4	37.1	11.4	39.3	12.6
Project management	67.5	2.5	81.8	21.2	66.7	27.5	56.1	19.3	43.3	20	50	33.3	57.9	15.8	85.7	14.3	94.3	25.7	67.4	19.3
Project bookkeeping	57.5	0	90.9	21.2	52.9	25.5	47.4	21.1	46.7	16.7	50	33.3	63.2	15.8	100	21.4	94.3	34.3	64.2	20
Internal conflict management	62.5	2.5	78.8	36.4	52.9	31.4	52.6	29.8	43.3	20	50	50	42.1	15.8	85.7	28.6	94.3	40	62.1	26.7

EC=Eastern Cape Province, FS=Free State Province, GP=Gauteng Province, KZN=KwaZulu-Natal, LP=Limpopo Province, MP=Mpumalanga Province, NW=North West Province, NC=Northern Cape Province, WC=Western Cape Province, Ben.=Beneficiary, Emp.=Employee

Table A6: Mean crop production (kilogrammes)

Province		Maize	Sugar Cane	Apple	Citrus	Macadamia	Beans	Vegetables	Grapes	Sunflower	Lucerne	Wheat	Asparagus	Kikuyu Grass	Proteas	Coffee	Ray & Raddish	Timber	Rooibos
LP	Before CASP	574	-	-	-	3279	86	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	After CASP	455	-	-	-	1279	88	1554	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MP	Before CASP	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	After CASP	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GP	Before CASP	74	-	-	3648	17	1	576	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	After CASP	5843	-	-	3606	0	32	6988	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NW	Before CASP	0	-	-	-	-	-	2963	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	After CASP	0	-	-	-	-	-	6372	-	172	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
KZN	Before CASP	1177	422209	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	0	-
	After CASP	1157	5354487	-	-	-	-	3125	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	113	-	412500	-
FS	Before CASP	1852	-	-	-	-	1852	19	-	-	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
	After CASP	65981	-	-	-	-	0	19	-	-	588	5926	556	-	-	-	-	-	-
NC	Before CASP	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	6850	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	1850
	After CASP	50000	-	-	-	-	-	-	3750	-	5850	-	150	-	-	-	-	-	2250
EC	Before CASP	92	-	-	-	0	-	615	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	After CASP	106158	-	62185	-	123	-	7892	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
WC	Before CASP	-	-	28372	-	-	-	930	4	-	0	223581	-	-	0	-	-	-	-
	After CASP	-	-	37767	-	-	-	4651	4	-	426	23140	-	12442	256	-	-	-	-

Table A7: Mean number of livestock before and after CASP

Province		Cattle	Goats	Sheep	Broilers	Layers	Pigs	Donkeys	Horses	Fish	Ostriches
EC	Before CASP	54	11	14	22	0	1	-	-	-	1
	After CASP	103	34	356	0	24	6	-	-	-	0
FS	Before CASP	24	0	30	48	10	14	-	-	0	4
	After CASP	30	3	30	0	163	14	-	-	20	9
GP	Before CASP	11	4	2	152	61	5	-	-	-	-
	After CASP	10	4	3	0	16	6	-	-	-	-
KZN	Before CASP	8	2	-	213	0	14	-	-	-	-
	After CASP	25	2	-	0	0	28	-	-	-	-
LP	Before CASP	4	2	1	125	19	0	-	-	-	-
	After CASP	4	3	1	0	17	1	-	-	-	-
MP	Before CASP	33	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
	After CASP	30	0	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
NW	Before CASP	26	6	2	-	-	2	-	0	-	-
	After CASP	32	5	4	-	-	2	-	1	-	0
NC	Before CASP	45	32	7	-	2	-	0	0	-	10
	After CASP	81	95	15	-	2	-	2	1	-	67
WC	Before CASP	5	0	36	-	1	3	-	-	-	-
	After CASP	13	3	55	-	1	16	-	-	-	-
Total	Before CASP	210	57	92	560	93	39	0	0	0	15
	After CASP	328	149	464	0	223	73	2	3	20	76

Table A8: Project management's mean monthly salaries (R)

Province	Before CASP	After CASP
Eastern Cape	745.76	1190.68
Free State	285.58	499.06
Gauteng	430.72	615.06
KwaZulu-Natal	2743.75	3995.81
Limpopo	870.18	1017.86
Mpumalanga	1810	880
North West	955.17	1160.71
Northern Cape	455.26	500
Western Cape	677.91	1538.37
Total	1035.42	1488.08

Table A9: Project beneficiaries' mean monthly salaries (R)

Province	Before CASP	After CASP
Eastern Cape	390.68	599.49
Free State	232.35	536.54
Gauteng	210.84	250.60
KwaZulu-Natal	869.38	1109.38
Limpopo	364.29	696.43
Mpumalanga	530.00	670.00
North West	206.90	364.29
Northern Cape	263.16	152.63
Western Cape	1279.07	1338.37
Total	496.86	672.49

Annexure 2: References

Asian Productivity Organization. 2004. Report of the APO on strengthening agricultural support services for small farmers held in Japan, 4-11 July 2001.

Breisinger, C., Diao, X., Thurlow, J. and Al-Hassan R.M. 2008. Agriculture for development in Ghana: New opportunities and challenges. IFPRI Discussion Paper 00784. International Food Policy Research Institute. Washington, DC.

Department of Agriculture. 2001. Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture. Pretoria.

Department of Agriculture. 2004. Progress report on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agriculture Support Programme (CASP). Pretoria.

Department of Agriculture (undated). Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme: A draft document for the Deputy Director-General: Agricultural Production and Resource Management of the Department of Agriculture. Pretoria.

Department of Agriculture. 2007. A national review of the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme. Pretoria.

Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). 2012. Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) Annual Report (2011/12). Pretoria.

Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). 2013. Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) Annual Report (2012/13). Pretoria.

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 2009. A review of experiences of establishing emerging farmers in South Africa: Case lessons and implications for farmer support within land reform programmes. Rome.

Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). 2013. Agriculture and trade policy background Note: Republic of China.

Global Harvest Initiative. 2013. 2013 GAP Report – The Brazil-China agricultural connection. www.globalharvestinitiative.org. Accessed on 06 December 2013.

Hart, T and Aliber, M. 2012. Inequalities in agricultural support for women in South Africa. Policy Brief November 2012. Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Pretoria.

Kirsten, J F and Machethe C L. 2005. Appraisal of Land Reform Projects in North West Province. Unpublished review report to the National Department of Agriculture. University of Pretoria, Pretoria.

Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs. 2006. Land and agrarian reform in South Africa: 1994-2006. Pretoria.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2006. OECD review of agricultural policies in South Africa. Paris: OECD.

Overseas Development Institute (ODI). 2011. Ghana's sustained agricultural growth: Putting underused resources to work. London.

Public Service Commission. 2011. An Evaluation of the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP). Pretoria.

Republic of Kenya. 2011. Agricultural Sector Development Programme: A programme document. Nairobi.

Statistics South Africa (Statssa) 2011. Census 2011: Profile of persons with disabilities in South Africa. Report 03-01-59. Pretoria.

The United Republic of Tanzania (undated). Agricultural Sector Development Programme. Tanzania.

Rural 21 (undated). How Brazilian agricultural policy is promoting family farms.

The World Bank. 1993. China agricultural support services. Staff Appraisal Report. Report 11147-CBA. International Food Policy Research Institute. Washington, D.C.

U.S. International Trade Commission. 2012. Brazil: Competitive factors in Brazil affecting U.S. and Brazilian Agricultural Sales in selected third country markets. Investigation no. 332-524. USITC Publication 4310. Washington, DC.

Vink N., van Rooyen, J. and Karaan, M. 2013. Farmer support programmes: Lessons from implementation. Paper read at “Strategies to overcome poverty and inequality: towards Carnegie III” conference, 04 September 2013, University of Cape Town.