THE PRESIDENCY
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DEPARTMENT: PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Impact and Implementation Evaluation of Government Coordination Systems:
Final Report

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Impact Economix

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APP	Annual Performance Plan
APS	Australian Public Service
ASIDI	Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Initiative
CAF	Committee of Federative Affairs (Brazil)
CANASEMS	National Council of the Municipal Health Secretaries (Brazil)
CEM	Council of Education Ministers
CIB	Bipartite Inter-Manager Commission (Brazil)
CIT	Tripartite Inter-Managers Commission (Brazil)
CIU	Cabinet Implementation Unit (Australia)
CNE	National Educational Council (Brazil)
COAG	Council of Australian Government (Australia)
CONARES	National Council of State Representatives (Health. Brazil)
CONFAZ	National Council for Fiscal Policy (Brazil)
DA	Delivery Agreement
DBE	Department of Basic Education
DDG	Deputy Director General
DG	Director General
DoE	Department of Energy
DORA	Division of Revenue Act 2012
DPE	Department of Public Enterprises
DPME	Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (SA Presidency)
DPSA	Department of Public Services and Administration
dti	Department of Trade and Industry
EA	Environmental Assessment
ECA	Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EMPs	Environmental Management Plans
EPC	Energy Portfolio Committee
ERA	Energy Regulations Act No. 4 of 2006
ESEID	Economic Sector, Employment and Infrastructure Development Cabinet Committee
FOSAD	Forum of South African Directors General
G&A	Governance & Administration
Headcom	Meetings of heads of national and provincial education departments
IF	Implementation Forum
IGR	Inter-governmental Relations
IGRA	Inter-Governmental Relations Act 13 of 2005 (South Africa)
IDC	Infrastructure Development Cluster
IMC	Inter-Ministerial Committee
IPP	Independent Power Producer
JCPS	Justice, Crime Prevention, and Security Cluster
JUG	Joined up Government
KPI	Key performance indicator
LOLT	Language of Teaching and Learning
LTSM	Learner, Teacher, Support Materials
MEC	Member of the Executive Council (Provincial cabinet member)
MFMA	Municipal Financial Management Act
MinMEC	Inter-governmental structure involving representatives from national, provincial, and local government at Ministerial level
MinTECH	Inter-governmental structure involving representatives from national, provincial, and local government at technical/ official level
MoA	Memorandum of Agreement
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPAT	Management Performance Assessment Tool
MPRDA	Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act 28 of 2002
MSA	Municipal Systems Act
MTSF	Medium Term Strategic Framework

NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NDHS	National Department of Human Settlements
NDP	National Development Plan 2030 (South Africa)
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NEAF	National Environmental Advisory Forum
NEMA	National Environmental Management Act 73 of 1998
NEP	National Evaluation Plan
NEPF	National Evaluation Policy Framework
NERSA	National Energy Regulator of South Africa
NES	National Evaluation System
NPM	New Public Management
NT	National Treasury
OTP	Office of the Premier
PEDs	Provincial Education Departments
PFMA	Public Finance Management Act
PICC	Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Committee
PoA	Programme of Action (South Africa)
SACMEC	Southern and East African Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality
SASAMS	Schools Administration and Management System
SEU	Social Exclusion Unit (United Kingdom)
SGBs	School Governing Bodies
SMS	Senior Management Service
SU	Strategy Unit (United Kingdom)
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference

PREFACE

The National Evaluation Policy Framework (NEPF) (2011) sets out the basis for government-wide evaluation focusing on government's priority outcomes. It is intended to establish a culture of continuous improvement in service delivery.

The key elements of the Framework are the basis of the National Evaluation System (NES), part of which is the National Evaluation Plan (NEP) which is rolled each year. The approach taken in the NES is to use evaluations for learning and improving programme (and policies) performance rather than as a punitive measure.

The purpose of the NES as outlined in the NEPF (2011) is to:

1. Improve policy or programme performance (evaluation for continuous improvement). This aims to provide feedback to programme managers.
2. Evaluate for improving accountability for instance. is public spending making a difference?
3. Improve decision-making e.g. should an intervention be continued? Should how it is implemented be changed? Should increased budget be allocated?
4. Evaluate for generating knowledge (for learning): increasing knowledge about what works and what does not with regard to a public policy, programme, function or organisation.

These four purposes are in accordance with the National Development Plan 2030 which emphasises the need for greater professionalization of the civil service, as well as improvement in the quality of service delivery if the main outcomes of the plan namely, eliminating poverty and reducing inequality are to be achieved. Within this context the South African government recognises the importance of evaluations and supports the active use of evaluation findings to adjust and enhance departmental policies, strategies and work plans.

The evaluations are implemented by the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) in partnership with the relevant (service delivery) department (if any). This is managed through an evaluation Steering Committee. Members of the steering committee may not necessarily agree with the results of the evaluation, but their role is to ensure that an independent, credible evaluation process was followed. Following the evaluation the relevant departments are required to provide a management response indicating their position on the evaluation findings.

The Implementation Evaluation of Government Coordination Systems is part of the National Evaluation Plan for 2012/13.

FORMAT OF THE REPORT

The report consists of several sections:

- A one-page Policy Summary, summarising the key policy findings and recommendations.
- A five-page Executive Summary, which covers all sections of the main report (and uses the numbering in the main report so the reader can cross-refer).
- A full evaluation report including:
  - o Background.
  - o Approach/methodology.
  - o International case study lessons summary.
  - o Results and Findings.
  - o Conclusions and Recommendations.

In addition, the following separate reports have been produced as part of the evaluation process:

- A shorter 1/5/25 page summary report for decision-makers.
- International coordination case studies report.
- Data annexure report containing detailed data on the three coordination systems, including additional quotes from key informants interviewed by analytric framework theme.

The shorter 1/5/25 page report allows for a one page outline of the main messages that have come from the research, a five page executive summary and short report to present the findings and methodology used in a language that is clear and accessible to the non-research specialist and/or for those who may not have time to read the full report.

This report has been independently prepared by Impact Economix, reporting to an Evaluation Steering Committee. The Evaluation Steering Committee comprises The Presidency, Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation in The Presidency, Office of the Public Service Commission, Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs. The Steering Committee oversaw the operation of the evaluation and commented and approved the reports.

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POLICY SUMMARY

The Presidency commissioned this evaluation to assess the performance of coordination systems in government, both technical and ministerial, and to see how to strengthen their effectiveness. The evaluation focused on clusters, MinMECs and outcome Implementation Forums (IFs). The evaluation was informed by a survey of directors-general (DGs), interviews with 38 DGs and 4 Ministers, as well as analysis of minutes and was undertaken from March - November 2013.

Co-ordination is meant to lead to improved performance across the chain of policy development and implementation. Coordination is meant to enhance outcomes, particularly government's impact on society. The National Development Plan points to the need for a developmental state with the organisational and technical capacity to lead society on a high trajectory of growth and development, and with a Centre capable of directing government as a whole and ensuring intra- and inter-governmental integrated and mutually-reinforcing actions.

There are indications that the coordination structures are not optimally meeting their roles and mandates. Only 54% of DGs felt that participants at clusters were adequately prepared for meetings, only 50% felt that the quality of decisions was good, while only 32% felt there was good accountability for implementing cluster decisions.

Key recommendations from the evaluation include:

Number of meetings:

1. The **number** of coordination structure meetings needs to be reduced. Some recommendations include The Presidency engaging with Parliament to agree on days on which departments and Ministers will not be called to Parliament, and reducing Programme of Action (PoA) reporting periods from 4 per annum to 3 per annum. Other possible options include: A) reduce number of clusters B) reduce numbers of departments participating in each cluster C) do away with Ministerial Clusters and only have Cabinet committees.

Weak coordination structure secretariat functions:

2. The **coordination structure secretariat role** should not be seen as administrative but a high level organisational role requiring at least one dedicated senior official. The job descriptions should be revised by the Presidency working with the clusters to reflect this role.

3. Refined **Terms of Reference (TORs)** should be developed by the Presidency for all structures which clarify the difference in roles, as well as the core mandates they should focus on. The need for guidelines and terms of reference should be backed up by The Presidency to support and ensure compliance.

4. The **Presidency**[1] should play a stronger role in supporting structure secretariats and the coordination structures in a number of areas including the pro-active identification of key implementation blockages and policy coherence issues, raising these within and outside the coordination structures, and working to ensure that blockages are resolved. This includes setting minimum capacity and competency requirements for secretariats, training, monitoring and supporting the secretariats.

Lack of leadership, problem-solving, accountability and weak coordination culture:

5. For coordination to be effective ministers have to take a lead.

6. The **chairing** of meetings needs to be improved. It would assist if chairpersons of clusters/IFs were the dominant actor/department in that area. Specific training should be organised for ministers and senior public servants covering chairing, coordination and problem-solving.

7. Coordination between the coordinating structures is also an issue. This is important for ensuring policy coherence across government. The Presidency should identify issues requiring

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[1] Note that the Presidency is used to include DPME and the National Planning Commission Secretariat.

coordination between structures and set up and lead issue-specific task teams to deal with such issues.

8. All departments need to ensure that performance agreements cascade down from ministerial, DG, to at least chief director levels, and that these include **stronger performance indicators** and targets for coordinated outputs**/**outcomes, and problem-solving.

9. Wherever possible DGs need to give **delegated powers** to officials to address coordination issues outside of the cluster structures. This includes the establishment of task teams to work on specific issues. Issues should only be brought to the structures if attempts to address these outside of the coordination structures have been ineffective.

10. Ministers need to hold **DGs accountable** when departments do not report on progress to the coordination structures and/or to Cabinet committees.

11. Improvements are needed to the **PoA** progress reporting system to ensure they are focusing on a limited number of top government priority items, and refining the role of Cabinet committees in the process. It is suggested above that the frequency of reporting is dropped to 3 times a year.

12. **Specific decisions** need to be taken to clarify and confirm the relationship between the **Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Committee's (PICC)** Management Committee and the Outcome 6 Technical and Ministerial IFs (for example, should the Outcome 6 Technical IF support the PICC Management Committee, is the Outcome 6 Ministerial Forum needed in addition to the PICC Management Committee?).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1   INTRODUCTION

1.1 An impact and implementation evaluation of Government Coordination Systems was undertaken as part of the National Evaluation Plan for 2013/14. Improved coordination is regarded as having an important contribution to make towards ongoing improvements to government service delivery. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the performance of coordination systems in government, both technical and ministerial, and to see how to strengthen their effectiveness. The focus was on national-level technical and ministerial clusters, MinMECs and Implementation Forums (IFs) and not on other coordination systems. The analytical framework comprising key coordination success factors related to mandate issues, resources and system issues, and behaviour issues.

1.2 A multi-method approach was undertaken to collect a range of qualitative and quantitative data on coordination success factors. Evidence was obtained from various sources including: a literature review of international coordination case studies; interviews with 4 Ministers and 38 directors general (DGs) and senior government officials; a survey of 34 DGs; six issue-specific coordination case studies; an analysis of the types of decisions taken by the 3 coordination structures between June 2011 – July 2013; and levels of attendance at structure meetings between 2011-2013.

2   BACKGROUND

2.1   Clusters do not have a clear statutory mandate but coordinate policy issues before going to Cabinet. Implementation Forums coordinate and monitor the delivery agreements for the 12 outcomes, some of which are based on clusters, some on the national-provincial MinMEC structures. MinMECs (and MinTECHs at DG level) are sectorally-based meetings of national ministers and provincial members of executive committees (MECs) applied for concurrent functions. MinMECs are the only one of the three structures that has a mandate defined through legislation (the IGR Act 13 of 2005).

2.2   The report defines coordination and shows it as a continuum between collaboration (shared responsibility, risks and rewards), networking (exchange of information) coordination (shared work), and cooperation (shared resources). Coordination is seen to be necessary when "an outcome can only be improved or attained through coordinated government action, and when the benefits…outweigh the costs…. But coordination takes time, resources and energy, so it needs to be carefully planned and focused to be effective" (New Zealand Public Service Commission. 2008). Approaches to coordination can be top-down or bottom-up, formal or informal. Coordination can be applied in developing and reviewing policies and strategies in a holistic manner; encouraging a wider understanding across departmental silos; or promoting integrated implementation where this is more effective. Peters (1998b: 47-49) extracts a series of lessons regarding top-down and bottom-up approaches to coordination:

- **Mere structural changes cannot induce behaviour alteration**, especially if the existing behaviour is reinforced by other factors in government. Geoffrey Mulgan, reflecting on the UK's experience of 'joined up government' (JUG), notes that: "On their own, interdepartmental committees and task forces have tended to have relatively little effect on behaviour, without substantial investment of time and political capital by the prime minister" (2002: 26).

- There is often **greater willingness to coordinate programmes at the bottom of**

organisations than at the top. At head offices, budgetary issues, questions of political power, and worries about influence over policy within the overall system of government tend to be dominant. At the lower echelons of organisations, services to clients tend to be the more dominant concern, and there may be greater willingness to engage in discussions with 'competitors' about ways to provide those services better.

- **Timing is important**. If coordination questions can be addressed early on in the formulation of a programme, future misunderstandings and organisational opposition can be minimised, if not necessarily eliminated. On the other hand, if the inter-organisational questions are raised prior to the existence of a clear idea of what the policy is about, the bureaucratic 'turf-fighting' may become more important than the actual formulation of a policy intervention.

- **Formal methods of coordination may not be as beneficial as the more informal techniques involving bargaining and creating market-time conditions**, if not real markets. The usual reaction of governments when faced with the issue of coordination or similar challenges is to rely on hierarchy and formal organisational mechanisms to" solve" the problem. Central agencies are particularly prone to assume that their intervention is absolutely crucial to successful coordination. However, as with coordination at the bottom of the pyramids discussed above, a better approach may be to permit those involved to address the problems themselves.

2.3   The international case studies were from the UK, Brazil and Australia. Key lessons emerging from the case studies are:

1. Coordination should take place at the lowest possible level.
2. Departments working in silos appears to be a universal norm and is a challenge facing all countries. It is unrealistic to set a goal of eliminating this behaviour - it should be accepted and managed.
3. Coordination structures should focus on a limited number of key priorities to be effective.
4. There are potential tensions between performance management of managers and coordination. Coordination should reflect in individuals' performance indicators and performance contracts, so that it is clear that coordination is part of their work responsibilities.
5. Coordination structures need to be adequately resourced and efficiently managed and have the authority and leverage to ensure compliance.

3   COORDINATION CASE STUDIES

3.1   Four case studies were used to draw out lessons from how they addressed coordination problems. The four included 2 issues which have been problematic (both addressed by clusters), and two more successful and which were dealt with by MinMECs.

4   FINDINGS: HOW WELL ARE THE COORDINATION SYSTEMS WORKING OVERALL?

4.1   Regarding **mandates** (e.g. structure roles, leadership), there were high levels of agreement by DGs that some roles are clear, appropriate and realistic, but disagreement on others. There is seen to be a blurring of roles between clusters, IFs and MinMEC s. There are indications that the structures are not optimally meeting their roles and mandates (where these are clear).. Only 54% of DGs felt that participants at clusters were adequately prepared for meetings, and only 50% felt that the quality of decisions was good, while only 32% felt there was good accountability for implementing cluster decisions.

4.2   On average only 6% of the time of clusters was spent on unblocking implementation, while 32% of time was spent on reporting. Contradictions between roles have been identified, including an excessive focus on PoA reporting at the expense of unblocking implementation and strategic policy alignment (for clusters and IFs). There are felt to be too many formal coordination structure meetings of the structures, poor timetabling, meetings are too long, and concerns expressed with the quality of some reports tabled. The feeling was that the focus of agendas could be improved to focus on strategic items and the core roles of the formal coordination structures, and that meeting chairing could be improved.

4.3   In terms of **systems and processes**, only 29% of DGs felt that reports to the clusters were well prepared. In terms of the agendas of meetings, most DGs felt that cluster agendas were well structured (78%), but fewer felt this for MinMECs (62%) and for IFs (71%). Many of the structure secretariats are not adequately resourced and are staffed by insufficiently senior officials which undermines their effectiveness. Reports are not being submitted or received on time, inappropriate reports are submitted to the formal coordination structures, and there is inadequate follow-up of decisions taken by formal coordination structures to improve accountability. Officials are not always sufficiently empowered to resolve coordination issues outside of the formal coordination structures and this contributes to over-burdening the structures with too many issues. Where issue and task-focused technical task teams have been formed to support the formal coordination structures, these have made important contributions to the effective coordination of developing legislation as well as improving service delivery and monitoring (e.g. Independent Power Producer - IPP and Learner Teacher Support Material – LTSM - case studies). But such structures are not used enough by the main coordination structures.

Insufficient accountability undermines the effectiveness of the coordination structures where Ministers do not always hold DGs accountable for submitting reports and implementing decisions taken by the coordination structures (i.e. there is a lack of a culture of consequences). Linked to this, performance management systems are not sufficiently refined to support effective participation in the coordination structures and to counter departmentalism and silo tendencies.

4.4   In terms of **behaviour**, the culture of coordination in government overall is seen as weak. This reinforces the need for coordination structures to counter or balance this culture. At the same time, where high levels of commitment to coordination and participation in coordination structures are found among both Ministers and DGs, these impacts positively on the quality of reports submitted to coordination structures as well as the quality of decision-making (e.g. IPP and LTSM case studies). Key skills and attitudes which undermine the effective functioning of the coordination structures include inadequate problem solving, the insufficient use of negotiation skills and weak chairing meeting skills. Overall there was only 40% attendance of DGs at technical clusters in 2013. Nevertheless, 87% of DGs surveyed believe that attending cluster meetings is a valuable use of time, (83% for MinMECs and 80% for IFs).

5   ISSUES IMPACTING SPECIFICALLY ON THE COORDINATION EFFECTIVENESS OF CLUSTERS, IFs AND MINMECs

5.1   An issue identified was the blurring of roles/mandates between the technical and ministerial clusters and a lack of consensus on what items/issues should be submitted from the technical cluster to the ministerial cluster. The highest percentage of DG attendance levels was the JCPS cluster at 49%, and the cluster with the lowest percentage of DG attendance levels was the G&A cluster at 25% attending. A large portion of decisions made in clusters are focused on the functioning of the clusters (17%), as well as reporting issues/processes (32%). Only 6% of cluster decisions dealt with unblocking implementation. One significant issue mentioned was the lack of a

meeting schedule agreed a year in advance for ministerial cluster meetings which is coordinated with Cabinet meetings. An important issue raised is whether the working of the cluster system, including Cabinet scrutinisation of quarterly PoA reports, is actually undermining or weakening the willingness of officials to take actions at lower levels to promote unblocking outside of the cluster structures. The view was expressed that some officials unnecessarily send an issue to a coordination structure for a decision, instead of taking action outside of the coordination structure to resolve it.

5.2   There are fairly high levels of agreement amongst DGs surveyed on the clarity and appropriateness of most **MinMEC** roles. 39% of MinMEC decisions taken in meetings between June 2011 – July 2013 pertain to administrative functioning of the MinMECs and MinMEC reporting. DGs were fairly satisfied with MinMEC decision-making, with the one exception of accountability for implementing decisions where 32% (or 55% if one includes neutral responses) of DGs felt that there was not good accountability for implementing decisions. An issue was raised that national policies do not always first go through MinMECs before being submitted to Cabinet and that Cabinet decisions are not always communicated back down to MinMECs to enhance coordinated implementation. Do MinMECs have a decision-making role regarding national policy and legislation or only a consultative role? Another issue raised was how departments with no MinMEC interface with provincial and national departments, when their activities impact on local areas and the provincial and local spheres. Concerns were raised with respect to Delivery Agreements (DAs). Provincial governments see the DAs as a national government responsibility and as a result the level of provincial buy-in and participation is good for the main concurrent competences of health and basic education, but not good in other areas.

5.3   A number of DGs do not believe that the IF's role of ongoing monitoring and reporting on implementation of the DAs is realistic. 33% of overall IF decisions dealt with IF functioning (21%) or reporting (11%). Otherwise, decisions taken by the IFs seem to cover most of the IF roles with the two most frequent decision categories dealing with unblocking implementation and coordination of departments. Only 50% of DGs surveyed feel that IF participants were adequately prepared for meetings. Only 38% of DGs felt that decision-making by IFs in the past year has been effective and only 41% of DGs agree that there has been good accountability for implementing IF decisions in the past year.

6   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summarised recommendations **across the three structures** are:

6.1   **Number of meetings:**

1. The **number of meetings** is placing impossible demands on Ministers and DGs. Some recommendations include The Presidency engaging with Parliament to agree on days on which departments and ministers will not be called to Parliament, and PoA reporting periods being reduced from 4 per annum to 3 per annum. Other possible options include:

   a) Reducing the number of clusters.
   b) Reducing the numbers of departments participating in each cluster.
   c) Dropping Ministerial Clusters and only having Cabinet committees.

2. The Presidency should do a feasibility study on the use of **video conferencing** (as happens for clusters between Cape Town and Pretoria) and telepresencing technology as a strategy to reduce the direct and indirect costs of such meetings.

6.2   **Weak secretariat functions:**

3. Secretariats need to have the **capacity** to ensure that the reports are higher quality (including PoA reports), much less time is spent on reporting and more time is available for unblocking and decision-making.
4. The structure secretariat role should not be seen as administrative but a **high level organisational role** requiring at least one dedicated senior official. The job descriptions should be revised to reflect this role. Secretariats need to play the following roles:
    a) Organise DG-ministerial briefings in advance of meetings.
    b) Structure meeting agendas to focus on a limited number of strategic issues which are aligned with the core mandates of the structures.
    c) Ensure that reports meet sufficient quality requirements before they are tabled (giving feedback on report quality issues which must first be addressed before being tabled).
    d) Follow up with departments to obtain report submissions on time.
    e) Take good quality minutes.
    f) Follow-up to try and resolve issues between meetings as well as follow-up on the status of decisions made in meetings.
5. Refined **TORs** should be developed by the Presidency for all structures which clarify the difference in roles, the core mandates they should focus on, as well as operational mechanisms. The TORs should include clear time-frames which secretariats must strictly enforce for the submission of reports for coordination structure meetings, as well as ensuring that Cabinet committee reports have first been approved for submission to the Cabinet committee via the relevant cluster structure. The revised TORs should clarify and formalise how feedback should take place between structures.
6. The **Presidency** needs to ensure that required processes have been followed in making Cabinet submissions, that submissions are of sufficient quality, and to advise the principals in The Presidency on the consistency of such submissions with broad government objectives and with other policies and programmes. Secretariats should enforce co-ordination imperatives, among others by having the power to send back submissions into the Cabinet system if they do not meet requirements as well as monitoring and following-up more strongly on implementation of decisions.
7. The Presidency should play a major role in strengthening structure secretariats, with a senior official allocated to each cluster who works with the cluster. Tasks include:
    a) Establishing guidelines for strengthening the resourcing and functioning of structure secretariats.
    b) Working with the secretariats to refine the strategic and unblocking focus of agendas.
    c) Training and monitoring and supporting the secretariats.

6.3   Lack of leadership, problem-solving, accountability and weak coordination culture:

8. For coordination to be effective ministers have to take a lead, as demonstrated in the Learning and Teaching Support Materials case study.
9. The **chairing** of meetings needs to be improved, which is closely linked to meeting management, discussed below. **Chairpersonship** should reflect the actual co-ordination role of the ministry/Department in that area (e.g. Rural Development should not coordinate the Economic Cluster but rather one of the lead departments, dti, EDD or National Treasury).
10. **Coordination between coordinating structures** is important for ensuring policy coherence across government. The Presidency should identify issues requiring coordination between structures and set up and lead issue-specific task teams to deal with such issues.

11. There is a need for all departments to ensure that performance agreements for ministers, DGs to at least chief director levels include **stronger performance indicators and targets** for coordinated outputs**/**outcomes and problem-solving, and that these are linked (e.g. between Minister and DG). The Presidency should develop guidelines, and/or specific examples of refined Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) which promote coordination and the effective functioning of the coordination structures. Attendance by ministers at ministerial cluster meetings should be a KPI in the ministers' performance agreements with the President. DGs need to give delegated powers to officials to address coordination issues outside of cluster structures. Issues should only be brought to the high-level structures if attempts outside of the structures have been ineffective.

12. Ministers need to hold DGs accountable when departments do not report on progress to the coordination structures or Cabinet. The Presidency should engage the SA School of Government (as well as explore possible partnerships with Higher Education Institutions) to include in the curriculum:
    a) Coordination and problem-solving skills.
    b) Specialised courses on negotiation skills and meeting chairing, including a high level programme on chairing skills for DGs and ministers.
    c) A dedicated training programme for structure secretariats.

13. The Presidency needs to take responsibility for forming and supporting ad-hoc dedicated coordination task teams to deal with difficult cross-cutting policy or strategy issues where deep differences exist between departments. To enhance their effectiveness, these task teams should report either directly to the President (or deputy President), and/or a senior minister, and/or Cabinet committee.

6.4   Recommendations for **specific structures** are:

14. The refining of MinMEC TORs should clarify which issues require **coordination** between MinMECs and clusters.
15. The Presidency needs to work with MinMECs to clarify the role they play in alignment of strategic plans; priorities, objectives and strategies across the three spheres.
16. It may be appropriate to establish an **economic development MinMEC**, so that the lead economic departments have a forum for working with provinces.
17. DPME to review the TORs with the IFs to ensure members are clear on the IFs' role in unblocking bottlenecks, including guidance for the functioning of special working groups to address specific bottlenecks, and for the referral of matters to clusters.
18. Specific decisions need to be taken regarding the **Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Committee (PICC)** structures and the outcome 6 technical and ministerial IF. For example, should the Outcome 6 Technical IF support the PICC Management Committee, and is the Outcome 6 Ministerial Forum needed in addition to the PICC Management Committee?.

1.   Introduction

1.1   Background to the evaluation

The Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) in the Presidency is the custodian of the National Evaluation System and seeks to ensure continuous improvement in service delivery through performance monitoring and evaluation. DPME's mandate derives from Section 85 (2) (c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which states that the President exercises executive authority, together with the other members of the Cabinet, by coordinating the functions of state departments and administrations.

DPME commissioned an evaluation of the effectiveness of the cluster, implementation forum and MinMEC coordination structures as part of the National Evaluation Plan for 2013/14.

Chapter three of the South African Constitution establishes the following principles of co-operative government and inter-governmental relations and which provide a background to this evaluation (only relevant principles quoted here):

(1) All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must:

   (a)   preserve the peace, national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic;
   (b)   provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole.
   (c)   Respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the other spheres.
   (d)   Exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere.
   (e)   Co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by-
       (i)   Fostering friendly relations.
       (ii) Assisting and supporting one another.
       (iii) Informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common interest.
       (iv) Co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another.
       (v)   Adhering to agreed procedures.
       (vi) Avoiding legal proceedings against one another.

The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (DPSA, 1995) noted that the first democratic government inherited a system with poor integration and coordination. In recognition of this, the 1996 Presidential Review Commission recommended a stronger Cabinet secretariat or Cabinet Office (The Presidency, 1998). Based on the findings of the Presidential Review Commission and comparative studies of other countries by the then deputy president's office, the Presidency was restructured in 1999 and a new system was put in place, including a new Cabinet cluster system and clusters of directors general.

In 2008, the Presidency produced an assessment of the cluster system, which identified certain issues related to improving oversight of the implementation of the PoA, as well as aligning departments to cross-cutting priorities (see section 2.2 for more details) (Presidency, 2008). In 2010, government introduced the Outcomes System (Presidency, 2010) which included performance agreements for the Presidency and ministers, DAs for the 12 outcomes, and IFs to oversee these. In addition, the Inter-Governmental Relations Act of 2005 (IGRA) formalised the

MinMEC arrangements to promote inter-governmental or vertical coordination. The report concluded that further research was needed on why some cluster sub-structures have been more successful at coordination than others and the role of the Presidency as the centre of the cluster system. This evaluation will contribute towards taking forward the above-mentioned areas and confirm whether the findings of the 2008 report are still relevant or not.

Given that the clusters, IFs, and MinMECs have been in existence for a number of years and that the current 2009-2014 term of office is coming to an end, the Presidency decided that this was an opportune time to evaluate the effectiveness of these coordination systems.

1.2   Evaluation purpose and scope

The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the performance of coordination systems in government, both technical and ministerial, and to see how to strengthen their effectiveness.

The focus was on national-level technical and ministerial clusters, MinMECs and IFs, not other coordination systems. The focus included the relationships between the administrative structures (referred to as technical clusters, IFs and MinTECHs) and political structures (referred to as ministerial clusters, MinMECs, and ministerial IFs) including the linkages between these and the Cabinet committees.

The original evaluation questions as contained in the evaluation's terms of reference are as follows:

1. **To what extent are these systems improving coordination in government in general?**
   a)   What is working well and what is not working well, and why?
   b)   How are the cluster system (ministerial and Forum of South African Director General clusters) and MinMECs working in general terms? How do the ministerial and technical structures relate? How do they work in relation to the outcome IFs? Is there a need for rationalisation in this regard?

2. **What needs to be done to improve the coordination mechanisms?** For example:
   a)   Are the mandates, roles and responsibilities clear, appropriate and being fulfilled or do they need to be clarified or changed?
   b)   Does there need to be change in mandates?
   c)   Do the coordination structures have the institutional capacity to do what is expected of them? If not, what should be done in this regard? How could their operation be improved?
   d)   Is the schedule of meetings appropriate?
   e)   What is needed to ensure appropriate representation?

3. **Should the regulatory framework be changed,** e. g. to give clusters or MinMECs authority and accountability for overseeing implementation?

1.3   Report structure

This report has the following six main sections as follows:

a) Section 1: Introduction - evaluation background, purpose, and methodology.

b) Section 2: Coordination background including the three coordination structures; key coordination concepts; the coordination analytic framework, and a summary of overall coordination lessons from the international case studies.

c) Section 3: Coordination issue case studies to identify key lessons in terms of how the coordination structures have handled specific coordination issues.

d) Section 4: Overall findings and conclusions regarding how well the three coordination structures/ systems are working in terms of mandate, resource/ process, and behaviour issues.

e) Section 5: Cluster, MinMEC and IF-specific findings and conclusions regarding how well each of the three coordination structures/ systems are working in terms of mandate, resource/ process, and behaviour issues.

f) Section 6: Overall conclusions and recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms.

1.4   Methodology

The evaluation methodology included international case studies, development of the analytical framework, a survey of DGs, analysis of minutes of meetings, and a range of interviews with Ministers, DGs, and outcome facilitators. This is summarised in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1**: Methodology for evaluation of government coordination systems**

The analytic framework was derived from the international literature review and identifies enablers and success factors for coordination. This was used to guide the collection and analysis of data relevant to the functioning of cluster, IF and MinMEC structures.

A rich set of qualitative and quantitative data was collected from a variety of data sources to inform the findings, conclusions and recommendations, including the following:

a) **Key informant interviews** conducted between June 2013 - September 2013:
   o Four ministers. Interviews were requested with nine ministers (Health, National Planning Commission, Tourism, and Home Affairs).
   o 16 directors general.
   o 10 outcome facilitators.
   o Eight other senior officials.
b) **A survey of DGs** carried out in August 2013 at a FOSAD workshop: 34 out of 45 DGs (75%) responded.
c) **Analysis of selected minutes** of cluster, IF, and MinMEC structures (June 2011-August 2013).
d) **Analysis of cluster DG attendance** levels (2012-2013).
e) **Six coordination issue case studies** dealt with by the coordination structures (both dealt with well and dealt with poorly).
f) **A review of other key documents** and legislation on the functioning of the coordination structures, including the 2008 Presidency review of the cluster system, the Inter-governmental Relations Act 13 of 2005 and the DPME's terms of reference for implementation forums (DPME. March 2012).

Evaluation limitations and process challenges experience are detailed in Annex 3: Methodology.

A steering committee was chaired by the Presidency and included four director generals. This oversaw the evaluation process and commented on draft deliverables at key stages. The steering committee met on 13 March, 27 June, and 19th August 2013 and a presentation the preliminary findings were made at a FOSAD Management Committee on 7 October 2013. A number of local and international peer reviewers also provided comments on the draft report Including Joel Netshitenzhe, Geoff Mulgan, and Anne Letsebe. The final report was approved by a Steering Committee in January 2014.

2.   Background and Context

Section 2 provides an overview of the cluster, IF, and MinMEC system. It then discusses key coordination definitions, concepts, approaches and tools, and high level lessons from the literature.

2.1   The cluster, IF, and MinMEC system

2.1.1 Cluster system

FOSAD clusters are responsible for policy and legislative issues, as well as other horizontal cross-cutting matters. They comprise technical clusters (at DG level) and ministerial clusters (at ministerial level) as illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Cluster system: implementation forums, clusters and Cabinet committees

Source: Presidency. 27 May 2010. Guide to the Outcomes Approach.

The aim of the Cabinet cluster system was to ensure that ministers have sufficient time outside the Cabinet committees to deal with cross-cutting policy issues. Clusters do not have a clear statutory mandate. The Constitution and key pieces of legislation such as the Public Finance Management Act, Public Service Act, and Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act make no mention of clusters. However, during the period 1999-2004, the Presidency produced various documents, including "Democratic Governance: A Restructured Presidency at Work" (Presidency, 2001), which described the roles and responsibilities of the clusters. The original purpose of clusters was to (Presidency, 2008):

a) Ensure an integrated and coordinated approach to policy formulation and coordination;
b) Combat silo approach to governance;
c) Build a collegial approach and shared perspective on government priorities.

The four main cluster roles are to (Presidency, 2008):

a) Improve Cabinet decision-making processes;
b) Harmonise and align the work (including policies and priorities) of departments and reduce departmentalism (coordinate cross-cutting matters, legislation and policy);
c) Produce cluster-based reports on the implementation of the PoA;
d) Coordination or oversight over implementation of the PoA.

In 2009, the Presidency developed ToR presentations for the clusters outlining their purpose as part of the 2009-2014 Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) process which sought to clarify government's priorities for the 2009-2014 period. The different terms of reference for the clusters as outlined in 2009 are in Annex 6. These have been synthesised for this evaluation into the following set of cluster roles (in no particular order):

a) Improve Cabinet decision-making processes.
b) Harmonise the work of departments through promoting inter-departmental planning, collaboration and coordination.
c) Produce quarterly reports on progress with the implementation of the PoA (the delivery agreements) to increase implementation pressure and transparency.
d) Coordinate and oversee implementation of the PoA including identifying and resolving implementation blockages.
e) The coordination and alignment of departmental policies and priorities.
f) Integrated planning and implementation of policy and cluster programmes.
g) Promoting effective decision-making on issues relating to policy development and implementation.
h) Promote active collaboration with provincial clusters to implement government's PoA,
i) Integrated approach to monitoring and evaluation of government's performance.
j) Ensuring adequate resources for the implementation of cluster priorities.

2.1.2 Implementation forums (IFs)

In 2009 government decided to introduce a new outcomes approach, focusing on the achievement of results in 12 priority outcome areas. When the president entered into performance agreements with his ministers in 2010, he appointed some of them as coordinating ministers for each of the outcomes.

In April 2010, Cabinet approved a memorandum clarifying the institutional arrangements for the outcomes approach. Key decisions included the following (Governance & Administration Cluster Draft TOR, January 2013):

a) Outcome coordinating ministers will lead IFs to coordinate the development and implementation of delivery agreements for each of the outcomes.
b) As far as possible, existing structures will be used as outcome IFs. Outcomes were therefore allocated to various ministerial clusters and MinMECs (and other structures similar to MinMECs) (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). For example, the implementation forum for Outcome 12 was identified as the G&A Ministerial Cluster and the Implementation Forum for Outcome nine was identified as the local government MinMEC.

c) At the level of officials, it was decided that technical implementation forums will support the IFs. Again, existing structures were to be utilised. Hence the FOSAD G&A cluster was identified as the technical implementation forum for Outcome 12 and the local government Headcom (meeting of national and provincial heads of department, together with representatives of local government) was identified as the technical implementation forum for Outcome nine.

d) There will be flexibility and diversity in the membership and functioning of the IFs and technical implementation forums. Some of the work of the forums may be carried out by various types of substructures. All departments and other spheres which have a substantial contribution to make to an outcome should participate in the forums or their substructures.

e) The IFs will provide progress reports on the outcomes to the relevant Cabinet committees on a quarterly basis. These will be high-level reports which focus on providing Cabinet with information on the degree to which the outcomes are being achieved. The IFs for both outcomes nine and 12 report to the G&A Cabinet committee.

f) The new PoA will be based on the outputs, indicators and targets for the outcomes.

g) DPME will assist the technical IFs with monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the delivery agreements for each outcome. The purpose of this monitoring and evaluation will be to enable improvements to be made with regard to the implementation of the delivery agreements, and the monitoring and evaluation results will be used to inform annual revisions of the delivery agreements.

In summary outcome IFs are responsible for producing the 12 delivery agreements, coordinating implementation, and monitoring and reporting on progress against the 12 outcomes to Cabinet committees. IFs do not have a statutory mandate.

A separate terms of reference for IFs was developed and distributed by DPME in 2010. In 2012, the Presidency (DPME, March 2012) produced a revised terms of reference which formalised the IF's roles and stated that they will facilitate collaboration, agree on necessary interventions to ensure delivery stays on track and blockages towards achievement of the outcome and priority outputs are removed by contributing towards the following:

a) Improve Cabinet decision-making processes.

b) Promote policy coherence relevant to the cluster.

c) Inform and to execute Cabinet-decided priorities relevant to the cluster.

d) Promote active collaboration between ministries and departments.

e) Ensure effective implementation and monitoring of delivery agreements (DAs).

f) Unblock implementation blockages, resolve emerging bottlenecks (organisational, legislative, policy, financial) and identify opportunities to speed up implementation and effective service delivery.

g) Coordinate and secure mutually supporting actions amongst all members to fast-track delivery on the outputs and activities related to the outcome.

h) Develop and maintain a communication strategy with the sector to facilitate implementation, wider support and buy-in.

When the cluster operates as an outcome implementation forum, it should utilise the terms of reference for IFs. DPME's Terms of Reference Guideline for Implementation Forums (23 March 2012: 1) states that:

> The main aim of monitoring and reporting on progress with implementing the Delivery Agreements is to enter into a cycle of continuous improvement.

Monitoring of the progress reports should highlight areas where implementation is weak, where the activities and outputs are not contributing to the outcome as planned, and should prompt an evaluation of why things are the way they are and propose actions regarding what is needed to improve performance. This in turn should result in interventions to improve implementation or in periodic revisions to the activities in the Delivery Agreements, so that government gets better at achieving the outcomes and outputs over time.

In terms of the 12 outcomes, there are two types of DAs in terms of the legal status:

Outcomes approach, IFs, and Delivery Agreements: outcomes involving more than 1 sphere Delivery Agreement will have the status of an Implementation Protocol in terms of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act so that the dispute resolution mechanisms as prescribed by the Act can be utilised. For outcomes involving national departments, Delivery Agreements will not yet have legal status and will be inter-departmental agreements (a management tool for implementing the outputs related to the outcome). (DPME, 27 May 2010: 17)

Table 1: Relationship between implementation forums, clusters and MinMECs

	Coordinating Structure	Technical Implementation Forum	FOSAD Cluster	Implementation Forum	Cabinet Committee
	Level	Administrative	Administrative	Executive and administrative	Executive
	Agenda	Agenda: implementation of outcome	Agenda: General coordination	Agenda: implementation of outcomes	As before, with addition of outcome reports
1	Education	Headcom	Human Development	MinMec	Social Protection and HD
2	Health	Headcom	Human Development	MinMec	Social Protection and HD
3	Security	JCPS Cluster / substructure	JCPS	JCPS	JCPS
4	Skills	Headcom	Human Development	MinMec	Social / economic
5	Employment	Economic Cluster / substructure	Economic	Economic	Economic Sectors and Infrastructure Development
6	Infrastructure	Infrastructure Cluster / substructure	Infrastructure	Infrastructure	Economic Sectors and Infrastructure Development
7	Rural	Headcom	Social Protection / Economic	Expanded MinMEC	Social / economic
8	H. Settlements	Headcom	Social Protection	Expanded MinMEC	Social Protection and HD
9	Local gov't	Headcom	G&A	Expanded MinMEC	G&A
10	Environment	Headcom	Economic / Infrastructure	Expanded MinMEC	Economic Sectors and Infrastructure Development
11	International	ICTS Cluster / substructure	ICTS	ICTS	ICTS
12	Public service	G&A Cluster / substructure	G&A	G&A	G&A

Key:
■ Integration with MinMEC system
□ Continuity with existing cluster system

Source: DPME. 23 March 2012.

With respect to the relationship between clusters, IFs, and MinMECs the Presidency's TOR states the following (and refer to Table 1 illustrating the links between clusters, IFs and MinMECs):

Implementation Forums are usually either MinMECs or Clusters. At some meetings the MinMEC or Cluster will focus on the outcome, and sometimes it will focus on other issues. When the MinMEC or Cluster is focusing on the outcome it is then functioning as an Implementation Forum. The Technical

> MinMEC or Cluster we refer to as the Technical Implementation Forum, and
> the meeting of ministers and MECs as the Minister's Implementation Forum.

The purpose of the DAs is to provide the clusters and MinMECs acting as IFs with a strategic agenda and plan around government's priorities.

2.1.3 MinMECs

MinMECs (and MinTECHs at DG level) are sectorally-based meetings of national ministers and provincial members of executive committees (MECs) applied for concurrent functions. The primary reason for their establishment is to promote cooperation, coordination and communication between the various national departments and their provincial counterparts. MinMECs comprise a national minister and members of the executive council (MECs) in each of the provinces. Depending on the sector, MinMECs are intended to meet regularly, and discuss the implementation of government policies and the division of financial and other resources. The forum allows for cross-cutting issues to be debated and the opportunity for various departments involved in the delivery of a common objective to collaborate, and more importantly, to coordinate their efforts in the interests of efficiency of effort and expediting delivery.

Their deliberations are less overarching and more sectoral and detailed in character than the matters discussed by the bodies such as the Cabinet or the inter-governmental forum.

MinMECs are the only one of the three structures that has a mandate defined through legislation (the IGR Act 13 of 2005) as follows:

> A consultative forum for the Cabinet member responsible for the functional area for which the forum is established:

1. Raise matters of national interest within that functional area with provincial governments, and if appropriate, organised local government and to hear their views on those matters.
2. Consult provincial governments and, if appropriate, organised local government on:
   a) The development of national policy and legislation relating to matters affecting that functional area.
   b) The implementation of national policy and legislation with respect to that functional area.
   c) The coordination and alignment within that functional area of:
      - Strategic performance plans.
      - Priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local governments.
      - Any other matters of strategic importance within that functional area that affect the interests of other governments.
3. Discuss the performance in the provision of services in order to detect failures and to initiate preventive or corrective action when necessary.

MinMECs and MinTECHs are therefore are responsible for the following:

- The harmonisation of legislation within a given sector.
- The division and deployment of financial resources.
- The harmonisation of programmes on a national basis.
- Consultation and negotiation on national norms and standards.
- The integration of inter-governmental policies and strategy.
- The formulation of joint programmes and projects.
- The sharing of sectoral information.

- The unambiguous assignment of roles and responsibilities between the various spheres of government.

2.2   Key coordination concepts: definitions, reasons to coordinate, approaches and tools

This section provides an overview of government coordination drawn from the international literature and provides a background to the coordination case studies in terms of the following:

a) Definitions of coordination.
b) Reasons why coordination is important.
c) Coordination approaches and types of coordination mechanisms or tools.
d) General government coordination lessons.

2.2.1 Definitions of coordination

There are a number of definitions of coordination:

a) "A process in which two or more parties take one another into account for the purpose of bringing together their decisions and/or activities into harmonious or reciprocal relation" (Kernaghan and Siegel, 1987: 263).

b) "The development of ideas about joint and holistic working, joint information systems, dialogue between agencies, process of planning and making decisions" Perri. 2004:106).

c) The all-important duty of inter-relating the various parts of the work (Gunlick. 1937).

d) '"The instruments and mechanisms that aim to enhance the voluntary or forced alignment of tasks and efforts within the public sector. These mechanisms are used in order to create a greater coherence and to reduce redundancy, lacunae and contradictions within policies, implementation or management" (Bouckaert et al. 2010).

e) The sharing of information, resources and responsibilities to achieve a particular outcome (New Zealand State Services Commission, Factors for Successful Coordination. 2008).

Different levels of coordination outcomes are identified in the following table:

Table 2: Levels of coordination as an outcome

Government strategy
Establish central priorities
Set limits on ministerial action
Arbitration of policy differences
Search for agreement among ministries
Avoid divergences among ministries
Consult with other ministries (feedback)
Communicate with other ministries (info exchange)
Independent decision-making by ministries

Coordination can be viewed as an end-state in which the policies and programmes are characterised by minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae (Peters, 1998a:296).

Coordination can be seen as a continuum (see Table 4): collaboration (shared responsibility, risks and rewards), networking (exchange of information) coordination (shared work), cooperation

(shared resources). Whilst separate, the three dimensions and the relationships underpinning them are interrelated and mutually-reinforcing. In practice, the relationships between inter-related coordination structures: clusters, MinMECs, and IFs (interdepartmental and inter-sphere structures) can cover a wide spectrum.

The continuum demonstrates that not all interdepartmental and inter-sphere coordinating structures interrelationships involve formal coordinating arrangements. The extent to which goals, power, resources, risks, successes and accountabilities are shared across the continuum varies. Coordinating government approaches require collaborative relationships as depicted at the further end of the continuum where common goals, recognised interdependencies, high levels of commitment, and shared responsibilities and rewards are established.

Table 3: Continuum of coordination relationships

Networking	Coordinating	Cooperation	Collaboration
Exchange of information for mutual benefit	Exchange of information for mutual benefit	Exchange of information for mutual benefit	Exchange of information for mutual benefit
Informal relationships	Alter activities	Alter activities to achieve a common purpose	Formal relationships
Minimal time and trust	Formal relationships	Formal relationships	Enhance the capacity of another to achieve common purpose
No sharing of resources	Requires moderate time and trust	Requires substantial time and trust	Requires extensive time and trust
	Minimal sharing of resources	Sharing of resources	Sharing of resources
		Some sharing of risks and rewards	Share risks, responsibilities and rewards

Source: Victoria State Services Authority. 2007.

2.2.2 Why is coordination important?

The question arises as to why coordination is important. Reasons include the following:

a) The challenges facing countries are bigger than one department/agency/sector of society can solve alone.
b) By pooling the best of their resources departments/agencies/role-players provide better solutions.
c) It helps to reduce duplication and ensure citizens and businesses can access the best service at the right cost.
d) It targets government effort at priority areas.
e) Citizens (and businesses) expect it.

Put more simply, coordination is often seen as necessary to reduce the gap between government's stated intentions and the reality of government services experienced by citizens. Several studies on whole-of-government approaches conclude that a gap between talk and action often occurs because of significant barriers to coordination (Gregory, 2006).

Coordination is seen to be necessary when "an outcome can only be improved or attained

through coordinated government action, and when the benefits…outweigh the costs…. But coordination takes time, resources and energy, so it needs to be carefully planned and focused to be effective" (New Zealand Public Service Commission. 2008).

Finally, coordination has increased in importance where governments have been seeking to reassert central direction in order to improve performance (Halligan. 2008).

It is recognised that coordination is a worldwide challenge experienced by all governments to which there are no easy or quick solutions and that this challenge is not unique to the South African context.

2.2.3 Coordination approaches and mechanisms/tools

Various broad approaches to coordination can be identified. These approaches include:

- top-down approaches (where coordination is ensured by the exercise of authority at the top);
- bottom-up approaches
  - o include the use of networks; as well as
  - o market mechanisms (where various mechanisms including contracts and regulations structure relationships).

Coordination can take place at various stages: during the planning and budgeting process, the policy/legislative or programme/project development stage, and/or the policy/legislative or programme/project implementation stage. Top down approaches are often linked to the policy/legislative or programme/project development stage, whist bottom up approaches are often linked to the policy/legislative or programme/project implementation stage.

Another typology of coordination mechanisms shown in Fgure 3. Three categories of coordination are identified:

a) 'Behind the Handshake' refers to the fact that fundamental changes in organisational cultures are necessary to facilitate coordinated approaches in planning and executing programs and policies. Without this backdrop, the use of coordination mechanisms is unlikely to lead to success.

b) The 'Visible Hand' emphasises the fact that strong leadership is a condition for successful coordination action.

c) The 'Invisible Hand' emphasises the fact that coordination mechanisms and processes need to be supported with an appropriate level of resources and a sound organisational structure. Coordination initiatives may, for example, benefit from a management culture that relies less on command and control, and more on financial incentives, continual monitoring, and on-going consultation and engagement.

There are a number of problems with the **top-down approach to coordination**, including that it presumes linear implementation. Almost all delegated tasks, however, involve some degree of discretion. Top-down approaches can work well as long as the organisations involved are well integrated from top to bottom and they have a clear mandate about what to do.

Figure 3**: Three categories of coordination mechanism**

Source: Adapted from Mansholt. 2008. Public Health Agency of Canada (accessed at: http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/2009/ActNowBC/section2-partie2-eng.php#bib).

Administrators often have technical expertise and detailed knowledge of their various fields; they often have a better understanding of detailed mechanisms than politicians, which gives them the ability to make detailed policy decisions. Lipsky (1980), in his seminal work on street level bureaucrats shows how officials such as educators and social workers make choices to enforce some rules, particularly those which protect them, while disregarding others. The large workload, inadequate resources as well as the unpredictability of clients leads to the development of practices that enable officials to cope with the pressures they face. Policy continues to be made during the implementation stage. The decisions of street-level bureaucrats effectively become policies that they carry out. Responsibility for ambiguous, vague and conflicting goals belongs to elected officials (also see Maynard-Moody and Musheno. 2009).

Coordination can also be implemented from the **bottom-up**. For most social, health and educational programs the decisions that really matter are those made at the bottom of the organisation. This bottom-up perspective on coordination and implementation uses the experience and knowledge of lower-level employees who are in direct contact with clients.

Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011:99) point out that coordination can also be achieved less formally, by voluntary cooperation with a network. This can be more easily achieved where objectives are widely shared amongst all network members, communications are easy and full and the scale of operation is modest in that no major administrative reorganisation is required. Informal coordination can then happen spontaneously as needed.

Networks are considered an alternative form of governance and coordination and depend more on voluntary collaborative actions between relevant organisations. Horizontal coordination in network–type arrangements tends to depend upon bargaining, negotiating and mutual cooperation amongst individuals. The authors quote Mintzburg's "standardisation of norms and values" as an important means for intra-organisational coordination. Norms are standardized, socialisation is used to establish common values and beliefs in order for people work toward common expectations. In this perspective, a common culture that may exist amongst a set of actors may produce coordination with limited formal interaction.

This does not mean a passive role for government. The literature suggests that government can play an important role in creating, managing and sustaining cooperative networks amongst its public organisations (and other bodies) using horizontal and spontaneous coordination to enhance its policy implementation. The role and position of government is completely different from where government uses hierarchy-type mechanisms to enhance policy implementation.

A third form of coordination is the **market mechanism** which enables the activities of many producers/sellers and consumer/buyers to be coordinated without the instructions of the central authority. For example, the price mechanism enables the activities of many producers/sellers to be coordinated without any central authority telling them to do so. The use of contracting in the public sector can be considered a central element of market-type coordination. The problem is that the market mechanism may be effective in coordinating the buyers and sellers of a defined product, but less effective at coordinating sick people and health care.

Peters (1998b: 47-49) extracts a series of lessons regarding top-down and bottom-up approaches to coordination and that can assist practitioners in solving their own coordination problems:

- The first lesson is that mere structural changes cannot induce behaviour alteration, especially if the existing behaviour is reinforced by other factors in government. Those other factors, including the budgetary process and links between programmes and powerful external interest groups, may be difficult to overcome simply by altering formal structures. Those political factors tend to reinforce the tendency inherent in most organisations to deal only with their own vision of policy problems rather than cooperating with other organisations, especially when their budgets may potentially be affected. Structure is important, and can facilitate coordination, but to produce behavioural changes may require the active intervention of political leaders, often political leaders at the very top of government. The differential weight attached to coordination by different politicians appears to count for more than structure. Geoffrey Mulgan, reflecting on the UK's experienced of 'joined up government' (JUG), notes that: "On their own, interdepartmental committees and task forces have tended to have relatively little effect on behaviour, without substantial investment of time and political capital by the prime minister" (2002: 26).

- The second lesson is that there is often greater willingness to coordinate programmes at the bottom of organisations than there is at the top. At head offices, budgetary issues, questions of political power, and worries about influence over policy within the overall system of government tend to be dominant. At the lower echelons of organisations, services to clients tend to be the more dominant concern, with the consequence that there may be greater willingness to engage in discussions with 'competitors' about ways to provide those services better. Coordination at this level may, however, be extremely inefficient. It requires breaking down a series of structural and procedural barriers that have been created by the organisations, rather than solving these problems of coordination at a policy level in the first place.

- A third lesson is that timing is important in this and all other aspects of administrative change. On the one hand, it appears that if coordination questions can be addressed early in the formulation of a programme, future misunderstandings and organisational opposition can be minimised, if not necessarily eliminated. On the other hand, if the inter-organisational questions are raised prior to the existence of a clear idea of what the policy is about, the bureaucratic 'turf-fighting' may become more important than the actual formulation of a policy intervention.

- A fourth lesson is that formal methods of coordination may not be as beneficial as the more informal techniques involving bargaining and creating market-time conditions, if not real

markets. The usual reaction of governments when faced with the issue of coordination or similar challenges is to rely on hierarchy and formal organisational mechanisms to" solve" the problem. Central agencies are particularly prone to assume that their intervention is absolutely crucial to successful coordination. However, as with coordination at the bottom of the pyramids discussed above, a better approach may be to permit those involved to address the problems themselves.

Finally, it is useful to identify the range of **specific coordination instruments or mechanisms** that various countries have developed as responses to their needs (Mulgan, 2002; Australian Public Service, 2004):

- **Developing and reviewing policies and strategies in a holistic manner**

    o Policy making units located in the centre of government which are relatively free from departmental interests and involve a wide range of experts from both within and outside government (e.g. in the form of policy action teams in the UK) in the policy development process.

    o Cabinet Implementation Unit (CIU): pro-active coordination role with policy expertise capacity to advise Cabinet regarding implementation plans and risks involved in implementing policies before they are approved.

    o Regular cross-cutting reviews of policy (e.g. through a spending review process or by the centre of government).

    o Joint task teams/forces reporting directly to the president or minister for dealing with difficult policy issues where there is deep contention between departments/spheres and tight time limits.

    o Joined up budgets (e.g. for combatting drugs, criminal justice, managed by teams), so using budgets to incentivise initiatives that would help other departments.

- **Encouraging a wider understanding across silos**

    o Improving government's **focus on outcomes** which cut across government departments and/or spheres/levels through developing various kinds of service delivery agreements which include targets (the UK has used Public Service Agreements for this purpose. South Africa has used DAs and IFs).

    o New approaches to **professional development** (e.g. encouraging the police to understand the social context of crime).

    o Appointment of ministers with **cross-cutting portfolios** (ministers responsible for a programme based in another department).

    o Inter-departmental committees to produce or review policy (e.g. coordinated policy options).

    o Promoting networks (especially for professional groupings).

- **Promoting integrated implementation where more effective:**

    o Coordination of purchasing through Office of Government Commerce to aggregate government demand.

    o Re-shaping business processes that cut across departments.

A very important issue is that the appropriate type of coordination structure and its purpose must be informed by the nature of the coordination issues to be addressed. For example, the 2004 Australian Commonwealth review found that, "well run interdepartmental committees are very effective in coordination, including crisis management, and in producing policy options. Their representative nature and consensus approach to decision making can make them less useful for dealing with difficult policy issues where there is deep contention between portfolios, or in the community, and tight time limits. Dedicated taskforces under strong leadership and working directly to the prime minister, a senior minister or a committee of Cabinet have proved to be more likely to produce high-quality outcomes in these circumstances" (2004: 19).

2.2.4 General government coordination lessons including barriers to coordination

Some of the barriers to coordination identified in the international literature include the following:

- **Cost**. Coordination is often seen as a real cost to an organisation rather than a potential benefit. The benefits of coordination are uncertain.

- **Silos**. People are used to working in silos and people may be unwilling to move away from existing patterns.

- **Ignorance** and a shortage of shared information may inhibit joint working. Ignorance refers to a genuine lack of awareness that another department has an interest in this area or is doing the same thing as you are. This may be due to incompetence. There are also more profound reasons. With the complexity of many policy areas there are potential overlaps with other policy areas, and many of these are not at all obvious. There are often strong incentives for maintaining secrecy which can enhance the likelihood of poor coordination.

- **Time**. Coordinating programmes at single points in time is the most common format of cooperation among organisation but there are problems because organisations and programmes must work together across broader spans of time.

- **Responsibility complexities**. In order for administrative accountability to function effectively there must be clear patterns of responsibility for action and identifiable purposes for which public funds are spent. Coordination can cloud some of these authoritative relationships and make it more difficult to trace the sources of legal power and the uses of public money.

- **Performance systems.** There can be performance systems that work across departments and programmes and even government-wide systems. Since no organisation really owns these indicators or can be directly responsible for the outcomes according to the indicator, none of them is really accountable for outcomes. There is a clear gap in accountability. The level of commitment of any individual programme manager to achieving cross-cutting goals is likely to be less than it is for the individual programmes from which he/she and their organisation is responsible.

- **Splitting of agencies.** Governments have added to their coordination burdens by disaggregating ministries into autonomous agencies.

- **Turf**. Turf refers to the desire to maintain or extend the range of responsibilities of the department. Page argues that this is the most widely cited mechanism preventing departments/sections from working together (Page. 2005: 142).

- **Budget protection**. Coordination is more important in a time of financial scarcity

given that it is a way of eliminating redundant and inconsistent activities. Yet, as public funds become tight, there is a tendency for organisations to focus on their core functions and activities and attempt to defend themselves against perceived external threats. For example, they may not be anxious to cooperate with other organisations providing similar or even complementary services since these may fall into the category of 'threat'. They seek to protect their own budgets. Areas of joint work where no stable agreement about sharing of costs has been met, offer the possibility of one organisation unwillingly subsidising another. When this area is not deemed to be part of the core organisation, or part of its turf, and where the funding brings no other influence on how the service is developed, the arrangement is likely to be unattractive to one or all organisations involved.

- **Bureaucratic politics**. Different departments in the same organisation often view the same issue from different perspectives because their departments have different objectives, ways of doing things, and because they have been socialised into thinking and acting in different ways.

- **Technical reasons**. Technical reasons also contribute to silo mentality. One example is the incompatibility between computer systems. This can occur between and within departments.

On a more practical level, a 2004 Australian Public Service (APS) report on whole-of-government notes that barriers to coordination exist at a more mundane level (APS, 2004):

> Often the real challenge of whole-of-government work is not the large-scale, high-level, multi-lateral exercise so much as the day-to-day realities of trying to work across boundaries to make sure that outcomes are achieved.

Given that there are such a wide range of potential barriers to coordination, a major implication is that coordination initiatives should only be undertaken when there is a clear justification and on a selective and pragmatic basis. In the context of focusing on outcomes and taking a whole-of-government approach, a strong message from the literature and case studies analysed for this report is that whole-of-government approaches to complex problems should only be undertaken when necessary. The 2004 review of whole-of-government case studies undertaken by the Australian Commonwealth government noted that: "Although there is a conviction about the effectiveness of whole-of-government approaches in the case studies, there is also a warning about judicious use. It is costly and time consuming and competing political and community agendas can undermine its objectives. It may not be the preferred approach for dealing with routine, straightforward issues" (Australian Commonwealth, 2004: 10).

New Zealand has identified three critical factors that impact on successful coordination. They are (1) mandates, (2) systems, and (3) behaviours. This, together with associated success factors are depicted in Figure 4 below. This provides a helpful structure for analysing coordination which is used in the analytical framework below.

Figure 4: Factors for successful coordination

- Leadership commitment
- Ministers' and stakeholders' buy-in
- Defined and agreed joint outcomes

MANDATE

Coordinated
State Agencies

SYSTEMS

BEHAVIOURS

- Appropriate and documented governance and accountability framework
- Sufficient and appropriate resources
- Process to measure performance from established baselines

- Right representation, skills and competencies
- Organisational cultures that support coordination
- Shared culture, language and values

Source: New Zealand government, state commission services. February 2008.

2.3   Analytical framework

An analytical framework has been developed drawing from best practices and lesson learning of similar evaluations conducted internationally, the ToR for this evaluation assignment, as well as the 2008 evaluation of the clusters (Presidency. 2008). The key findings and recommendations of this evaluation have informed the current evaluation design in general and shaped this analytical framework in particular.

In developing an analytical framework to guide the evaluation, the team adapted the New Zealand model. The diagram in

Figure 5 below depicts the three dimensions and the success factors, and enablers of these that inform the analytical framework.

Mandate: for successful coordination, leaders must emphasise the importance of effective coordination and commit to making it work by prioritising the coordinated activity within an all-of-government context. Ministers and other stakeholders also need to buy into the coordinated approach and public servants must agree on clearly-defined joint outcomes to focus effort. The roles of each coordination structure must be appropriate and documented, either through legislation or less formally (e.g. ToR, memorandum of understandings etc.).

Systems: for successful coordination, appropriate governance and accountability frameworks must be in place and sufficient and appropriate resources and meeting management systems must

be in place to support effective decision-making, as well as the monitoring of decision-making and enforcing accountability for implementation of decisions. Processes should support coordinated planning of policy and programmes.

Behaviours: for successful coordination, the right departments/spheres/role-players must be involved at the appropriate level/stage with the appropriate authority, and the right skills and competencies to work collaboratively to take decisions which support coordination. Both departmental organisational culture, as well as cultures developed within specific coordination structures, must support coordination so that, over time, those civil servants involved in the coordinated activity come to share a common culture, and shared priorities, terminology, and values.

Figure 5: Factors and enablers of successful coordination

Success factors and enablers of successful coordination

- Legislative
- Leadership
- Clear vision
- Roles and responsibilities

MANDATES

COORDINATING STRUCTURES

(Clusters, MinMecs, Implementation Forums)

SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES

- Accountability & performance mechanisms
- Effective meeting management, information sharing and sufficient resources
- Integrated planning

BEHAVIOURS

- Organisational culture, shared values, and relationships of trust
- Skills, competencies, participation, representation

Source: Impact Economix. 2013.

The above has informed the analytical framework set out in greater detail below. The framework identifies factors and enablers that ensure coordinated activities are successful or effective. The enablers are necessary to achieve the success factors. These success factors and enablers are grouped under these three dimensions: mandate, systems and processes and behaviours.

This analytic framework will be used to inform the analysis of international coordination case studies, as well as the evaluation of the three coordination structures/ systems.

Table 4: Government coordination success factors and enablers

Dimension	Key success factors	Enablers
Mandate	Clear mandates captured in legislative/policy framework. High levels of political and bureaucratic commitment to vision and coordination, as well leadership. Stakeholder relationships that are underpinned by a collaborative approach. Trust, confidence and shared responsibility. Clear and shared vision across departments and spheres of government. Clear and appropriate coordination roles (both ministers, senior officials, as well as coordination structures) at different levels.	Political and bureaucratic leadership. Common and shared vision. Strong Cabinet able to take whole of government decisions. Legal frameworks. Outcome focus. Priorities identified.
Systems/ Processes	Effective accountability and performance mechanisms (including the effective use of performance agreements, KPIs/ targets for cross-cutting collaboration, formal agreements for horizontal and/or inter-governmental collaboration and effective use of dispute resolution approaches and mechanisms). Sufficient resources to support effective functioning of coordination structures (including effective meeting management systems, secretariat support, meeting preparation, agenda setting and management, information sharing, decision-making).	Appropriate governance and accountability frameworks. Effective monitoring and reporting and evaluation. Two way communication. Integrated state-wide planning. Resource allocation and budget systems. Accountability and performance management. IT and information sharing systems. Preparedness to innovate & take risks. Flexible and adaptable approaches.
Behaviours	Organisational culture and shared values that supports collaboration/ joint working, learning from evidence and coordination Right level and mix of competencies, capabilities, capacity (knowledge, skills and attitudes) as well as representation on, and participation in, coordination structures.	Organisational culture to foster coordination, cooperation, collaboration, communication and coexistence.

Source: Impact Economix. 2013.

This analytical framework is used to analyse the international coordination case studies as well as the main evaluation itself. Having done the evaluation we also propose further refinements to the framework for future use. Such a framework could inform the development of guidelines for improving government coordination as was done in New Zealand and Australia.

2.4   Lessons from the International case studies

2.4.1 Introduction

This section summarises the lessons identified in the separate report on international case studies on UK, Brazil, and Australia commissioned as part of this evaluation, using the analytical framework. Annexure 4 contains the detailed lessons identified from each of these countries.

South Africa is not unique. Even developed countries struggle to improve coordination, with highly sophisticated public management reforms failing in such countries. Lessons and preliminary conclusions are identified in terms of coordination success factors and enablers linked to the framework of mandates, systems/processes, and behaviours.

Mandates: roles/responsibilities, legislative/alternative
a. There should not be a one-size-fits-all approach for coordination structures. The nature and design of the structure should be informed by its purpose and the tasks that it has been established to perform.
b. If coordination structures do not have a legislated mandate, they are easier to abolish (for example, if there is a change in political power).
c. Coordination roles which are being played by the centre of government in some of the case study countries have included: monitoring of outcomes; advice to Cabinet specifically regarding implementation plans and risk management plans; pro-active involvement with other departments, e.g. to provide advice early on in policy development processes.
d. In terms of coordinated policy (and one could argue programme) development processes, it is clear that better coordinated the development/planning processes can reduce coordination challenges and problems when it comes to implementation. It is therefore important that attention is paid to strengthening the coordination of policy and programme planning processes.

Mandates: leadership
a. The active support of the prime minister for structures responsible for developing cross-cutting policies and strategies greatly enhances the policy/strategy development process. Having the head of a cross-cutting strategy/policy development structure report to the prime minister can secure appropriate cooperation from multiple departments (including securing sensitive information).
b. One needs a combination of both the right kinds of leadership, as well as relevant and effective structures and processes, to improve coordination. It appears that without the right kind of leadership, direction and support, it is difficult for structures to meaningfully influence behaviours which support coordination.
c. Structure is important, and can facilitate coordination, but to produce behavioural changes may require the active intervention of political leaders, often political leaders at the very top of government. The differential weight attached to coordination by different politicians appears to count for more than structure.

Mandates: clear vision
    It appears that the more focused the priorities are of coordination structures, the higher their chances of success. This also links to the need for strategic and focused agendas (see meeting management section below).

Systems/processes: accountability/performance mechanisms including monitoring and evaluation

a. It is important to develop formal agreements at or near the beginning of any coordinated effort about the respective responsibilities of the different parties/institutions involved. There need to be clear responsibility for implementing decisions made, and consequences for failure to implement these decisions.

b. Another way that cross-cutting initiatives can be promoted is through the use of a wide range of different incentive mechanisms which should complement or reinforce the operations of coordination structures wherever possible.

c. There must be political commitment to undertake cross-cutting work and to engage in high-level negotiation to unblock strategic coordination challenges. This commitment to cross-cutting work should be in the Ministers' performance contracts with the president. Ministers in turn need to be champions of cross-cutting coordination measures.

d. Cross-cutting activity should be visibly rewarded and those leaders should be judged and rewarded on their performance in securing cross-cutting objectives as highly as achieving purely departmental objectives.

Systems/processes: meeting management/sufficient resources

a. There is a need to ensure that there are clear principles and guidelines which inform the role of secretariats in supporting the effective functioning of coordination structures.

b. There is a need to ensure sufficient secretariat skills and capacity to ensure that the agendas of coordination structures are strategic and focused on issues which are appropriate to address at that level given the nature of participants in the coordination structure.

c. There is a need for greater awareness of cost-effectiveness with respect to the frequency of meetings held by coordination structures.

d. The centre of government can play an important administrative support role for the establishment and functioning of temporary coordination structures which are established to deal with specific time-bound tasks.

Behaviours: organisational culture, shared values, relationships of trust

a. Departments working in silos appear to be a universal norm which most people are comfortable with. As such, departmentalism appears to be a dominant culture which is very difficult to break away from.

b. Leadership's role in sustaining a culture that promotes and supports a sense of individual responsibility on the part of staff is vital.

c. A culture of negotiation, or preparedness to negotiate, can be important to address coordination issues outside of formal coordination structure meetings. This negotiation can take place at various levels, from the ministerial level down.

Behaviours: skills, competencies, participation, representation

a. To deliver joined-up government, managers and staff need a broader skill set than the traditional technical skills set of policy development and program management (Allen, 2006). Appropriate leadership styles and skills are most important to developing a culture that supports joining up collaboration and delivers on successful outcomes. Managers need to be willing to take risks, tolerate ambiguity, act as mediators and build trust (Jackson & Stainsby, 2000).

b. It will be important that the civil service's HR and recruitment processes are informed by a clear identification of the kinds of competencies and experience which is needed on the part of officials to engage in and support the kinds of behaviours which are necessary for successful coordination (e.g. negotiation, team-work, problem-solving etc.).

2.5 Theories of change for the South African cluster system/MinMECs/IFs

Theories of change (ToC) for the cluster system and IF system were developed early in the evaluation process in order to identify the assumptions about how these structures are intended to work, which could then be tested in the evaluation. **Annex 4** contains detailed ToCs for the three structures (including MinMECs) and which include detailed assumptions regarding how the coordination structures are supposed to improve coordination.

The ToC contains the following components:

a) Identification of coordination problems and possible causal factors generally applicable to all three structures.

b) Intended outcomes for each structure, linked to each structure's mandate and identified/ documented roles.

c) Change mechanisms/processes according to which each structure operates and which are intended to deliver on their mandates and impact on the outcomes.

d) Key assumptions which need to hold true if these change mechanisms/processes are to work effectively and impact on the outcomes.

The following coordination problems and causal factors emerge as potential problems for all three coordination structures.

Coordination problems include:

a) Lack of policy and/or service delivery implementation effectiveness and coherence. Failure to meet the needs of citizens and customers, failure to achieve developmental as well as service delivery objectives, and to make meaningful progress in achieving outcomes as well as impacts including growth, job creation, poverty reduction and reduction of inequalities and so on.
b) Inefficient use of scarce resources/wastage.

The possible causes of coordination problems are multiple and could include:

a) Other political imperatives are given priority over and above addressing coordination issues.
b) Lack of collaboration and coordinated planning and implementation between national departments and between national, provincial and local government. Departments frequently operate in isolation from each other in planning, budgeting, and implementation phases in situations where alignment, coordination, or collaboration is required in order to achieve efficient and effective planning and implementation.
c) Insufficient transparency between relevant departments on what they are doing to address government priorities to support better coordinated implementation.
d) Relative lack of accountability (in terms of consequences for poor performance and failure to achieve commitments and implement decisions) at all levels, Cabinet, ministers, and DGs, in part as a result of poorly developed and/or enforced performance agreements between the president/ministers and/or ministers/DGs (and/or DGs/chief directors etc.).
e) Weak or absent leadership commitment to coordination, prioritisation and promotion of a collaborative culture of negotiation between departments and spheres to align planning, budgeting, and implementation.

f) Lack of pro-active coordination capacity, mandate, and role from the Presidency which can counter the normal bureaucratic forces which promote the silo approach.

g) Lack of joint/collaborative planning due to lack of incentivisation and/or pressure from political leaders who prioritise instead quick implementation (not leaving time for coordination, planning and implementation) as well as the departmental performance management system.

h) Coordination structures (IFs, clusters, MinMECs, as well as their relationships to each other) are not able to fully achieve their purpose and roles for various reasons including, but not necessarily limited to, poor participation, reporting, decision-making and monitoring systems.

i) Lack of relevant indicators and targets in strategic plans and Annual Performance Plans (APPs) which promote cross-departmental/inter-governmental coordinated behaviour and action by departments.

j) Insufficient use of, and/or compliance with, formal agreements (e.g. implementation protocols for inter-governmental coordination, partnering protocols e.g. Memorandum of Agreements (MOAs), Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs etc.) which clarify roles and responsibilities, contributions and so on.

k) Insufficient use of clearly mandated joint coordinating structures at the right level (e.g. programme steering committees or inter-ministerial task teams).

l) Lack of sufficiently mandated, capacitated and/or pro-active officials (insufficient number/capacity) at director and chief director level who are able to negotiate with partner departments in the planning and implementation stages to improve coordinated implementation.


A high level ToC for the cluster and IF systems is presented in Figure 6 and Figure 7.

Figure 6: Theory of change for the cluster system

Source: Impact Economix and DPME. 2013.

Figure 7: Theory of change for the outcome/implementation forum system

Source: Impact Economix and DPME. 2013.

2.6   The findings of the 2008 Presidency report on clusters

In 2008 the Presidency conducted a review of the cluster system. The report pointed out that the clusters have been established to:

a) "[enable an] Integrated and coordinated approach to policy formulation and coordination
b) Combat silos' approach to governance
c) Build a collegial approach and shared perspective on government priorities."

The main findings of the Presidency's 2008 review were as follows:

1. **There was poor participation in cluster meetings** from DGs and their deputies for two reasons; they did not see sufficient value in attending the meetings and found there was an insufficient focus on policy and strategy. The focus of cluster meetings should be on issues which require harmonisation and this could result in shortening the frequency and/or duration of cluster meetings. In addition, there was poor participation of National Treasury in the G&A cluster, and to a lesser extent, the economic cluster.

2. **Configuration of clusters:**

a) The more clusters are divided into specific cross-cutting issues, the more challenges for coordination between clusters will arise.

b) Clusters should consist of the key departments, which are core to the issues around which the cluster is formed.

c) The Presidency needs to develop a ToR for each cluster, clarifying the scope of issues to be dealt with by each cluster, as well as the roles and responsibilities of clusters in relation to other institutional IGRA mechanisms.

3. **Role and mandate of the clusters and role of the PoA:**

a) Clusters were not fulfilling their oversight role regarding implementation of the PoA, in part because the decentralised regulatory framework does not necessarily make provision for clusters to play such a role (i.e. a cluster structure cannot take decisions which have financial impacts on a particular department and which impinge on the responsibilities of accounting officers under the Public Finance Management Act).

b) Clusters need to be complemented by a mechanism which integrates the cross-cutting priorities into a decentralised accountability system for individual departments.

c) Control mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that the strategic plans of departments include the cross-cutting priorities, and performance measurement mechanisms should be strengthened to monitor the achievement of targets by departments.

d) The regulatory framework (e.g. PFMA) does not provide a legal basis for clusters to play a decision-making role in order to fulfil their oversight role, with decision-making powers vested in ministers and DGs. How do clusters oversee the implementation of the PoA/ DAs in a way which does not conflict with departmental oversight of implementation? There needs to be clarity regarding the authority and accountability of clusters and the authority and accountability of individual ministers and DGs.

e) The PoA should reflect the key priorities that cut across the three spheres of government, as well as those that cut across national departments. The PoA should contain a balanced and holistic set of key cross-cutting priorities.

The report concluded that further research was needed on why some cluster sub-structures have been more successful at coordination than others, and the role of the Presidency as the centre of the cluster system. This evaluation aimed to contribute towards taking forward the above-mentioned areas requiring further research and to confirm whether some of the findings of the 2008 report are still relevant or not.

3. Coordination Case Studies

3.1   Introduction

As part of the assessment of the Government Coordination Systems, with specific emphasis on three coordinating structures (clusters, implementation forums and MinMECs), it was decided to utilise case studies as an instrument to measure the performance and effectiveness of these structures. This would allow for an evaluation to be made using an actual event or process, which in turn could be assessed against the objectives of a specific coordinating structure, to test its effectiveness, successes and shortcomings. Six case studies of the following coordination issues dealt with by selected structures were undertaken (see Table 5 below). The case studies, while using a real issue such as accreditation of the metros, concern themselves with whether the MinMEC is effective or not as a coordination structure. It also examines the reasons why the structure is effective or not and whether the structures are fulfilling their roles appropriately. This would include whether, for example, the structures are interpreting and managing their mandate correctly (are the right issues being addressed and discussed at the relevant level of strategic vs. operational), determining whether the structure is correctly populated (are the right people assigned?), checking whether the correct level of administrative capacity is available (are the agendas dealt with timeously and appropriately?), and are decisions actually being taken and followed up by measurable actions and outcomes in the form of feedback or sanctions for non-compliance. In simple terms, is coordination actually happening?

Table 5: Coordination case studies per coordination structure[2]

Issues involving coordination	Issue dealt with by cluster structure	Issue dealt with by MinMEC	Issue dealt with by implementation forum
Dealt with well		1. **Textbook challenges**, set up well functioning monitoring system (HeadCom, Council of Education Ministers). 2. **Accreditation of the Metro's with the Housing Function**: Complex vertical transfer/assignment of the function to six metro's negotiated through a horizontal arrangement of the four affected provinces and their metro representatives.	3. **Finalisation of EIA process.** 4. Regulation for creation of independent power producers.
Dealt with poorly	5. **Establishment of the Border Management Agency.** 6. Industrial relations in mining and agriculture.		

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[2] Case studies 5-6 in the table could not be completed within the agreed time-frame due to the non-availability of senior officials which resulted in only one completed interview for each of these case two studies.

The above case study issues were selected by DPME based on suggestions by outcome facilitators/managers, who participate in the cluster, IFs and MinMEC structures. The table contains issues that the DPME outcome facilitators/managers believed were on the whole either dealt with well or poorly. The aim was to have one issue dealt with well and one dealt with poorly per coordination structure, however, the feedback received did not completely match these criteria.

The case studies were informed by interviews with a small number of key officials who also participated in the structures, a review of key documents, and, where available, minutes from meetings of the coordination structures. The interviews were conducted on the basis of anonymity and confidentiality. As such no names or formal designations of those canvassed are mentioned, but they were high ranking officials with a comprehensive understanding of the case study specifics. The primary objective was to canvass their views of the performance of the relevant structure.

Due to time constraints DPME was unable to obtain responses to requests to secretariats for the minutes from all the structures. We received access to a limited number of minutes from the following structures: infrastructure cluster/IF (IPP case study), Environment MinMEC (EIA case study); but no access to minutes from Human Settlements IF/MinMEC (housing case study).This constrained the researcher's ability to obtain concrete evidence on specific decisions and roles taken by the structures with respect to coordinating the case study issues.

3.2   Case study 1: Regulation of independent power producers (IPPs)

3.2.1 Background

The infrastructure development cluster (IDC) was tasked by Cabinet in 2009 to draft legislation for the establishment of the Independent System and Market Operator (ISMO) to ensure that Independent Power Producers (IPPs) receive fair treatment and that there is non-discrimination between IPPs and the buyer of power generated by IPPs. The IDC's mandate is to ensure the implementation of economic infrastructure projects and reports on these to Cabinet (www.gov.za). It comprises the Department of Transport, Department of Energy (DoE), Department of Water Affairs, Department of Public Enterprises (DPE), and Department of Cooperative Governance, the Presidency, and National Treasury (NT). An Energy Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) was also established and consists of the DPE, NT, Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), dti, and the Presidency and other stakeholders include Eskom (Government of South Africa: Delivery Agreement Outcome-6: Part 2.. 2010: p.13)

The following progress has been reported as part of the quarterly PoA reports submitted to the infrastructure cluster:
- A ring-fenced entity for the procurement of electricity from IPPs has been established, with contracts already signed with four IPPs and 277MW of electricity added to the national grid as part of the initiative to supplement Eskom's electricity generation capacity to ensure security of electricity supply (POA report, undated).
- The Economic Sector, Employment and Infrastructure Development (ESEID) Cabinet Committee approved the draft ISMO establishment Legislation in March 2011, for tabling at Cabinet. Regulation on licensing is to be introduced requiring Eskom to ring-fence regulatory accounts. A ring-fenced ISMO has been established within Eskom. An ISMO bill has been enacted creating the framework for the establishment of ISMO as a separate

legal entity. Financial, legal and technical due diligence was conducted (IDC PoA report 2012).

3.2.2 Findings

Mandates

The Department of Transport is responsible for chairing and leading the cluster and reporting on the IPP issue to the Cabinet. The Department of Energy is responsible for the formulation of IPP and ISMO legislation and regulations and the Department of Public Enterprise for Eskom.

The infrastructure cluster departments are very clear on what their mandate is and the legislative and policy frameworks which govern their work and the issue of crafting legislation and regulations for the creation of independent power producers (Electricity Regulation Act (ERA) No. 4 of 2006 and the National Energy Act of 2008 (no. 34 of 2006). The Department of Energy (DoE) gazetted the Electricity Regulations on New Generation Capacity under the ERA in May 2011. The New Generation Regulations establish rules and guidelines that are applicable to the undertaking of an IPP Bid Programme and the procurement of an IPP for new generation capacity (Eskom. Undated).

The main task with regards to the creation of IPPs in terms of the outcome six delivery agreement is to put in place the ISMO Act which must be passed by Parliament and signed by the President. An ISMO task team, consisting of DoE, DPE, NT and Eskom was set up to prepare inputs for the processing of the ISMO bill (Energy Portfolio Committee, 1 February 2013).

The Cabinet memo sent to Cabinet members contained detailed progress on the delivery note and the ISMO bill as well as the challenges faced by the cluster in terms of the conflict of interest faced by the DPE and Eskom. Both the pros and cons of establishing an ISMO through legislation was captured in the Cabinet memo. In the main it was found that the Cabinet memo presented a balanced view for Cabinet to make an informed decision with regards to the establishment of the ISMO and continue with processing of the ISMO bill.

Clear and appropriate roles were set for the various departments for the processing of the ISMO bill. The DPE is responsible for the formulation for the ISMO and ensuring that appropriate inputs are made by key stakeholders and that the process remains on track for Cabinet to make meaningful decisions. The former Minister of Energy, Ms Dipuo Peters drove the process by interacting with her peers on the issue as well as appointing sufficient high level resources (DDG and chief director) to manage the process. The former Minister of Energy also piloted the bill through Parliament and ensured that it had the support of all political parties on the Energy Portfolio Committee (EPC), which has resulted in the bill been passed by the EPC a few months ago (Pressly. 27 March 2013).

Systems and processes

The relationship between the political and administrative level showed high levels of commitment and leadership in terms of the tasks assigned to both the politicians and executive officials tasked by the EPC of Parliament to conduct a due diligence and transfer of transmission and assets from Eskom into ISMO. The task team consisted of the Deputy Director General (DDG) responsible for Policy, Planning and Clean Energy and representatives of the NT and DPE as well as Eskom. The

scope of work of the task team was clearly defined by the Energy Portfolio Committee (Energy Portfolio Committee. 2013).

The drafting of the ISMO bill was facilitated smoothly because the cluster had a well-functioning and well-resourced secretariat that prepared and processed meetings because important decisions had to be taken by the cluster (Outcome 6 Facilitator). Similarly, the DGs of the respective departments met in the infrastructure cluster to iron out all the technical issues pertaining to the drafting of the bill.

The report submitted to the Cabinet Committee was of high quality which resulted in broader discussions of the bill. Similarly, the presentation made to the EPC by the ISMO task team focused on issues that would come up in the establishment of the bill and flagged these issues for further recommendations by the EPC for the drafting of the bill (Energy Portfolio Committee 2013).

The former Minister of Energy was very focused on the outcome of the bill and the detail of the delivery agreement. The former Minister also engaged her fellow ministers in the National Treasury and Department of Public Enterprises which resulted in these Departments making valuable inputs into the proposed bill and strengthening the collaboration and cooperation with these Departments in ensuring the attainment of the objectives and deliverables of the delivery agreement (interviewee, outcome six facilitator).

Performance agreements of the executive and senior management of the DoE were also clearly aligned to the Delivery Agreement for Outcome 6 which was signed by the relevant ministers. This gave urgency to the issue of the establishment IPPs and drafting of the ISMO bill because the political and administrative level were clear of who would be held accountable for what as well as what their respective roles would be to achieve the set targets.

Eskom was consulted to create a win-win situation given that Eskom's main concern was that it would lose its transmission assets for the delivery of energy should it be moved to the ISMO. Public hearings conducted by the task team were also held for the establishment of the ISMO and the transfer of transmission assets of Eskom to the ISMO. Concerns raised by the public had influenced the decision of the EPC to further process the bill or to put it on hold until government and Eskom could come up with proposed solutions around issues raised about the transmission of assets, willing buyer-willing seller as well as the alignment with existing legislation in terms of the ERA, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa, and the ISMO.

Behaviours

The DoE has been quite instrumental in establishing and fostering good coordination between the departments tasked in the cluster to draft the Bill. What further enhanced the relationship is that the drafting of the bill is a DoE competence. This situation fostered a relationship where departments were prepared to share information for mutual and public benefit and attain the national objective, enhance the capacity of each other, share resources and responsibilities as well as share the rewards of tackling the issue speedily.

The right departments were chosen to work on the issue and report to Cabinet and the right officials from each department were chosen to collaborate and cooperate. The officials chosen to work on the issue in the cluster had the right level of executive powers and delegations and the right mix of competencies, capabilities and capacity..

The cost of time spent participating in joint activities by government, parliament and outside organisations such as Eskom and NEDLAC have proven to be mutually beneficial to all parties involved in the process to draft the bill and a positive impact on coordination. The cluster played, and is still playing, a significant role in ensuring the issue does not become a DoE issue alone but also creates a platform for NT and DPE to iron out the differences between them and create a win-win situation. The EPC also created a platform for Eskom and NEDLAC to participate in the issue through the task team. This enabled the cluster and the IF to work with parliament and feedback to the Cabinet committee through quality reports on the issue. The bill has been passed by the EPC and is still being deliberated in the NCOP and the EPC of parliament.

3.2.3 Conclusions

The coordination structures both within government and Parliament have made a huge impact in ensuring that the ISMO issue takes priority and is dealt with in a well-coordinated way by creating a platform for departments to work in a relationship of collaboration and cooperation. The DoE on its own would not have moved on the issue as quickly as it did if the cluster and IF did not create the space for departments to iron out its differences through a negotiated process and find win-win solutions. DoE was well placed as the department that took the lead as it is the department's competence. This has highlighted the importance of ensuring that the right department with the right competence leads the issue.

The cluster clearly played a role in ensuring that the delivery agreement was in place to address government expectations and that the roles and responsibilities of each department involved were clear. The IF (which consisted of DDGs, CDs, directors and deputy directors) also played a role in terms of the addressing the technical aspects of the delivery agreement.

The process of drafting the bill has in a way inculcated the benefits of joined-up government within and outside of government. It is also clear from the way that the issue was coordinated that it generated a sense of shared accountability for a shared outcome. The DoE was not the only department receiving recognition, but all the other departments involved and the cluster as a whole, which points to the issue of the importance of aligning rewards and incentives for supporting horizontal cross-cutting initiatives/issues. At the political level the former Minister of Transport pushed the issue hard and was focused on the outcome of getting the bill through Parliament. The former Minister of DoE provided legitimate leadership in driving the process and tabling the bill in a short space of time thereby addressing government expectations that the bill would be approved and passed by Parliament and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) and ensuring IPPs are fully on board to address the issue of more electricity generation which would benefit SA as a whole.

In conclusion, the way in which this issue was coordinated is an example of good coordination. The key success factors which supported effective coordination by the coordination structures are as follows:
- Effective and strong leadership demonstrated by the former Minister of Energy.
- The cluster was very outcome focused given the urgency to accelerate legislation. There was effective monitoring and reporting on progress in the drafting of the bill.
- Accountability and performance management: the drafting of the ISMO bill was clearly stated as a priority deliverable in the Outcome 6 DA which reinforced the urgency of the issue and made accountability for addressing it clear.

3.3   Case study 2:   Learner, teacher, support materials (LTSM) (textbooks)

3.3.1 Background

This case study examines how Learner, Teacher Support Materials (LTSM) issues have been dealt with in terms of some of the institutional arrangements driving decision-making, as well as inter-sphere processes and coordination instruments in the sector.   It covers the Education Implementation Forum/MinMEC.

The case study makes observations about key factors impacting on effective coordination, including relevant policy, legislative and programmatic measures implemented to improve coordination. The study also makes observations about key coordination constraints, contradictions and opportunities, and draws conclusions about lessons to inform potential future refinements to government coordination.

Finally, the case study concludes that improvements in LTSM delivery in 2012/2013 are largely explained by improvements in coordination of the LTSM value chain, and these include streamlined procurement processes, mainstreamed policy regime, and enhanced institutional capacity and support mechanisms.

3.3.2 Findings

Reform trends that worked

Major reforms on LTSM coordination started in earnest after the 2011 textbook delivery saga in Limpopo (which is extensively cited as a major turning point on coordination of LTSM at the Department of Basic Education (DBE). Formal investigations by the Presidency pointed to major coordination shortcomings in the value chain of planning, budgeting, procurement and delivery of LTSM to schools. However, the study also found a number of interesting trends in the coordination and management of LTSM that led to a turnaround, and these are:

- Political ownership of coordination mechanisms by the Minister in collaboration with MECs was an important milestone in tuning around LTSM coordination, from a crisis management mode to a planned service.
- The reform of policy governing coordination, improvement of information systems and knowledge management, as well as the strengthening of national and provincial coordination structures played a critical role.
- Strengthening of integrated cooperative governance system in which DBE monitors and supports provincial departments more effectively, was an important ingredient to development of a system of early warning signals of significant provincial government failures.
- Lack of policy instruments for standardized planning, budgeting, procurement and distribution of LTSM was the weak point in the system. The Department of Basic Education developed a national LTSM plan aimed at bringing coherence to planning and delivery of LTSM. The plan went beyond policy provisions to include mainstreaming of process standards, operational plans for procurement and delivery, as well as strengthened contract and risk management.

Mandates

LTSM delivery to schools is a concurrent responsibility of the DBE and Provincial Education Departments (PEDs), with no specific law or protocol assigning primary responsibility for coordination. However, in the process of resolving implementation hiccups, the sector has evolved a number of sector-specific mechanisms to manage national and provincial mandates. First, is an emerging consensus in the sector that public perceptions assign primary responsibility for coordination to the Minister and the DG by virtue of their norms and standards responsibility in education provisioning. As a result the Minister has increasingly played a leading role in overhauling coordination of the LTSM value chain.

Second is a pragmatic 'third way' approach to mandates that espouses flexibility and responsiveness to policy implementation. The paradigm looks at mandates as multi-layered and multifaceted phenomenon, and the LTSM sector plan is a good example. The plan is essentially a series of mandates, with performance milestones and responsibilities, designed to provide comprehensive monitoring and reporting frameworks to both the DBE and PEDs.

Lastly, is the way the Council of Education Ministers (CEM) is used that has discouraged the dichotomy of separation of powers between national and provincial spheres in favour of a coordination framework that defines institutional arrangements across spheres. As a result fully fledged LTSM units are now in place, and a national coordinating LTSM committee has been established under the guidance of the Director of LTSM.

Systems/ processes

The CEM has had to overhaul the coordination mechanisms over the last two years, and initiated major reforms in policy coordination, systems improvement, knowledge management, as well as the strengthening of coordination structures. The plan is applauded across the system for bringing about the much desired coherence and predictability to LTSM procurement and delivery. However, the reform process was not uncontested as some provinces viewed the reforms as meddling with their powers.

Critical policy promulgations included the realignment of the procurement process, rationalisation of prescribed titles to manage the quality of textbooks circulating in the public schooling system, promulgation of performance milestones that guide the LTSM procurement business process and its value chain, as well as standardisation of the procurement cycle to an 18 month turnaround time.

Coordination arrangements were streamlined in a way that keeps the LTSM delivery on the radar screen of both CEM and Headcom, and this gave rise to a threefold structure of CEM, Headcom and the Inter-Provincial (IP) LTSM committee. CEM makes policy decisions and focuses on resolving blockages. Headcom coordinates PED inputs and provides both vertical and horizontal coordination. The LTSM IP committee shares implementation models across provinces and identifies blockages to be up scaled to Headcom and CEM. Other systemic reforms that worked well include improvements to the reporting frameworks, information management systems and data verification.

The new electronic reporting tools were adapted from the Auditor General's (AG's) dashboard reporting system used to manage high risk exposure. This allows DBE to get a bird's eye view of delivery progress per province with access to online reporting in real time. DBE is now working on a systems linkage project that will build an LTSM module into the electronic Schools Administration and Management System. The entire LTSM coordination reform has now become a success story of reforms which were piloted and then up-scaled to benefit the entire system. As a result, its use

has been extended to improve coordination of infrastructure delivery, national examinations, and nutrition.

3.3.3 Conclusions

In conclusion, this case study has identified three useful success factors that have led to improved coordination of LTSM at DBE. First is political ownership of coordination by the Minister in collaboration with MECs. There is no doubt that the Minister at CEM gave clear signals to Headcom about important coordination issues to be closely managed with intensity. The Minister seems to have focussed CEM on strategic areas to be resolved and communicated priorities in no uncertain terms. Notwithstanding the profile generated by court litigations, the key ingredients to success seem to have been a clear vision, a plan and an execution strategy.

Second, is sensitivity to, and prudent management of, the issue of concurrent powers. Officials at DBE make the point that provinces' receptiveness to support efforts and willingness to partner with DBE is an important ingredient to successful coordination, by virtue of being implementing agents.

Third, in a context of concurrent powers, it is useful to have a specialised institutional arrangements (including dedicated technical sub-structures), a strong arm of provincial coordination, monitoring and support along the lines of the Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Initiative (ASIDI). DBE institutional arrangements were extremely limited when the Limpopo saga broke out.

Finally, where there is a clear national framework of collaboration between provinces, coordination improves and things get done.

3.4   Case study 3: Accreditation of Metros with the Housing Function

3.4.1 Introduction

Towards the end of 2005, government endorsed the new plan to extend municipal powers to undertake the housing function in order to expedite housing delivery. Municipalities that are accredited will receive their transfers directly from national government and take over the administration of the housing function from provinces. They will administer and account for the grant, and be responsible for delivering on the housing mandate. So far the process has been slow in devolving the responsibility to municipalities that have capacity to carry out the function. In the period ahead the process needs to be accelerated so that provinces and national government can concentrate on supporting low capacity municipalities.

In this particular instance, the cluster involved is "Social", the implementation forum is "Outcome 8: Human Settlements", the structure being tested is the MinMEC and the issue being dealt with is the complex vertical transfer and assignment of the crucial function of accreditation of six identified metropolitan entities with the Housing Function.

3.4.2 Findings

In the case of the transfer of the housing function the respondents were generally of the opinion that the MinMEC played a crucially important role in facilitating the transfer of the function. However, it was pointed out that one of the key challenges to the process was related to the **behaviours** and **attitudes** of many of those participating in the debate. In many cases the assumption of responsibility of this challenging portfolio created what one respondent referred to

as a "threat to the comfort zones of key participants". This statement implies that there was a reluctance on behalf of certain participants to relinquish their political mandates and powers, especially in a key deliverable such as housing provision, to lower levels of government such as municipalities.

The process of accreditation has been a long standing intention (commencing in 2005), but the actual realisation of this has taken some two years to steer through MinMEC. It was pointed out that this forum was crucial in bringing together the key departments who play a role in human settlement development including land affairs, rural development and those departments tasked with the provision of infrastructural services such as sanitation and water supply.

The other key element was the ability to assess whether the targeted local authorities had within their structures the necessary capacity to assume responsibility for the housing function. While it was noted that many of the provincial authorities were keen to transfer the function, the debate within the MinMEC raised a broader awareness regarding the differing levels of readiness of various local authorities to assume responsibility for this key function. This in turn gave rise to the need, prior to accreditation, to test the competence and capacity of municipalities to perform. The acid test was whether the assumption that the metros could manage and deliver the housing function was accurate.

The one issue that galvanized the use of MinMEC as an important forum with respect to harmonisation and working together on the accreditation of the metros was the change of emphasis when housing was transformed into human settlement development.

This event shifted the focus from a single measurement of housing delivery and measurement of performance based on quantities to a more qualitative, integrated and holistic approach. This shift highlighted the need for a broad based engagement with a range of associated departments.

In terms of **mandates,** it also highlighted the complications of driving a human settlements objective through a Housing Act and the need for a human settlements outcome to be steered through a national vision. The MinMEC provided a platform to share a collective understanding of the new mandate based on integrated human settlement objectives set by the National Department of Human Settlements (NDHS) and what was expected from the accrediting of delivery and management agents, in particular the municipalities, the provincial departments as well and other non-accredited departments such as Environmental Affairs. It also necessitated confronting the vexed issue of dealing with the reduction of provincial powers and managing the political challenge to this. As one respondent noted, "without Ministerial support we would not have succeeded with implementing this change". The implication is that the Ministers involved in Human Settlements worked together with Ministers and MECs responsible for a number of complementary functional areas such as land availability, planning, local and cooperative governance and infrastructure to ensure that not only the accreditation was facilitated but that the other components necessary to achieve the objective of "sustainable human settlements" were aligned. It speaks of political leadership bringing a range of stakeholders together in pursuit of a common cause, viz. the addressing of the spatial inequities within the urban environment.

The respondents were also more secure in their roles regarding the driving of human settlement issues and objectives through the MinMECs. They described their specific roles as to make sure that the proper process of accreditation is undertaken, is well managed, and is based on risk mitigation. This necessitated ensuring that the accreditation principles are complied with. It also required that the testing of the requisite capacity, as well as the "state of readiness" of accredited municipalities is rigorously undertaken and understood. This ensured that the preconditions for success of municipalities in assuming responsibility for the housing function were present.

Through the MinMEC structures, other parts of government were also able to embrace those municipalities that are accredited. In other words it provides leadership at a higher level so that other departments support the process and are able to better manage conflicts. At the end of the day the MECs are left with the final responsibility of deciding on accreditation and it is important to have their support and their analytical understanding of this particular process so that it doesn't lose its leadership quality when it gets implemented.

On the negative side respondents noted that the administrative aspect of the MinMEC was not up to the standard of, for example, private company secretariats. Their contention was that within private companies the committee secretariats are often sourced from within the corporate environment. As such, many have had direct experience of corporate protocols and procedures as well as an in-depth understanding of the finer details of the institution and its objectives and business practices. In certain instances, the secretariat's inability to comprehend or fully understand the often complex and intricate subject matter discussed at high level meetings, as reflected in subsequent minutes and records, tended to weaken the effectiveness of the structures ability to function at full capacity. Up scaling of skills in this area of deficiency was considered crucial by those interviewed for this case study.

The structuring of agendas to highlight the exact issues to be debated was also considered to be in need of improvement.

One respondent also felt that improved communication with regard to the accreditation process prior to it being presented at the MinMEC would have addressed some of the initial resistance to the proposal which subsequently consumed a lot of time at the MinMEC meetings and delayed the accreditation process.

Despite these shortcomings, many of which according to those interviewed can be readily remedied through interventions such as training and on-going education especially on best practice for chairing meetings, time management and capacitation of support staff, it is acknowledged that MinMECs do have an important role to play in promoting **Inter Governmental Relations (IGR),** and a number of departments are attempting to address the deficiencies identified above. A more effective mean*s* for promoting multi-sectoral coordination between MinMECs is, however, clearly necessary if the present fragmented and uni-sectoral approach to policy formulation is to be overcome.Conclusions

The general impression gained from those interviewed was that the accreditation of the metros was considered a success and an example of what can be achieved when the various participants work together.

One of the supporting factors was the fact that the sustainable human settlements policies were both defensible and credible, demanding a concerted effort to redress the ever increasing demand for better housing opportunities and improved urban environments, with better access to services, work opportunities and facilities. The underlying policy intentions were thus clear and generally supported.

As mentioned previously in this case study, those interviewed expressed their appreciation for the high levels of political commitment to the accreditation process and its intentions as well as the positive role played by those in leadership roles in facilitating the transfer of the housing function to the local authorities. This could be ascribed to the growing realisation amongst role players and participants that the function could be performed more effectively by the sphere of government closest to their constituents and recipients. This is not considered unique to the housing function, as it is generally conceded that the institutional knowledge of local and district municipalities

regarding localised needs and conditions renders them more aligned to the delivery of national policy objectives and the servicing of their constituent populations. It has the added benefit of making such institutions accountable to those they serve and places an additional obligation on local councillors and decision makers to base their actions on real as opposed to perceived needs.

However a number of limitations, shortcomings and problems emerged related to the administrative aspects of the Human Settlement MinMEC. These include:

- It is highly **sectorally focused** and pays insufficient attention to related functional areas. As a consequence the Human Settlement MinMEC tends to encourage the fragmentation of policy formulation. This is considered to be extremely problematic to the pursuit of sustainable human settlement objectives which rely heavily on cooperation with departments and ministries responsible for land release, planning and infrastructure;

- The **large number of MinMEC meetings** leads to either poor attendance or attendance by nominated lower ranking officials;

- The agenda is dominated by issues which in many cases could be dealt with more effectively by **technical committees**;

- The meetings are **dominated by national government** and do not really lend themselves to consensual decision-making;

- The **management and/or chairing of meetings**, the preparation and delivery of supporting documentation, and the conduct of proceedings are considered by those interviewed to be below par; and

- There is a lack of clarity over the **decision-making authority** of the MinMEC and insufficient capacity to implement decisions.

3.5 Case study 4: Finalisation of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)

3.5.1 Background

The focus of this case study is the **environmental impact assessment (EIA)** procedure and the role played by the environment MinMEC in this regard. There are two different focus areas with respect to EIA processes:

- Ensuring that there are clear EIA processes in place through ensuring that rules, regulations, and legislation are clear and consistent in their application both at national and provincial levels of government.
- Ensuring clear and consistent EIA processes are actually implemented at national and provincial levels of government.

The focus of this case study is the former although by its nature the report also refers to the latter.

3.5.2 Findings

Mandates

Part A of Schedule four of the Constitution covers concurrent national and provincial functions and includes: 'Environment', 'Administration of Indigenous Forests' 'Nature Conservation, excluding national parks, national botanical gardens and marine resources' and 'Pollution control'.

There are eleven responsible authorities for the EIA process: the national Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) and nine provinces (including MECs), making this a complex area for coordination. According to one high level interviewee, the DG of the national Department of Environmental Affairs has a largely strategic role in the EIA process which focuses on ensuring that the overall EIA process is efficient and streamlined and does not delay much needed development.

The broad role of the MinMEC has been to deal with broad coordination issues at national level as well as to set policy in line with laws and regulations. The MinMEC also facilitates inter-provincial coordination and assistance.

The overarching purpose of the EIA process is to determine, assess and evaluate the consequences (positive and negative) of a proposed development, activity or product.

As regards the question as to which department is primarily responsible for EIA, there was general consensus that this is the Department of Environmental Affairs. In the words of one official:.

> The Department of the Environment, because the role of the EIA is to make sure then the department issues the records of the decisions; … But of course the department of environment needs to work very closely with other departments.

The on-going protracted tensions between the respective roles of the Department of Environmental Affairs and the Department of Minerals around their respective mandates concerning the EIA process is a major coordination issue which is central to this case study.

Systems/processes

As regards the development of new regulations to better coordinate the respective roles of the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) and the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR), there has been good coordination at the MinMEC and MinTECH levels.

All EIA applications in the nine provinces are processed by the provincial department under which 'environment' falls, except for those activities that are of national significance, or those that straddle provincial borders and those where the provincial environmental department is the applicant. It should be noted however that the 'environment' function in the nine provinces falls into different departments resulting in a lack of cohesion in environmental MinMEC structures.

While there is general consensus that the EIA process has contributed overall to achieving sustainable development, it was pointed out that sustainability is unique to every region based on geographical and socio-ecological differences. Coordination to enhance service delivery is essential as well as shared learning experiences between provinces. It was further pointed out that sustainability can only successfully be achieved through acknowledging the specific socio-ecological and geographical differences and needs of the various regions in South Africa. For example different ecosystems and biomes provide unique challenges that cannot all be treated and approached in the same way in the EIA processes.

A number of weaknesses regarding environmental coordination structures were identified by key informants, including the fact that the committee for environmental coordination provided for in the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) is defunct; and the fact that the National Environmental Advisory Forum (NEAF) provided for in NEMA has been disbanded thus losing an important mechanism to get civil society involved in environmental issues.

Poor coordination between law reform initiatives have resulted in a fragmented approach to environmental management and duplication in procedures and processes. More specifically the complexity of environmental management which is widely recognised as complicating coordination.

In the environmental area we are dealing with moving targets to some extent in that for example the plethora of renewable energy projects which have emerged in the last five to ten years was not foreseen a decade ago. As a result, the necessary legislation and policy documents are not in place.

Behaviours:

The only documented evidence of the role of the Environment MinMEC (in the form of relevant MinMEC decisions reflected in the Environment MinMEC meeting minutes made available to Impact Economix) was in a 5 April 2013 meeting minute and read as follows:

> Ensure the urgent development of an EIA (and alternative instruments) awareness and education strategy aimed at local government, provincial EXCOs and departments, national departments, Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Committee (PICC), etc. and supported by Base Document/Guideline explaining context, purpose, process, roles and responsibilities in EIA and provide information on efficiency and effectiveness interventions and innovation in impact management system.

The above minute reflects the role that the MinMEC is playing in ensuring improved communication and awareness of EIA regulations and processes.

The MinTECH seems to be operating optimally. In the words of one official: "it is at the MinTECH level that most EIA coordination efforts have been most successful." A further success story described is the fact that water use license applicants must now take into account EIAs whereas this was not the case previously. This was as a direct result of the environmental MinTECHs.

With regard to the question of whether formulation of EIA regulations is an example of good, poor or mixed government coordination the answer is definitely 'mixed'. According to key informants, coordination within the EIA line departments (DEA and provincial environmental departments) has improved over the years. However, integration between EIA, waste management and air quality components could be improved. Cooperation between DEA and provinces on key issues such as shale gas and NEMA/mining interaction has been poor according to those interviewed for this case study.

3.5.3 Conclusions

This EIA case study has been an appropriate but somewhat complex case study to undertake due to a number of factors: the EIA has been around a relatively short time compared to other more traditional government functions; the fact that EIAs are being carried out in the context of concurrent national and provincial powers; the very nature of environmental concerns is all-pervasive and the notion of sustainable development is in reality the mandate of each and every government department at national and provincial levels. Be that as it may, this case study found that the coordination of service delivery in the environmental assessment process has made great strides in the last two decades.

Generally many examples were given of positive interaction and coordination, including the improved integration of environmental management systems, inclusive of EIA, into policies and strategies of all organs of state. According to one high level official a big difference could be made if there was an acknowledgement of the concurrent nature of the environmental management mandate to ensure meaningful deliberations on law reform initiatives and strategic issues, beyond mere consultation.

While overall coordination by the MinMEC as a whole can be rated as moderately successful a key area where EIA remains a challenge is in the mining sphere. While significant progress has been made with the current law reform initiative to move forward the proposed amendments to NEMA and MPRDA there is still room to improve the alignment between the statutes related to EAs. The amendments to NEMA and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) proposed the transfer of the environmental decision-making mandate to the Department of Mineral Resources. Unfortunately the transfer of decision making mandates (to mining) and the centralisation of decision making (e.g. NEMA and infrastructure bill) is an inappropriate response to this challenge. This issue is being included in an evaluation of environmental governance in the 2014/15 National Evaluation Plan.

3.6   Overall case study conclusions

Table 6 draws out the lessons from each of the case studies.

Table 6: Key success factors and challenges in the case studies

Case study	Key success factors	Key challenges
Regulation of IPPs	• Committed leadership by minister to drive legislation. • ISMO bill clearly stated as a priority deliverable in Outcome 6 Delivery Agreement - reinforced urgency and made accountability clear. • Effective monitoring and reporting on progress with legislation incl. Cabinet.	• Stakeholder management to address potential conflicts between government objectives (e.g. affordable electricity) and para-statal objectives (e.g. sustainable finances) requires dedicated processes/ structures..
Textbook challenges	• Political ownership of the issue by Minister and MECs with hands-on directives and clear priorities. • Strong coordination mechanisms at provincial level enhanced MinMEC effectiveness and ability to monitor Provincial service delivery. • Adoption of a sector plan which is specific about coordination mechanisms and mandates. • Careful management of concurrent powers and Provincial willingness to partner with national department around support efforts.	• National departments need to acknowledge their roles should extend beyond that of policy formulation, and include provision of capacity and support to provincial departments to implement policy. • Sometimes, different national and provincial views exist as to whether MinMECs should be used as a mechanism to take decisions, or only to consult, on national policy or legislation.. Legally, MinMECs only have decision-making powers if a specific act has granted such powers.
Accreditation of the Metros with the Housing Function	• Underlying policy intentions were clear and widely supported by all 3 spheres. • Realisation by all 3 spheres that housing function best performed at local sphere closest to beneficiaries addressing localised needs and conditions.	• MinMECs are limited in ability to deal with horizontal aspects of concurrent powers which can result in fragmentation of policy, planning and implementation. • Not clear if MinMECs are able to effectively broaden participation beyond core national department, and provincial delivery departments to address vertical inter-governmental as well as horizontal, issues.
Finalisation of EIA process	• MinMEC playing a role to enhance awareness and communication of EIA regulations and procedures.	• Committee provided for environmental coordination in NEMA is defunct and National Environmental Advisory Forum has been disbanded- no national.

Case study	Key success factors	Key challenges
		mechanism for civil society to get involved in environmental issues. • Poor coordination between law reform initiatives resulting in duplicated procedures and processes. • Greater recognition of concurrent nature of environmental management required to ensure meaningful deliberations on law reform. • Proposed centralisation of environmental decision-making in MPRDA and draft Infrastructure Bill may be inappropriate.

The following conclusions can be drawn.

1. **Effective leadership within coordination structure meetings** is important at both political and administrative levels and an integrated approach requires champions, political support, and the involvement of senior public servants.

    a) Ministers need to provide clear direction. Ministerial leadership is key in driving legislation and working with other ministers to obtain their support for new proposals (e.g. IPPs). The public profile and urgency of some of the issues being dealt with (e.g. LTSM) may also have resulted in ministers playing a more active role in driving these specific issues. In addition, the inclusion of priority deliverables in minister's performance agreements contributed towards ministers playing an active coordination role. Ministers also made sure that officials were allocated to tasks with clear deadlines and that they would be held accountable for achieving these.

    b) Political ownership of coordination mechanisms by the minister in collaboration with MECs is important to improve coordination in MinMECs (e.g. LTSM). Also, provincial buy-in to a nationally coordinated process requires sensitive negotiation at both political and administrative levels.

    c) At technical level, there needs to be monitoring that what needs to be done has been done, and if not, to provide leadership to ensure that the relevant issues are addressed (outside of the coordination structures and often in task teams).

2. **Meeting management**

    a) The management and/or chairing of meetings, the preparation and delivery of supporting documentation, and the conduct of proceedings are considered by those interviewed to be below par in a number of cases. Agendas are dominated by issues which could be dealt with more effectively by technical committees.

    b) The improvement of information systems and knowledge management, including electronic real-time reporting systems, can also enhance the functioning of coordination structures, especially where concurrent powers and national-provincial monitoring is required (LTSM).

    c) MinMEC and IF agendas can be successfully merged and managed as one integrated agenda in some cases (e.g. basic education).

3. It is important to **resolve certain coordination issues outside of cluster/MinMEC meetings**.

a) In this context, negotiating skills are absolutely critical in unblocking certain issues, particularly when conflicting interests or needs are involved.

b) Two levels are key: at a political level, ministers need to engage with ministers of other relevant portfolios to resolve outstanding issues and get support for draft legislative proposals.

c) At a technical level, the right level of officials need to coordinate and participate in focused task teams to resolve issues and develop detailed proposals (e.g. around legislation, regulations, service delivery priorities) to resolve competing needs and conflicts between coordination structure meetings. This has contributed to good progress with coordinating complex and contentious issues such as the regulations for IPPs and the LTSM. Ensuring that the task team's scope of work is clear has also supported task team effectiveness. Task teams are often driven at either chief director or director level and can report to DDG or DG level (which often represents the department on the technical coordination structure).

d) Inter-provincial technical committees reporting to MinTECHs can play an important role in enhancing national government support and strengthening monitoring mechanisms.

e) Linked to the task teams was the submission of detailed memos/ reports to the cluster and Cabinet which presented a balanced overview of the pros and cons of different options and which supported informed Cabinet decision-making (IPP). Such memos also flagged issues relevant to the implementation of draft legislation and which allowed for pro-active Cabinet decisions to address these issues timeously (IPP).

4. The importance of **bringing in external stakeholders**, e.g. through public hearings, has also added value where there are additional stakeholders outside of the core of government and with strong interests in the matter at hand. Inputs received contributed towards ensuring that issues of alignment between draft legislation and existing legislation were addressed. In addition national departments also need to prioritise and coordinate relationships with both national and provincial treasuries, as well as offices of the premier (OTP) to ensure financial management issues are addressed (including budgeting and supply chain management processes), as well to ensure that the OTPs play effective oversight roles of provincial departments.

5. Specific issues in terms of **inter-governmental coordination** include:

a) There is a reported lack of clarity over the decision-making role of MinMECs with respect to national policy and legislation. Some role-players believe MinMECs should not be used as a mechanism to take decisions on national policy or legislation as such decisions are the responsibility of the relevant national department. Other key informants believe that that MinMECs should facilitate joint national and provincial decision-making, and not just information sharing and/or consultation. Legally, MinMECs only have decision-making powers if a specific act has granted such powers.

b) Strong coordination mechanisms at provincial level are needed to enhance the effectiveness of MinTECHS and MinMECs. Greater capacity is needed to implement decisions.

c) MinMEC meetings can be dominated by the national government in which case they do not really lend themselves to consensual decision-making.

d) A key role is obviously around the relative roles of national and provincial levels. Coordinating policy formulation and policy implementation cannot be easily separated and national and provincial departments need to be involved in both aspects to be effective and to find an appropriate balance in this regard. MinMECs can play an

important role in dealing with coordination issues involving the devolution of national and provincial powers to a municipal level (e.g. housing). This requires that an integrated portfolio of both ministers and MECs relevant to the power need to actively support the process. Clarity and support at both the political and administrative level for underlying policy intentions at national and provincial level can enhance the transfer of powers between spheres.

e) The adoption of sector plans which are specific about coordination mechanisms responsible for specific coordination issues is one tool that can clarify coordination mandates. Here, national departments need to acknowledge that their roles should often extend beyond that of mere policy formulation, and include the provision of capacity and support to provincial departments to implement policy.

f) MinMECs can play an important role in identifying models best suited to resolving service delivery blockages at a provincial level.

g) MinMECs are limited in their ability to deal with the horizontal aspects of concurrent powers. For example, both human settlements and EA regulations require active roles to be played by a range of national and provincial departments and it is not clear if MinMECs are able to effectively broaden participation beyond the core national coordinating department, and provincial delivery department to ensure that processes are coordinated to address both vertical inter-governmental, as well as horizontal, issues.

4. Findings: How well are the coordination systems working overall?

4.1   Introduction

Section 4 is organised into three main sections as per the analytic framework (mandates, systems and processes, and behaviours) with sub-sections that relate to the evaluation questions and sub-themes. Section 4 ends with conclusions on the overall coordination effectiveness of the coordination structures/systems. Sections 4 and 5 draw together the findings from the survey of 34 DGs, the face-to-face interviews with 38 DGs, ministers, and outcome facilitators/managers, the case studies, and the analysis of data on minuted decisions taken by the three structures between June 2011 – June 2013, as well as attendance levels for the selected coordination structures (where available).

Table 7: Key issues covered in sub-sections in Section four

Theme	Sub-sections	
Mandates	4.2.1	Mandates captured in legislation or other.
	4.2.2	Levels of political and administrative commitment to coordination and leadership.
	4.2.3	Strengthening the capacity of Cabinet.
	4.2.4	How clear, appropriate and realistic are the coordination roles.
	4.2.5	Are the systems meeting their existing roles/mandates?
Resources and processes	4.3.1	Relationships between the political and administrative level.
	4.3.2	Sufficient resources to support effective functioning of coordination structures; including effective meeting management systems, secretariat support, meeting preparation, chairpersons and agenda setting and management, accountability, coordination agreements, and bringing in views from outside of government.
Behaviours	4.4.1	Organisational culture and coordination.
	4.4.2	Right level and mix of competencies, capabilities, capacity (knowledge, skills and attitudes) as well as representation on, and participation in, coordination structures.

4.2   Mandates

This section contains findings relevant to the following three evaluation questions.

- Are the cluster roles feasible and realistic?
- Are the systems meeting their existing roles/mandates?
- Do clusters strengthen the capacity of Cabinet?
- Are there any contradictions between existing mandate s/roles and responsibilities and any other structures or legislation?

4.2.1 Clear mandates captured in legislative/policy framework or other means

The nature and source of the structure mandates are covered in section 2.1, with cluster mandates defined by the Presidency, TORs of Implementation Forums developed by the Presidency , while MinMECs have a mandate through legislation both in terms of overarching legislation (the IGR Act 13 of 2005) and in sector specific legislation which provide for selected sector-specific MinMECs.[3]

The findings from the survey of DGs with respect to the views of DGs regarding the clarity and appropriateness of structure roles show that there are high levels of agreement on the clarity and appropriateness of certain structure roles (where 85% or more of DGs agree the role is clear and/or appropriate) as well as high levels of disagreement on the clarity and appropriateness of other structure roles (where 20-50% of DGs disagree that specific roles are either clear or appropriate).

This suggests that there is not sufficient clarity on the structure roles and that there may be a need to clarify and confirm the roles of the structures. There may also be issues of role overlap between the structures which need to be addressed.

When key informants were asked to comment as to whether there was a need to define a mandate for IFs or clusters in legislation, there was widespread consensus that this was not necessary and would be undesirable. The feeling was that the macro structures of the state need to be able to adapt over time and that legislating the clusters and IFs could mitigate against the need for flexibility. However there was a feeling that cluster mandates needed to be more formal (e.g. through formalised ToR).

4.2.2 Are there any contradictions between existing mandates/roles and responsibilities and any other structures or legislation?

According to one minister interviewed, mandate complexities are further complicated by a plethora of structures whose mandates are not well defined. A number of key informants believe that it is not necessary to have three levels of structures (technical cluster, ministerial cluster, and Cabinet committee) and that there is some overlap between the technical and ministerial cluster structures. The feeling was expressed that we are 'meeting for the sake of meeting'. The issue of overlap has also been raised by a small number of key informants as applying to clusters, IFs and MinMECs overall. In addition there is a conflict between the large number of meetings that have to be attended, including parliamentary portfolio committees.

There is some lack of clarity on the mandates of ministerial clusters and Cabinet Committees. Examples were that there is sometimes confusion as to whether decisions to unblock delivery should be taken at the ministerial structure level or at Cabinet Committee level. Blockages are not always effectively elevated upwards from lower level structures to higher level structures when lower level structures have not been able to unblock issues. In some cases reports bypass ministerial structures and are submitted directly to Cabinet Committees.

A small number of key informants believe that there is no need for cluster structures at all (and that issue-focused IMCs are a better mechanism and can be established by the Presidency should the need arise). For example one DG said "Then in the past, or if there is a problem with coordination

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[3] Examples include the National Health Act no. 61 (2003) and the National Health Council (NHC), the National Education Policy Act No. 27 of 1996 and education, and National Housing Act No. 107 of 1997 and human settlements.

of a certain matter, Cabinet has appointed an inter-ministerial committee. The Presidency says I appoint an inter-ministerial committee, you go and deal with it. Why do you need a cluster system if there is a mechanism for the president to say there is an inter-ministerial committee, go and sort out this issue." A concern was also raised that decisions taken by ministers at an IMC can get overturned by officials at a technical cluster. A view was expressed that IMC decisions should go directly to the Cabinet committee and not to the clusters.

4.2.3 Are the systems meeting their existing roles/mandates, including decision-making?

There are a number of indications that the structures are not effectively, or optimally, meeting their existing roles and mandates, including inadequate preparation before structure meetings (sometimes due to insufficient time between meetings or reports not being received seven days before meetings) which impacts on the quality of structure decisions made and uneven implementation of structure decisions which is linked to poor enforcement of accountability for implementing structure decisions. Table 8 shows how DGs in the different clusters saw key aspects about the working of the coordination structures.

Table 8: Coordination Structure Decision-Making

Question	Rating (% of DGs surveyed) of		
	Clusters	**IFs**	**MinMECs**
% of DGs surveyed who feel that representatives were adequately prepared for meetings in the past year	54%	50%	67%
% of DGs who feel that the quality of decisions made was good in the past year	50%	50%	65%
% of DGs who feel that recommendations were effectively implemented	50%	61%	45%
% of DGs who feel that there is good accountability for implementing cluster decisions	32%	47%	45%

(horizontal lines)	<49.9%
(hatched)	50-59.9%
(dotted)	60% +

Source: Impact Economix. 2013, DG Survey.

Around half of DGs felt that those participating were not adequately prepared for meetings. Interestingly this was better for the MinMECs. Again only half felt that the quality of cluster decisions was good, that they were implemented effectively (better for IFs), and only a third that there was good accountability for implementing cluster decisions (again better for IFs and MinMECs). An interesting point made by one minister was that "…coordination is about pulling everything together and putting all the right pieces in the right places, with a view to moving towards a single outcome. The cluster system is actually more about consolidation than coordination. Coordination actually takes place outside the system." This comment reflects the view that cluster structure meetings spend a lot of time on consolidating PoA reports and that this focus can be at the expense of the cluster's role in taking decisions and unblocking which actually promote coordination.

Figure 8 shows an analysis of decisions taken from minutes of cluster meetings between June 2011 - June 2013 which were classified by type of decision taken and which correspond with the various cluster roles. This shows that a large proportion of decisions taken (and, by implication, meeting time) deal with either the structure's administrative functioning (e.g. attendance, agenda)

or issues of reporting (e.g. reports submitted to the structure as well as reports submitted from the structure to other structures), (49% of cluster decisions, 33% of IF decisions, 39% of MinMEC decisions), rather than unblocking implementation. This points to the structures not working optimally.

Figure 8: Minuted cluster meeting decisions classified by cluster role: June 2011 – July 2013

Source: Impact Economix analysis of cluster structure minutes. 2013

Key informants felt strongly that the reporting role (on the PoA) was becoming a dominant compliance focus at the expense of the strategic role of the structures (especially the clusters). The feeling was expressed that the structures are trying to coordinate too many issues (as reflected in the PoA) and that there should be a more strategic focus on a smaller number of priority issues requiring coordination. One DG said "I agree with those who say there is nothing wrong with coordination necessarily. It is becoming wrong and frustrating because you are coordinating too many things almost at the same time.". Another DG indicated that "with the cluster system working as it has we are seeing an increase in policies that conflict across the clusters. We [are] seeing legislation based on such policies resulting in a conflict … and sometimes resulting in legislation being passed which is not possible to implement." This points to the importance of the role of the Presidency in ensuring coordination across clusters.

In addition, inefficiencies in the PoA reporting process were mentioned by numerous key informants interviewed. These inefficiencies include the use of different reporting format templates for different structures, the need to obtain report approvals from many levels and the need for numerous senior level meetings to discuss PoA reports. These inefficiencies put additional unnecessary pressure on scarce minister and DG time. As a result, there has been an increase in policies which conflict with each other and/or which are not fully implementable (an indication of coordination failure).

In terms of mandates/roles, key informants identified the following tensions:

a) Clusters and IFs have become compliance driven with the danger being that those acting as IFs are becoming mainly focused on getting PoA reports to Cabinet, at the expense of

focusing on unblocking implementation blockages, as well as at the expense of focusing at a strategic level on policy alignment/disjuncture issues.

b) There is a potential contradiction between monitoring and fast-tracking the PoA, which has key outputs identified in the DAs as well as Cabinet directives, and whether IFs are focusing on the strategic priorities in the DAs.

c) Regarding the role of DGs and ministers, one key informant proposed that there needs to be a clear delineation between DG and minister's roles.   Ministers should focus on coordinating policy to ensure that there are no contradictions/inconsistencies and DGs should focus on implementation. However it is not clear if such a delineation is feasible.

4.2.4 High levels of political and bureaucratic commitment to coordination and leadership

Two issues were raised by a number of key informants interviewed:

* The importance of high levels of commitment of both ministers and DGs to coordination. This includes participating in the details of reports submitted to the coordination structures, which impacts positively on the quality of reports and the recommendations submitted to Cabinet, which in turn can improve the capacity of Cabinet to make well-informed decisions. Ministers are not always in agreement with information in reports coming from their own departments. This reflects a lack of prior engagement with reports by ministers before reports are submitted to Cabinet Committees,

* Both political and administrative leadership are needed and the ability of the political and administrative level to work well together can support effective coordination.

This raises the issue of the importance of people and personal qualities versus the nature of structures. It is clear that the personal qualities of ministers and DGs can have a big impact on how effective the coordination structures are. The case studies illustrated the importance of leadership, e.g. around Learner Support and Teaching Materials (LSTM) where political ownership of coordination mechanisms by the minister in collaboration with MECs was important to improve coordination in MinMECs.

4.2.5 Supporting Cabinet to make effective decisions

As well as playing a role in specific policy issues, clusters also act as the conduit of issues for discussion in Cabinet. Therefore it is important for clusters to be effective so the right issues are reaching Cabinet, with the right level of evidence, and with clear decisions needed indicated. The key issues identified by key informants which impact on the capacity of Cabinet to take meaningful decisions include the following:

a) Sometimes the information going to Cabinet is too detailed. For example Cabinet receives a lot of detailed information relating to the PoA and this involves both strategic and operational issues and Cabinet is not always clear as to whether the role of Cabinet committees should be to focus at a strategic (and outcomes level) or a detailed operational level (and outputs).

b) The quality of reports sent to Cabinet can be poor, which can then negatively impact on the ability of Cabinet to make meaningful decisions. Informants suggested that this results from the following three factors:
   o The quality of DG and ministerial participation in the structures, and their attention to the quality of reports.

- o Poorly attended meetings.
- o Reports to Cabinet committees do not always first go through the coordination structures and therefore do not necessarily benefit from inputs from relevant departments or spheres.

c) Documents sometimes take a long time to reach the Cabinet Committees because of frequent cancellation of technical or ministerial meetings and this slows down government's decision-making and consequent implementation.

Table 9: Coordination Structure Meeting Management Effectiveness

Question	Rating (% of DGs surveyed) of		
	Clusters	IFs	MinMECs
% DGs feeling that reports submitted to structures are well prepared,	29%	64%	59%
% DGs feeling that the majority of agenda items focus on strategic items.	73%	62%	62%
% DGs feeling that meeting agendas are appropriately structured to address its roles.	78%	71%	62%
% DGs feeling that structure meetings are chaired effectively.	87%	67%	72%

▦	<49.9%
▨	50-59.9%
▩	60% +

Source: Impact Economix. 2013 DGs Survey..

Table 10: Coordination Structure Participation and Representation Issues

Question	Rating (% of DGs surveyed) of		
	Clusters	IFs	MinMECs
% DGs feeling that meetings are well represented by relevant departments.	56%	45%	68%
% DGs feeling that attendance at structure meetings is by sufficiently senior officials.	53%	46%	76%
% DGs agree that attending structure meetings is a valuable use of DG's time.	87%	80%	83%
% DGs agree that their department has derived value from participating in the structure over the past year.	91%	73%	70%

▦	<49.9%
▨	50-59.9%
▩	60% +

Source: Impact Economix. 2013 DGs Survey.

4.3   Systems and processes

Key systems and process issues examined in this section include the following:

- Relationships between the political and administrative level.
- Sufficient resources to support effective functioning of coordination structures.

4.3.1 Relationships between political and administrative level

Three key issues have been raised by informants regarding the relationships between political and administrative levels and which impact on the coordination effectiveness of the structures:

a) The extent to which there is a **relationship of trust and respect between DGs and ministers** is particularly important in the effective operation of departments, and therefore implementation of policy.

b) **The time available between technical and ministerial structure meetings** to allow for briefings between DGs and ministers for adequate preparation in advance of ministerial structure meetings. Table 7 indicates that in general participants are not well enough prepared for meetings. It was noted that there was not always sufficient time in-between meetings to allow for briefing of ministers in advance of ministerial structure meetings.

c) **The extent to which ministers hold their DGs accountable for both submitting reports to the coordination structures, as well as implementing decisions** made by Cabinet and the coordination structures. Table 7 also points to the problem of accountability, in this case for implementing decisions taken by the coordination structures.

4.3.2 Sufficient resources to support effective functioning of coordination structures

This section examines evidence and findings with respect to the following:

- Meeting schedules and management systems (also linked to structure participation and attendance discussed in sub-section 4.4 dealing with behaviours).
- Secretariat support and meeting chairing/ chairpersons, including agenda setting and management.
- Coordination agreements.
- Accountability issues.
- Managing issues outside the formal meetings.
- Bringing in the views of stakeholders outside of government.

Meeting schedules

There is a feeling that there are too many meetings (42% of DGs for clusters; 44% (agree/ neutral) for IFs, 10% for MinMECs), and that the meetings are too long (44% of DGs for clusters; 54% agree/neutral for IFs, 43% agree/neutral for MinMECs). One Minister stated that "This additional layer [clusters], added 30 plus meetings to my dairy per annum. It is just not possible. It added to the diaries of DG's 50 plus meetings. And, you know, if you look at some of the bigger departments, it will obviously still be more. So this is a burden that I think right from the outset was impossible for ministers, DG's and other staff to carry and deal with." One DG stated that "Poor timetabling and time demands on the leadership are the biggest challenges. Ministers and DGs are servicing a lot of structures, and poor timetabling makes it difficult for them to lead clusters effectively."

Secretariat and meeting management

Table 9 on the previous page**Error! Reference source not found.** summarises the DG survey responses regarding the effectiveness of management of the structure meetings. The results are positive for clusters, and mixed for IFs and MinMECs. However the responses in the survey on the clusters is more positive than the views expressed in the 1-1 interviews suggest.

Secretariats play a number of important roles in supporting the effective functioning of the coordination structures. Key secretariat roles include:

- Sending out meeting agendas (it is believed that in some cases secretariats work with DGs and/or ministers to finalise agendas and in other cases secretariats take full responsibility for this).
- Making sure departments submit reports on time and ensuring the circulation of reports ahead of structure meetings (and issuing warnings to departments if the quality of a report is not good).
- Taking minutes of structure meetings.
- Maintaining a schedule or list of activities that the structure has to resolve, as well as monitor structure progress with taking forward this schedule of activities or issues.
- Supporting minister's to convene meetings.

With the exception of the IF, ToRs of the structures do not go into any detail regarding meeting management or the functioning of secretariats. As one key informant noted, decisions and guidelines regarding both MinMEC and cluster procedures and protocols have evolved over time and are reflected in minutes of various meetings.

Issues identified by key informants with respect to structure secretariats and what is not working are as follows:

a) There are **not always dedicated secretariats** for the coordination structures and whatever secretariat capacity does exist is not well-resourced e.g. sometimes DG's PAs perform the secretariat function amongst many other duties. They perform ad hoc tasks and do not have capacity to check on report quality issues or to provide an agenda management function e.g. checking whether the item should in fact be on the agenda of the particular structure. Sometimes PAs send information directly to the cluster meeting without being checked for quality. One minister indicated that "Some secretariats are located in the coordinating department's office and do not always have the know-how and capacity to run the system". One DG indicated: "We have introduced the cluster system, we have introduced the outcome system and we have not looked at the capacity needed to drive it. Equally the same thing applies to the MinMECs."

b) **Location of secretariat**. There are different perspectives as to whether secretariats should be based in the main coordinating department or elsewhere (e.g. at the Presidency). One minister interviewed proposed that the cluster secretariat should be located in the Presidency where the Cabinet secretariat is located (however, it is not clear if this proposal pertains to the minister cluster committees only - although this would be a fair assumption to make). One Minister said "We are right in the midst of a total system failure…. happening because this cluster system is not run by the Cabinet Secretariat but rather by the office of the minister who is appointed as chairperson of the cluster. In practice, ministerial staff do not have the capacity or know-how to run the system. Even if they did have the capacity, it probably wouldn't work, but would in any case only have had a chance of working if the Cabinet secretariat ran the system."

c) **Lack of response from departments/**ministers. Department/ministers are not always disciplined and do not respond to the coordinating secretariat requests for reports due (one of the reasons mentioned for this by key informants was that "all ministers are equal in Cabinet and one minister therefore cannot tell another minister what to do"). Because of this, structure participants do not always receive documents at least seven days before a structure meeting. Because of the challenges experienced by coordinating departments in

requesting and receiving cluster reports in time for circulation (or at all), several key informants raised the need for "someone must have authority over others and it must be clear." The idea of creating super DGs and super ministers has been raised as one possible solution to this issue. Another option is to strengthen both cluster ToRs as well as the cluster secretariats' capacity to administer these ToRs, including the reporting processes.

Chairing of meetings and agenda content and setting

Coordinating structure chairpersons come from the core lead department and tend to be the DG for technical structures and the minister for ministerial structures.

An important role of the coordinating structure chairperson is to structure the agenda and duration by deciding how much time is allocated to discuss or debate a particular issue. As one key informant noted: "Who chairs and the nature in which they do it is very important" (DG).

While Table 8 suggests that the majority of DGs were happy with the agendas (78% for clusters) and chairing of clusters (87%), in interviews the view was more negative, and the overwhelming number of key informant responses interviewed stated that the agendas need to be more focused and strategic and to only include agenda items which require coordination:

- "There needs to be a limited and focused agenda. This will specify the core business and prevent us from trying to do too many things." (DG)
- "For both IF and cluster meetings, there is a need to streamline the agenda item by focussing on strategic cross-departmental and harmonisation issues rather than department specific and administrative issues." (outcome facilitator)

By having a more focused and strategic agenda, as well as by improving the circulation of documents sufficiently in advance of meetings to allow for meeting preparation, priority issues could be discussed in more detail.

Managing issues outside the formal coordination structure meetings

The case studies also brought up how important it is to deal with issues between meetings, not only in the meeting itself. It pointed to the need for negotiating skills in unblocking certain issues, particularly when conflicting interests or needs are involved, and that ministers need to engage with ministers of other relevant and key portfolios to resolve outstanding issues and get support for draft legislative proposals.

It also pointed to the need for technical resolution and the potential of activities between meetings including:

- focused **task teams** to resolve issues and develop detailed proposals (e.g. around legislation, regulations, service delivery priorities) and to resolve competing needs and conflicts between meetings (e.g. for IPPs and the LTSM). These were often driven at either chief director or director level and can report to DDG or DG level (which often represents the department on the technical coordination structure).
- **Inter-provincial technical committees** reporting to MinTECHs playing an important role in enhancing national government support and strengthening monitoring mechanisms.
- Submission of **detailed memos/ reports** to the cluster and Cabinet to present a balanced overview of the pros and cons of different options (e.g. IPP). Such memos also flagged

issues relevant to the implementation of draft legislation and which allowed for pro-active Cabinet decisions to address these issues timeously (IPP).

- Other coordination instruments, such as **memorandums of understanding** (MoUs) or Inter-Ministerial Committees were seen as allowing the executive authority to take responsibility for delivering on their own portfolio or functional mandates and for taking responsibility for taking decisions. One DG suggested that (if you are dealing with a) "recurring problem, then you do as we do, and you do an MOU between the two departments that sets up a mechanism to coordinate these issues on a permanent basis and you say that official and that official are responsible to deal with the issue. You don't wait for the cluster system and implementation forum to deal with something as easy as that."

Greater use of these other coordination tools with submission of well thought out documents with good evidence could reduce the number of coordination issues that clusters are being expected to play a role in addressing.

Bringing in views from outside government

Bringing in views from outside of government typically takes place outside of the structure meetings, e.g. in task teams etc. As section five on MinMECs shows, in some instances legislation provides for the establishment of sector or issue specific broader consultative forums for government to use as vehicles to have broader engagement on policy issues.

Effective accountability and performance mechanisms including performance targets

There are several accountability issues raised in relation to the coordination structures:

a) **Ministers do not necessarily hold DGs accountable for implementing decisions of the coordination structures and the same applies to DGs and lower level officials (there is not a culture of consequences).** Table 9 points to the inadequacy of accountability for implementing cluster decisions. There are inadequate consequences so if a department does not report progress to the coordination structures or to Cabinet, or problems are not addressed, the ministers do not hold DGs accountable. This impacts on the ability of the structures to effectively fulfil their mandates. "There is no naming and shaming …. Even if agreements are in place and departments don't adhere to what has been agreed there are no consequences." (outcome facilitator). One view expressed is that accountability is best achieved by the President holding a minister to account or a minister holding a DG to account - not by holding meetings. A suggestion was the need for the Presidency to play a much more decisive role in assigning responsibility and accountability and for putting in place a mechanism for effective monitoring and accountability.

b) **Improving tracking of decisions and progress.** The improvement of information systems and knowledge management, including electronic real-time reporting systems, can enhance the functioning of coordination structures, especially where concurrent powers and national-provincial monitoring is required, as shown by the LTSM case study. This also points to strengthening the capacity of the secretariat.

c) **The top down nature of coordination structures can actually reduce accountability of the responsible department (minister, officials) for taking decisions** as ministers or DGs could state that they are waiting for the structure to meet to take a decision. As one

key informant stated: "In the past, or if there is a problem with coordination of a certain matter, Cabinet has always said I appoint an inter-ministerial committee, the Presidency says I appoint an inter-ministerial committee, you go and deal with it. Why do you need a cluster system if there is a mechanism for the president to say there is an inter-ministerial committee, go and sort out this issue. It also makes sure that the executive takes responsibility for the mandate that they are given to deliver on their own portfolio and not have ministers say but we are waiting for a cluster system to report on an issue. So I think there it enables executive decisions to be taken and take responsibility" (DG).

d) **Officials are not always sufficiently empowered to take action outside of the structure meetings to coordinate issues:** officials either prefer to wait for the structures to make decisions instead of taking the initiative to coordinate issues outside of the structure meetings, or are not empowered by their DGs to take responsibility for coordination issues outside of structure meetings. Several DGs referred to officials taking more responsibility for coordination, but that sometimes they are not given a mandate to take the initiative.

e) **Performance management systems and coordination.** Sometimes the performance management systems do not support the effective functioning of the coordination structures, and balance the trade-off with self-interest and competition between departments. A core driver linked to accountability is that DGs and ministers prioritise those issues on which their performance is measured and evaluated and that there are some coordination activities that are not well defined or integrated into these performance instruments resulting in DGs or ministers not necessarily providing the required leadership or direction. Many DGs noted that the reward system does not recognise time spent on these structures and so facilitate coordination: "It is all about incentives and sanction for ministers and DGs. No one is reporting on coordination in terms of DGs' performance contract with the minister and similarly ministers are not asked about their performance in terms of coordination." (DG). An important issue is whether the incentives which drive DGs and departments can be broadened or modified to include performance measures and targets which relate directly to, and which promote, coordinated behaviour or actions.

4.4   Behaviour

This section on behavioural issues, which influence the effectiveness of the structures includes the following sub-sections:

- Actual attendance and representation in the meetings.
- Organisational culture and coordination.
- Level and mix of competencies, capabilities, capacity (knowledge, skills and attitudes).

4.4.1 Participation and representation in meetings of the coordination structures

Figure 9 shows the low level of attendance at technical clusters by DGs. The level of attendance did improve between 2012 and 2013 from 23% to 40% but overall attendance is still low. Table 9 shows that only 56% of DGs feel that cluster structure representation is adequate, but only 45% feel this for IFs and 68% for MinMECs. The same picture can be seen in Table 9 for the seniority of participation in clusters, but there is a much more positive picture of this in the MinMECS and a less positive picture for the IFs. Table 9 also suggests that DG's do see it is a valuable use of their

time, but this is contradicted by them not attending meetings. Alternatively they just do not have the time (and a research project is underway in DPME to analyse the requirements on a DG's time). "DGs need to see the value in meetings and therefore fewer meetings that focus on highly prioritised and high impact issues." (DG)

Figure 9: Level of attendance by DGs at technical clusters

Source: Impact Economix analysis of attendance registers for 5 clusters provided by Cabinet Secretariat (Presidency) (excluding International Relations, Peace and Security cluster)

Table 10**Error! Reference source not found.** shown earlier summarises the DG survey responses regarding the effectiveness of coordination structures regarding participation and representation Issues.

Participation and attendance issues need to be understood within the broader context of the many demands which exist on both ministers' and DGs' time. These demands include the fact that some ministers and DGs attend at least three, if not more, clusters, MinMECs, or IFs, as well as attend a range of coordination structures over and above the cluster/IF/MinMEC structures such as IMCs (see the separate Data Annexure report for a list of Cabinet Committees where ministers need to attend multiple Cabinet committees, a list of technical / FOSAD clusters and core departments participating, and a list of existing IMCs). The proportion of DGs feeling that there are too many departments participating varies markedly between structure: 14% of DGs for clusters; 15% DGs for IFs, 4% DGs for MinMECs.
The core demands on Ministers and DGs include:

- **Ministers -** Monday: party meetings at head office and in provinces; Tuesday: Cabinet meetings and parliament; Wednesday: full Cabinet every alternate week and Cabinet committee alternating weeks and parliament in the afternoon; Thursday: some Cabinet committee meetings in the morning, parliamentary caucus at 10:00; Friday: constituency

days as far as possible. In addition, there are ad-hoc inter-ministerial committees to attend[4].

- **DGs** – Parliamentary portfolio committees, up to three cluster technical/FOSAD meetings per month, as well as linked ministerial/political briefing meetings; departmental management meetings; budget meetings; technical inter-ministerial committee meetings and so on.

The following key informant response illustrates competing time demand issues:

- "…the main cause of the cluster system not working is participation at the right level. And the main reason for participation being weak is because there are huge demands on DGs time. The main reason why they are not there is that they are summoned to the legislature. And that is an obligation. If they don't go to the legislature that causes all sorts of problems." (DG)

The results of the number of structures and number of meetings which DGs need to attend include:

- DGs sending junior officials to meetings.
- Lack of continuity in attendance from departments.
- Poor leadership in meetings as well as quality of reports and meeting productivity in terms of quality of meeting outputs (decisions)

Poor attendance by senior officials undermines the effectiveness of the clusters. Firstly, only DGs can exercise authority for taking certain decisions. Secondly, officials who are asked to attend meetings often tend to be those with free time to attend meetings and not necessarily those busy managers who add value. All of this undermines the ability of the structures to take effective decisions.

4.4.2 Organisational culture and shared values that supports collaboration and mutual learning

Apart from simply having the time, a culture which fosters coordination matters. Organisational culture varies from department to department and between the three spheres of the government. It includes beliefs and values which impact on employee's behaviours (Wagner, 1995) as well as the standards and norms that prescribe how employees should behave in any given organisation (Martins & Martins. 2003).

Many key informants noted that the culture of coordination is weak in government and that departmentalism, or silos, dominate organisational culture. One could argue that this dominant government culture reinforces the need for coordination structures.

The literature review pointed to the link between the effectiveness of coordination and the behaviour of leaders: "Currently, the culture of coordination is negligent, except for one or two IFs and clusters. The main determinant and contributor to the development of such a culture is the leadership style in a given forum." (Outcome facilitator). The issue of leadership is discussed under 4.2.

Respondents identified the need for induction training for government officials to address issues related to promoting a culture of coordination, including unpacking what it means to be a government official (this relates to government official mind-set issues raised in the section on

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[4] A 2012 survey carried out by the Presidency's Cabinet secretariat identified 25 IMCs. Out of the 25 IMC's, 22 last met between 2010 and 2011, one has not met and the dates when the remaining two IMC's last met are unknown.

competencies and skills that it is important for officials to understand that one of their roles is to 'unblock' implementation constraints).

It is not only the formal mechanisms but the rich network of cross-organisational relationships outside these formal structures which helps to build a coordination culture.

4.4.3 Right level and mix of competencies, capabilities, capacity (knowledge, skills and attitudes)

The following three key competency/capacity/attitude/skills issues were raised by key informants as undermining the effectiveness of coordination in general as well as the specific effectiveness of the coordination structures:

a) Many officials do not seem to understand that part of their role is to unblock implementation blockages or constraints: "The question for me is how do we get public servants to have an understanding that their function is to unblock. And that requires a mind-set shift and an integrated approach".

b) Some DGs do not think strategically and they are more focused on managerial issues.

c) Coordination requires negotiation skills, which need to be seen as a core senior official competence. At the moment, the dominant current approach followed by departments is that other departments must do what they are told to do.

5.   Issues Impacting Specifically on the Coordination Effectiveness of Clusters, IFs and MinMECs

Section 5 focuses on identifying the key coordination effectiveness issues over and above those identified in section four, and which are specific to each of the three structures: clusters, MinMECs and IFs.

5.1   Clusters

5.1.1   Cluster Mandates

The findings from the survey of DGs, with respect to their views regarding the clarity and appropriateness (how realistic?) of cluster roles, are discussed below. The questionnaire asked DGs for their views on whether participants in the cluster clearly understood each of the following cluster roles[5], as well as whether they agreed or disagreed that, "It is realistic for the structure to effectively fulfil or perform each of these following roles"[6]:

   a) Improve Cabinet decision-making processes.
   b) Harmonise the work of departments through promoting inter-departmental planning, collaboration and coordination.
   c) Produce quarterly reports on progress with the implementation of the PoA (the delivery agreements) to increase implementation pressure and transparency.
   d) Coordinate and oversee implementation of the PoA, including identifying and resolving implementation blockages.
   e) The coordination and alignment of departmental policies and priorities.
   f) Integrated planning and implementation of policy and cluster programmes.
   g) Promoting effective decision-making on issues relating to policy development and implementation.
   h) Promote active collaboration with provincial clusters to implement Government's Programme of Action.
   i) Integrated approach to monitoring and evaluation of government's performance.
   j) Ensuring adequate resources for the implementation of cluster priorities.

The following roles were seen as problematic. 40-50% of DGs surveyed do not believe that the following roles are realistic/ appropriate:

   1. Harmonise the work of departments through promoting inter-departmental planning, collaboration and coordination.
   2. Coordinate and oversee implementation of the PoA, including identifying and resolving implementation blockages.

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[5] These roles are identified in Presidency (2008) and Presidency (undated).
[6] Please note when reviewing the graphs summarising the DGs responses to these two questions, that not all DGs who responded to the "role clarity" question, responded to the "role appropriateness/ realistic" question (possibly due to the layout of the questionnaire). There is therefore a slight difference between the number of responses to the role clarity question and the role appropriateness/ realistic question. Unfortunately, time did not allow for the piloting of the questionnaire due to the timing of the FOSAD workshop date, which provided a rare opportunity to access most DGs in an efficient and effective manner in one place.

3. The coordination and alignment of departmental policies and priorities.

In addition, 35-50% of DGs surveyed disagreed or were neutral regarding the clarity of the following cluster roles:

1. Ensuring adequate resources for the implementation of cluster priorities.
2. Promote active collaboration with provincial clusters to implement Government's Programme of Actio.
3. Integrated approach to monitoring and evaluation of government's performance.

An issue identified was blurring of roles/mandates between the technical and ministerial clusters and there is not always consensus on what items/issues should be submitted from the technical cluster to the ministerial cluster.

As shown in Figure 8 in section four, a large portion of decisions made in clusters are focused on the functioning of the clusters (17%), as well as reporting issues/processes (32%). Only 6% of cluster decisions between June 2011 – June 2013 dealt with unblocking implementation.

Overall there is no common understanding across all DGs regarding the clarity and appropriateness of cluster roles and responsibilities, with around 50% of DGs surveyed believing that roles are either unclear or not realistic. The key cluster focus appears to be on PoA quarterly reporting, including reporting to Cabinet. So where reports are of good quality, the clusters are succeeding in building Cabinet's capacity to make quality decisions. However, the PoA process is seen to be inefficient in some cases (involving approvals from many levels and reports have to be written using different templates). There were wide-spread concerns reported that clusters have become more about consolidation of PoA reports, than about coordination.

It is not clear why a large proportion of DGs do not believe that it is realistic for clusters to play a role in resolving implementation blockages, harmonising the work of departments, or coordinating and aligning departmental policies and priorities. Possible reasons suggested include trying to coordinate too many issues, focus on PoA reporting and neglecting their more strategic role and that levels of DG attendance are not always sufficient to support effective decision-making. It appears that unblocking implementation often best takes place outside of the cluster meetings, but that issues sometimes appear on cluster structures where officials have not first tried to unblock at a level below DGs.

5.1.2 Systems and Processes

One significant issue mentioned was the lack of a meeting schedule agreed a year in advance for ministerial cluster meetings, which is coordinated with Cabinet meetings. Cluster meeting dates seem to depend on the availability of cluster chairpersons. In contrast the Cabinet committee meeting schedule is set one year in advance and is coordinated by the Cabinet Secretariat as part of the Cabinet meeting schedule. In general, key informants regarded the Cabinet committee system as a well-functioning system from a meeting scheduling point of view: "Cabinet committees provide a good example of a well-coordinated mechanism. They work on the basis of a firm fortnightly schedule, which coincide with Cabinet sitting. They are a fairly run mechanism." (Minister)

It is also not clear what the sequencing and scheduling should be between cluster meetings and IF meetings. One key informant noted that in theory there should be alternating monthly cluster and IF meetings.

One minister said:

> "Instead of knowing when ministers and DG's are available, the chairperson decides on the basis of his own availability when these meetings should be held. Very often you get notice of a meeting on a Tuesday or Monday of a meeting to be held on Wednesday. It is impossible to operate (on) such short notice. More than half of the Minister's cluster meetings are cancelled, because when ministers respond to meeting notices that they are unable to attend, then the staff realises that the meeting will not work. And by then, some ministers will have already changed their schedules to accommodate the meeting. It is a mess. If there is not a rhythm as with the Cabinet committee meetings, in which people know that meetings will be held on specific days, the system can't work."

This results in meetings often being cancelled and clusters submitting reports directly to the Cabinet committee to avoid excessive delays. These reports indicate whether feedback was received from the cluster, however, sometimes feedback is not received and this can cause divisions in Cabinet. On occasion feedback is referred back to clusters to resolve.

Concerns were raised by key informants around the effectiveness of clusters with more than one main coordinating department, resulting in cluster meetings sometimes being chaired by the DG from the non-core coordinating department. The view was expressed that it is not effective to have more than one coordinating department. Leadership is blurred because in some instances a structure has three coordinating departments and this does not augur well for coordination.

32% of DGs said there is good accountability for implementing structure decisions; compared to 47% of IFs and 45% of MinMECs, indicating that accountability challenges are particularly relevant to the cluster structures (the reason for this is not clear).

5.1.3 Behaviour

An important issue raised is whether the top-down nature of the cluster system, including Cabinet scrutiny of quarterly PoA reports, is actually undermining or weakening the willingness of officials to take actions to promote coordination outside of the cluster structures. The following key informant responses provide insight on this issue:

- "There is a top-down approach to work – officials do not take initiative." (DG)
- "Officials do not have a mandate to take initiative." (DG)
- "The current system inhibits coordination. The current structure of government works against coordination. There is a need to hold departments to account. Officials wait for instructions from above. Officials should take more responsibility for coordination." (DG)

The 2008 Presidency review of the cluster system found that clusters suffered from low levels of DG attendance (Presidency, 2008). The 2008 review found that this lack of participation should be assumed to be rational behaviour on the part of DGs, based on an assessment that [insufficient] value would be obtained from time spent in cluster meetings. Comparing the 2008 results with 2013 results (see Figure 10 below), it is clear that there has been a big improvement between 2008-2013 in DG's seeing value in participating in cluster meetings from 30% to 87%. However, there has only been a slight improvement in overall DG attendance levels at cluster meetings between 2012-2013, from 25% to 40% attendance. This is a reflection that the DGs face numerous competing demands on their time, which makes it extremely difficult to attend all cluster meetings.

Figure 10: 2008 - 2013 Trend Comparison: Participation in cluster and overall DG attendance levels at cluster meetings

Source: Impact Economix analysis of Presidency (2008), Cabinet Secretariat attendance data (2013), 2013 DGs Survey.

The highest percentage of DG attendance levels was the JCPS cluster at 49%, and the cluster with the lowest percentage of DG attendance levels was the G&A cluster at 25% DG attendance.

DGs believe that there are too many departments participating in the infrastructure (100% of DGs) and social clusters (67%); that attendance by sufficiently senior officials in the economic and G&A clusters is an issue (50%); and most DGs do not find participation in the Economic cluster as a good use of DGs time. The lack of Treasury participation in the G&A cluster was also mentioned, as well as that Department of Transport should be part of the Justice cluster, and that the Department of Women, Children and Persons with Disabilities does not attend the cluster often enough, due to capacity.

Apart from the number of meetings, high turnover of DGs was seen to impact on continuity and cluster effectiveness. One respondent stated that the "high turnover among DGs mean that many are still learning". At least 6 DGs of the 34 need to attend three clusters.

There may be an over-use or over-reliance on cluster structures to make decisions on matters that officials could address outside of cluster meetings. In addition, DGs may not always sufficiently empower officials to address coordination issues outside of cluster structures. Furthermore, cluster structures can be abused by departments not wanting to take responsibility for taking decisions, and which rather rely on clusters to take decisions.

5.2   MinMECs

5.2.1 Mandates

The mandate and roles of MinMECs, as defined in the IGRA (2005) are as follows:

1. Raise matters of national interest within that functional area with provincial governments, and if appropriate, organised local government and to hear their views on those matters.

2. Consult provincial governments and, if appropriate, organised local government on the development of national policy and legislation relating to matters affecting that functional area.

3. Consult provincial governments and, if appropriate, organised local government on the implementation of national policy and legislation with respect to that functional area.

4. Consult provincial governments and, if appropriate, organised local government on the coordination and alignment within that functional area of:

    o Strategic performance plans.

    o Priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local governments.

5. Discuss the development of minimum norms and standards for concurrent functions and attempt to reach consensus on these.

6. Discuss the performance in the provision of services in order to detect failures and to initiate preventive or corrective action when necessary.

There are fairly high levels of agreement amongst DGs surveyed on the clarity and appropriateness of most MinMEC roles. The main roles where there are lower levels of agreement pertain to development of norms and standards, service delivery performance, and the coordination and alignment within functional areas of strategic performance plans; priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local governments.

From the LTSM case study, it appears that the establishment of technical structures or committees at Provincial level and reporting to MinTECH, as well as sector-focused service delivery monitoring systems, can support the ability of MinMECs to effectively monitor service delivery performance.

Figure 11 shows that 39% of MinMEC decisions taken in meetings between June 2011 – July 2013 pertain to administrative functioning of the MinMECs and MinMEC reporting. The MinMEC decisions taken show a good balance between MinMEC roles, with the possible under-representation of the following two roles (although some decisions relating to these roles have in all likelihood been categories under "coordination across the 3 spheres"):

- Consult provincial governments and, if appropriate, organise local government on the coordination and alignment within that functional area of: strategic performance plans; priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local governments.

- Discuss the development of minimum norms and standards for concurrent functions and attempt to reach consensus on these.

Based on the 2013 survey of DGs (see
Source: Impact Economix analysis of Cluster meeting minutes supplied by DPME.

Figure 12), DGs were fairly satisfied with MinMEC decision-making, with the one exception of accountability for implementing decisions where seven out of 22 or 32% (or 55% if one includes neutral responses) of DGs felt that there was not good accountability for implementing decisions.

Figure 11**: Minuted MinMEC decisions classified by MinMEC role: May 2011–July 2013**

Source: Impact Economix analysis of Cluster meeting minutes supplied by DPME.

Figure 12: Decision making in MinMECs in the past year

Source: Impact Economix. 2013 Survey of DGs.

An issue was raised that national policies do not always firstly go through MinMECs before being submitted to Cabinet and that Cabinet decisions are not always communicated back down to MinMECs to enhance coordinated implementation. As one informant commented: "Sometimes a policy goes directly to Cabinet to be approved. Sometimes it comes thorough MinMEC to be approved and then to Cabinet... I think all policies or all issues relating to MinMEC should go through MinMEC. That should be the work flow. And even MinMEC should translate Cabinet decisions back down to us so we understand what is Cabinet deciding so we can coordinate throughout the country, otherwise what is the use of having a Cabinet decision."

Do MinMECs have a decision-making role regarding national policy and legislation or only a consultative role?

Is the role of MinMECs to make decisions regarding national policy and legislation, or solely for national policy/legislation to be noted by the Provinces? One minister interviewed believes firmly that some national departments are unnecessarily using MinMECs to take decisions on national policy/legislation, whereas, he believes that this is unnecessarily slowing down processes and taking away from the national government's decision-making responsibilities. A provincial MEC stated that the role of national departments with respect to concurrent powers should be enabling and that concurrence "should involve joint deliberation and decision-making, not information sharing and consultation."

Importantly, the National Health Council is deemed to be an advisory body, but is mandated in an Act. As a result the Minister of Health stated that decisions by the NHC are supposed to be binding on the parties. In practice however Premiers tend to overrule or ignore decisions made by the NHC. As a communication from the DOH states, "where a Department has taken the initiative to develop legislation to strengthen its stewardship role in a sector, what leverage does such legislation provide to that Department….The National Health Council includes the South African Military Health Services (SAMHS) and SALGA, who do not report to any Premier. So, how can a Premier overrule SAMHS?".

The interviews suggest that some participants in MinMEC meetings are not always **clear if the role of MinMECs is to consult on national policies or to take decisions on national** policies. dominated by the national Government and do not really lend themselves to consensual decision-making and that there is a lack of clarity over the decision-making authority of MinMECs and insufficient capacity to implement decisions.

5.2.2 Systems and Processes

A key issue raised is that MinMEC items are not always first discussed at MinTECH resulting in MECs not being properly briefed or prepared. This impacts on the relationships between the political and administrative level, and can result in MECs not participating in discussions on those items in the MinMEC meetings (hence undermining the effectiveness of the meetings).

A concern raised by DGs regarding MinMECsis that the meetings are too long. The capacity of some secretariats (e.g. Rural Development) is not seen as sufficient in terms of not having a dedicated MinMEC secretariat, where the MinMEC is run from the DG's office. In contrast, the National Health Council secretariat is reportedly well-resourced and well-functioning. One difference between the two secretariats is that the Health MinMEC was established as a result of dedicated legislation, whereas the rural MinMEC was not. The need for a dedicated senior official to run MinMEC secretariats was raised in order to improve the management of the technical quality

of reports to MinMECs, and the ability to interact with senior officials to address report quality issues.

Concerns were raised with respect to Delivery Agreements:

1.   Provincial governments see the **DAs as a national government responsibility** and as a result in some cases the level of provincial buy-in and participation is not good. This creates challenges when national targets contained in the DA can only be achieved through the contributions of each province, and as a result provincial targets need to be agreed with national government.

2.   **The DAs cover too many issues**, not all of which are strategic, and therefore the quarterly reporting on this is more compliance-driven and not necessarily at a strategic level.

3.   **Effective accountability and performance mechanisms** including performance targets. The Minister of Health raised a serious problem of accountability involving the National Health Council (NHC) and requested that this issue be raised for the attention of the Presidency to assist in addressing the issue. Premiers and MECs reportedly sometimes do not carry out MinMEC decisions taken, and or resolutions adopted and approved, by the NHC if these do not suit their agenda..

5.2.3 Behaviours

An obvious potential challenge with MinMECs relates to the different cultures and capacity of provincial departments participating in the MinMECs. In addition, party political dynamics can also impact on the MinMECs. These issues can undermine the extent to which MinMEC decisions are implemented.

A general issue which impacts on how realistic the roles of the MinMECs are, relates to the issue of DG experience and sector knowledge. In part, due to the high turnover of DGs experienced, some DGs may not have sufficient experience and/or knowledge of the sector required in order to support effective decision-making and the fulfilment of MinMEC roles. In one sector, the Outcome Facilitator mentioned that the DG had a very poor understanding of the sector's issues and this undermines the ability of the MinMEC to deal coherently with policy issues.

Regarding participation and representation in MinMEC meetings, 76% of DGs believe that there is attendance by sufficiently senior officials and 68% agree that the meetings are well represented by relevant departments. A concern was expressed by one Minister that it is very difficult to ensure effective participation of the local government sector in MinMECs due to the many different levels and capacities of local government:

> "The one weakness, and I don't think we have an answer to deal with that it is also supposed to bring in local government and SALGA, is obviously the representative of local government. But quite honestly, I haven't been at one MinMEC in 9 years in government where I felt there was proper input from local government and SALGA. That is a weakness of the system."

5.3   Implementation Forums

5.3.1   Mandates

The expanded set of roles adopted by the DPME TOR for IFs (March 2013) include the following roles for IFs:

a)   Develop, review and refine the Delivery Agreement(s) for the outcome.

b)   Coordinate and secure mutually supporting actions amongst all members to fast-track delivery on the outputs and activities related to the outcome.

c)   Ongoing monitoring of, and reporting on, implementation of the Delivery Agreement.

d)   Identify and resolve emerging bottlenecks (organisational, legislative, policy, financial), which impact on the implementation of the delivery agreement for the outcome and, which hamper effective service delivery.

e)   Where needed, identify special working groups or specialized pieces of work, to address specific bottlenecks (or emerging opportunities).

f)   If the IF is a MinMEC or a related structure, refer issues of a crosscutting nature including legislation and high-level policy issues to the relevant cluster.

g)   Submit quarterly progress reports to the relevant Cabinet Committee.

h)   Refer issues requiring resolution to the relevant Cabinet Committee.

i)   On an annual (or as and when required) basis, review and revise where necessary the activities in the Delivery Agreement, linking to the budget process for the following financial year.

The three roles which the highest percentage of DGs surveyed do not believe are clear are:

- Where needed, identify special working groups or specialized pieces of work, to address specific bottlenecks (or emerging opportunities);
- If the IF is a MinMEC or a related structure, refer issues of a crosscutting nature including legislation and high-level policy issues to the relevant cluster;
- Coordinate and secure mutually supporting actions amongst all members to fast-track delivery on the outputs and activities related to the outcome.

It is not clear why DGs do not believe these roles are clear, however, it is of concern that this lack of clarity does exist. It appears that there is a need to refine the TOR for IFs to clarify the processes by which IF items can be referred to clusters, and to provide guidelines for the establishment and operation of working groups.

A number of DGs also do not believe that the IF's role of ongoing monitoring of, and reporting on, implementation of the DA is realistic. Again, it is unclear why this is the case. This is one of the core IF roles. There may be value in the IFs discussing how realistic this role is and identifying issues which impact on the ability of IFs to effectively perform this role to inform actions for improvement.

33% of overall IF decisions deal with either IF functioning (21%) or reporting (11%). Otherwise, decisions taken by the IFs seem to cover most of the IF roles with the two most frequent decision categories dealing with unblocking implementation and coordination of departments.

Figure 13: Total Implementation Forum meeting decisions made by type: June 2011 - July 2013

Source: Impact Economix analysis of Cluster meeting minutes supplied by DPME

Only 50% of DGs surveyed agree that the quality of IF decisions made in the past year were good and that IF participants were adequately prepared for meetings. Only 41% of DGs agree that there has been good accountability for implementing IF decisions in the past year. Only 38% of DGs agree that the IF decision-making in the past year has been effective. This all indicates that there is scope for substantial improvement in the quality of decision-making in IFs as well as regarding accountability of implementing decisions made by the IFs.

Issues raised by key informants which impact on the IFs ability to fulfil their roles include the following:

- Insufficient time is allocated on IF agendas for discussion of Delivery Agreements, including unblocking implementation constraints.
- One of the challenges in developing the DAs has been inconsistent IF attendance by departments. The DBE has dealt with departments that have not attended meetings by holding separate bi-laterals with these departments outside of the MinTECH or MinMEC meetings.
- The PoA Quarterly Reports are not discussed by the technical IF before submission to Cabinet.

It was also suggested that Cabinet is too hands-off regarding the Outcomes approach/process and does not sufficiently interrogate the reports in terms of why progress or targets are not being achieved. The desire was expressed that Cabinet could be more hands on and take resolutions per outcome and follow up on these. The level of reporting to Cabinet is too detailed at the activity level and should rather focus on higher level impact indicators (outcomes and sub-outcomes).

5.3.2 Systems and Processes

The DPME TOR for IFs (March 2012) makes the following provisions for meeting schedules:

- Minister's Implementation Forum and Technical Implementation Forum meetings will be convened at least four times per annum. Technical Implementation Forums and its substructures may meet more often.
- The Secretariat of Implementation Forum meetings will determine a schedule containing dates for forum meetings and this should be circulated at least 6 months in advance. Minister's Implementation Forum meetings should take place at least a week before Cabinet Committee meetings in order to ensure that reports reach the Cabinet Office seven days before Cabinet Committees sit to reflect on progress reports.
- Only the Chairperson may cancel or postpone a meeting.   If this situation arises it is proposed that the meetings be reconvened within seven days after the scheduled date.

The main meeting management issue which DGs reported as a concern was the IF agenda structuring, where 38% of DGs surveyed disagree/ neutral that the majority of IF agenda items focus on strategic items.

One DG noted that the DGs' performance against DAs is not measured.

An issue specific to the Economic Cluster and IF regarding resources, is that there are four outcomes which are part of the Economic Cluster (three of the outcomes have their own IF and outcome 4 uses the cluster as the IF). The original design was that the economic cluster would only comprise the IF for outcome 4 on employment. A DG mentioned that as a result there is not enough staff capacity to focus properly on each of the four outcomes:

> If you are serious about outcome seven on rural development and you don't have a dedicated team of technical experts whose function is to monitor, evaluate, to put the problems on the table of your outcome seven executive implementation forum by your technical implementation forum, how are you going to get anywhere. Effectively what you land up doing is taking someone who is doing all their rural development work and agricultural work and all their normal everything else work and on top of that expecting them to drive outcome seven. (DG)

5.3.3 Behaviours

39% of DGs surveyed believe (or are neutral) that there are too many departments participating in IFs. 83% of DGs agree that attending IF meetings is a valuable use of DG's time. 76% of DGs believe that the attendance at IF meetings is by sufficiently senior officials. Regarding the G&A IF, a key informant expressed the view that the membership is too broad and too wide where every department is invited and every province is invited. As a result, the IF is sometimes unwieldy and is not a meeting of the key administrative centre of government departments (DPSA, DPME COGTA, National Treasury, Offices of the Premier).

6. Conclusions and recommendations

One DG interviewed for this evaluation stated that "Generally people want to coordinate but they do not want to be coordinated". This is illustrative of some of the many tensions which exist when it comes to coordination. There are complex relationship and power dynamics involved.

This section contains overall conclusions and recommendations which are relevant to all three coordination structures as well as broader government systems. This is then followed by structure-specific conclusions and recommendations.

6.1   What is working well

Overall there is some evidence that DGs feel the structures are worthwhile, e.g. Table 9 shows that they feel that attending the structures is a worthwhile use of their time. However this is undermined by the actual attendance levels.

It is not easy to isolate the role of any specific coordination structure played in the successful coordination of any one particular issue for at least two reasons:

a)   Firstly, there is no clear counterfactual situation (i.e. identifying what would have happened in the absence of the coordination structure making a contribution to the coordination of the issue).

b)   Secondly, the coordination structures are part of a broader government system which involves various processes and levels of decision-making and which have not all been included in the scope of this evaluation. It has therefore not been possible to analyse all of the linkages and relationships between the coordination structures and the broader government system.

The coordination case studies reviewed showed that when a coordination issue was highly visible in the public eye, and was also widely recognised to be of critical national importance, it was more likely for Ministers to provide the required level of leadership and drive to move coordination issues forward by both negotiating with fellow Ministers for support, as well as by allocating key officials with responsibility and holding them accountable for achieving key tasks (e.g. the IPP and LTSM case studies). An integrated approach requires champions, political support, and the involvement of senior public servants. Nevertheless, even in these examples, it took at least 2-5 years to deliver meaningful change and results, in part due to the complexity of the issues under negotiation (IPP, Metro Housing Function) and in part due to the need to develop new technical structures and systems at both Metro / Provincial and National level to strengthen monitoring and coordination systems (LTSM and Metro Housing Function).

There are examples where the creation of issue- and task-focused technical task teams (or structures below and supporting the technical coordination structure) have made important contributions to the effective coordination of developing legislation as well as improving service delivery and monitoring. However, it appears that the structures do not use this mechanism often enough.

Other factors which appear to have supported the structures playing an effective coordination role include the commitment and dedication of leaders (including the hands-on involvement of both Ministers and DGs) to ensure the effective functioning of coordination structures both inside and outside of structure meetings.

It would appear that when a cluster involves departments where there are clear service delivery inter-dependencies (e.g. JCPS), then the chances of officials appreciating the need for coordination may be greater than when the inter-dependencies are not so clear or strong (e.g. between health and education in the Social cluster).

6.2   Number of meetings

6.2.1   Too many meetings overall (both coordination structure meetings as well as other compulsory meetings for DGs and Ministers) are negatively impacting on the participation in structures by sufficiently senior officials.

Too many meetings is limiting the ability of the structures to fulfil their mandates effectively by undermining the level of official participation and the quality of decision-making. A large number of key informants (Ministers and DGs) stated that the meeting demands on their schedules are simply overwhelming and impossibly to fully comply with in terms of competing demands on available time and weekly schedules. As a result, DGs delegate attendance at structure meetings to lower level officials who often do not have the decision-making powers, and/or required leadership, to make, or contribute towards, meaningful decisions at coordination structure meetings. This results in poor quality decisions and undermines the ability of the coordination structures to effectively fulfil their mandates.

Recommendation:

R1   The schedule of structure meeting dates must be developed a year in advance and must coordinate with the Cabinet committee meeting schedule.

R2   The Presidency should engage with Parliament to agree on days on which departments and Ministers will <u>not</u> be called to Parliament.

R3   POA reporting periods should be reduced from 4 per annum to 3 per annum.

Other possible options to consider include:

a)   **Reducing the number of clusters**: potential advantages of this option would be that ministers and senior officials would not need to participate in as many clusters (which could improve senior-level attendance) and potentially there would be a focus on a smaller number of critical government priorities. A potential disadvantage is important issues requiring coordinated decision-making may be neglected.

b)   **Reducing the numbers of departments** participating in each cluster: potential advantages of this option would be that ministers and senior officials would not need to participate in as many clusters (which could improve senior-level attendance). A potential disadvantage is that the quality of coordination decisions may not be optimal (i.e. important information from a relevant department may not be included in the decision-making process) and coordination decisions may not be (optimally) implemented by all relevant departments.

c)   **Dropping Ministerial Clusters** and only having Cabinet Committees: a potential advantage of this option is that it would free up space in minister's schedule for other commitments. A potential disadvantage is that all relevant ministers may not have been adequately consulted/ involved in decision-making processes prior to Cabinet and this could result in Cabinet Committee debates and delays in decision-making.

6.3   Quality of secretariats

6.3.1   Meeting management systems and resources are not optimal and undermine the effective functioning of the structures and their ability to fulfil their mandates:

Levels of attendance at structure meetings by sufficiently senior officials are not generally adequate, and meetings are seen as not well enough prepared for or chaired. This contributes towards poor quality decisions being taken in meetings, which also then negatively impacts on, for example, the quality of Cabinet's decision-making ability. Key issues which need to be addressed are:

- **Reports are not always received sufficiently in advance** (e.g. a week) of structure meetings, which compromises on the ability of participants to adequately prepare for meetings, including holding DG-Minister briefings and DGs obtaining technical inputs from their departments. This also then contributes towards poor quality discussion and decisions.

- **Secretariats are often not adequately resourced and supported** (although there are also examples of effective Secretariats such as the health MinMEC secretariat) in order to effectively carry out a number of key functions which then negatively impacts on effective meeting management and structure effectiveness (e.g. resulting in too much time spend in meetings dealing with structure administrative issues).

- The quality of meeting chairing (chairperson skills) is not always strong and this can contribute negatively to the length of meetings and the quality of decision making.

Recommendations:

R4   The TORs mentioned earlier should include clear timeframes which Secretariats must strictly enforce for the submission of reports for coordination structure meetings, as well as ensuring that Cabinet committee reports have first been approved for submission to the Cabinet committee via the relevant cluster structure.

R5   Secretariats need to play the following roles at a high level:
   a) Ensure that reports are only submitted to the coordination structures <u>after</u> officials have attempted to resolve issues outside of the structures (wherever possible).
   b) Ensure that reports meet quality requirements <u>before</u> they are tabled (and give feedback on report quality issues which must first be addressed before submission to the coordination structures).
   c) Follow up with departments to ensure reports are submitted on time.
   d) Structure meeting agendas to focus on a limited number of strategic issues which are aligned with the core mandates of the structures.
   e) Take accurate, specific good quality minutes.
   f) Follow-up to try and resolve issues between structure meetings, as well as follow-up on the status of decisions made in structure meetings.
   g) Organise DG-Ministerial briefings in advance of meetings.

R6   In order to be able to do this the structure secretariat role should not be seen as administrative but a high level organisational role requiring at least one dedicated senior official. The Presidency should develop job descriptions for structure secretariats to reflect this role.

6.3.2 There is a blurring of roles between clusters, IFs and MinMECs:

Key issues include the following:

a) There is not a common understanding across all DGs regarding how clear and appropriate the roles are for each of the structures. This lack of common understanding in all likelihood contributes to undermining the effective functioning of the structures.

b) Coordinating policy formulation and policy implementation cannot be easily separated and national departments responsible for concurrent functions need to be involved in both aspects to be effective and to find an appropriate balance in this regard.

c) Structure participants are not always clear which issues should be dealt with at a technical level or a Ministerial level.

d) The referral of appropriate issues between the structures does not seem take place often enough (e.g. from IFs to clusters).

e) There is not a clear picture of whether both ministerial clusters and cabinet committees are needed. Dropping the former would reduce time demands, but then ministers would not have a chance of discussing issues in cluster meetings which they chair, as opposed to cabinet committees which are chaired by the President or Deputy President , and which form part of the formal/legal imperatives of government decision-making processes.

Recommendations:.

R7 Refined ToRs should be developed by the Presidency for all structures which clarify the difference in roles, core mandates and operating procedures. As part of developing and/or refining ToR for the structures, specific guidelines regarding the establishment and operation of technical task teams need to be developed.

R8 To strengthen policy harmonisation and minimise the need for coordination, the Presidency should develop a set of standardised guidelines regarding policy development processes to ensure meaningful engagement and interaction between departments during the policy development process and to pro-actively address and minimise coordination issues requiring addressing at formal cluster meetings and once policy implementation has started.

6.3.3 The Presidency needs to play a stronger role in supporting coordination and the coordination structures in a number of areas, including the following:

R9   The Presidency (Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet Secretariat) need to take final decisions to approve/reject submissions into the Cabinet system if they do not comply with set guidelines.

R10   The Presidency should play a role in strengthening structure secretariats by:

a) Establishing guidelines for strengthening the resourcing and functioning of structure Secretariats (which include guidelines and procedures to address issues raised above and including: managing agendas; the report submission process; meeting schedules; ensuring appropriate representation for agenda items; minute taking; monitoring decisions-taken) for each of the coordination structures as part of developing refined ToRs for the coordination structures. These ToR should include clear time-frames which Secretariats must strictly enforce regarding time-frames for the submission of reports.

b) Working with coordinating department's Secretariats to refine the strategic & unblocking focus of agendas.

    c) Ensuring that departments allocate sufficient resources for coordination (e.g. structure Secretariats).

    d) Training and monitoring and supporting the secretariats.

    e) Refining ToRs to guide the effective functioning of the coordination structures.

R11 In order to do the above the Presidency should have a senior official allocated to each cluster who works with the cluster to ensure the agendas and reports are appropriate and well prepared.

R12 The Presidency needs to identify the required resources (new and/or existing), develop an implementation plan, and allocate responsibilities for playing a stronger coordination support role in the above areas, including a dedicated senior official working with each cluster.

R13 Ministers need to hold DGs accountable when departments do not report on progress to the IFs or Cabinet (as part of the performance management process).

6.4 Leadership, problem-solving, accountability and weak coordination culture

6.4.1 Leadership

The coordination case studies reviewed showed that when a coordination issue was highly visible in the public eye, and was also widely recognised to be of critical national importance, it was more likely for Ministers to provide the required level of leadership and drive to move coordination issues forward by both negotiating with fellow Ministers for support, as well as by allocating key officials with responsibility and holding them accountable for achieving key tasks (e.g. the IPP and LTSM case studies). An integrated approach requires champions, political support, and the involvement of senior public servants.

R14 For coordination to be effective ministers have to take a lead, as shown in the LTSM case study.

6.4.2 Inadequate chairing

The chairing of coordination structure meetings needs to be improved, which is closely linked to meeting management discussed below. It would also assist if chairpersonship reflected the actual co-ordination role of the Ministry/Department in that area (e.g. Rural Development should not coordinate the Economic Cluster but rather one of the lead departments, dti, EDD or National Treasury). Sub-section 6.5.2 contains recommendations to improve meeting chairing.

6.4.3 There is an inadequate culture of coordination, especially in structures where service delivery processes between departments or spheres are not closely linked into an overall system

There is an inadequate culture of coordination, especially in structures where service delivery processes between departments or spheres are not closely linked into an overall system:

There appear to be numerous challenges in terms of a culture of coordination. These include DGs prioritising issues on which their performance is measured (self-interested behaviour), competition between departments, a reported limited strategic ability of some DGs, as well as the limited strategic focus of cluster agendas. It appears that coordination is more effective in structures where the role-players in that structure are all part of a closely linked system and, as a result, are ultimately responsible for managing the performance of the overall system. One key informant

provided the example of the Justice cluster (where different departments and organisations have clear roles within an overall system) and contrasted this with the Social Cluster (where the roles of different department and organisations within the overall system are not always clear).

Recommendation:

R15   The refined ToRs for the coordination structures, as well as the process to develop these refined ToRs and other complementary support measures and systems, should include or address the following (drawing from Manetje and Martins. 2009):

a) Minimize the number and complexity of rules, procedures and approval processes.

b) Involve structure members in designing the rules, methods, and procedures.

c) Create information systems that allow organisational members to track their own results in "real time", including around coordination.

d) Ensure that information and influence can flow laterally and diagnostically, rather than only vertically, so favouring informal coordination at all levels.

e) Involve employees at different levels in improving coordination structure systems and procedures, including making suggestions of how coordination can be improved at operational and decision-making levels.

f) Periodically review the performance of coordination structures and be prepared to change the rule book and start over.

6.4.4   There is a need for ongoing skills development of Ministers, DGs and senior officials to enhance skills to support effective coordination, including: strategic thinking, problem-solving, negotiation skills, and meeting chairing skills:

Harrison (1993, p 22) indicates that for organisational change key leaders should embody the values and behaviours that typify the new culture that is desired, and organisational members should have internalised the values of the new culture and understanding how it functions. It is not clear this has happened.

Recommendations:

R16   The Presidency should engage the SA School of Government (as well as possible partnerships with the Higher Education Institutions) to include in the curriculum and related awards system the following:

a) Coordination, M&E and problem-solving skills.

b) Specialised courses on negotiation skills and meeting chairing skills. This should include a high level course and training program on chairing skills for DGs and Ministers.

c) A dedicated training programme for coordination structure secretariats.

d) The Public Sector Excellence Awards (or an equivalent award initiative) needs to include an award for the best example of (or initiative illustrating) government coordination (possibly to be sponsored by the Presidency).

6.4.5   There is insufficient resolution of coordination issues outside of the coordination structures and this over-burdens the structures and undermines their strategic focus and overall coordination effectiveness:

Large formal meetings are not good forums for solving complex problems, but rather should focus on approving issues resolved prior to the formal meetings. This requires resolving issues as far as possible prior to the meetings. A number of mechanisms can be used including:

a) Use of dedicated task teams to resolve coordination issues outside of structures, and in-between structure meetings.
b) Empowering lower level officials more to take responsibility for resolving coordination issues outside of the structures.
c) Raising awareness amongst government officials that one of their key roles is to unblock implementation constraints.

Issues should only be brought to the structures if attempts to address these outside of the structures have been ineffective/ exhausted (with Secretariats also playing a role to ensure tighter control over the report submission process to structures). Clusters/IF's should make decisions about the group of departments (and officials) responsible for specific joint/related projects.

Recommendations:

R17   DGs need to delegate officials to address coordination issues outside of the coordination structures, wherever possible.

R18   The Presidency needs to take responsibility for forming and supporting ad-hoc dedicated coordination task teams to deal with difficult cross-cutting policy or strategy issues where deep differences exist between departments, and/or in the broader public, and/or strict time limits for resolving these exist. To enhance the effectiveness of these task teams, they should report directly to either the President (or deputy President), and/or a senior minister, and/or or a Cabinet Committee.

R19   Revised TOR for the coordination structures must require that coordination structure decisions are clear and specific about the group of departments (and officials) responsible for specific joint/related projects.

6.4.6 Linkages between coordination structures are not always clear and need to be strengthened:

Issues identified regarding poor linkages, or feedback mechanisms, between coordination structures include:

a) Cabinet committee decisions are not always fed back to MinMECs.
b) IF matters regarding policy issues are not always fed into the cluster system ("There is no feedback mechanism, that comes to our cluster to say this implementation forum met and resolved that ABCD things to be delivered by your clusters so that we can see whether those things are a programme of work or outside our work" (DG)).

Recommendation:

R20   Revised TORs for the structures should formalise and clarify how feedback of structure decisions should take place between structures as well as how structures should refer matters/ reports to other structures (including how relevant Cabinet decisions should be communicated back to relevant structures. There should be a standing item for all IF/Cluster meeting agendae on "matters/feedback from Cabinet" pertaining to IF/Cluster work.

6.4.7 Low levels of accountability for implementing decisions made by the structures (incl. a lack of consequences for not implementing decisions) have been widely reported and seriously undermine the effectiveness of the structures in fulfilling their mandates:

Accountability issues frequently raised by informants include the need for Ministers to be more actively involved and to hold DGs to account regarding the submission of reports to the coordination structures and for departments to account for implementing decisions made by the coordination structures.

Key informants made the point that DGs prioritise what their performance is evaluated on, namely what is in the Annual Performance Plan (APP), Management Performance Assessment Tool (MPAT), and Auditor General's (AG) reports, and as a result participation in coordination structures and support for Outcomes can suffer. In addition, Minister's performance agreements have not been properly cascaded into Strategic Plans and APPs and DGs' performance agreements.

Recommendations:

R21   It would assist if chairpersonship reflected the actual co-ordination role of the Ministry/Department in that area (e.g. Rural Development should not coordinate the Economic   Cluster but rather one of the lead departments, dti, EDD or National Treasury).

R21   There is a need for all departments to ensure that performance agreements cascading down from Ministerial, DG, to at least Chief Director levels, include stronger performance indicators and targets for coordinated outputs (and possibly outcomes), and problem-solving. The Department of Public Service and Administration should assist by developing guidelines, and/or specific examples of refined KPIs, which promote coordination and the effective functioning of the coordination structures.

6.4.8 The coordination structures need to monitor and assess their performance regularly, including through an annual assessment:

Recommendation:

R22   An annual assessment of the coordination structures needs to designed and coordinated by the Presidency starting end 2014, and building on the revisions set in place following this evaluation. This could include a survey of the structure participants which tracks annual trends in key structure performance areas (some of which are included in the 2013 DGs survey carried out for this evaluation). In addition, trends in attendance should be monitored.

6.5   Specific recommendations for clusters not covered in the general recommendations for all structures

Clusters are prioritising compliance and Cabinet PoA reporting at the expense of playing a more strategic role in promoting policy alignment and unblocking implementation, resulting in an increasing risk of policy conflicts and sub-optimal service delivery.

Recommendation:

R23   Coordinating departments need to ensure that report quality is good, deadlines for submissions, so reports can be taken as read, so less time is spent on reporting and more time is available for unblocking and decision-making.

6.6   Specific recommendations for MinMECs not covered in the general recommendations for all structures

MinMECs have added value and worked well in a number of ways including:

a)   MinMECs can play an important role in dealing with coordination issues involving the devolution of national and Provincial powers to a municipal level (Housing). This requires that an integrated portfolio of both Ministers MECs relevant to the power need to actively support the process.

b)   Clarity of, and support for, underlying policy intentions at national and provincial level can enhance the transfer of powers between spheres;

c)   MinMECs can play an important role in identifying models best suited to resolving service delivery blockages at a Provincial level and in enhancing integrated service delivery (or seamless government from the citizen's perspective);

d)   Inter-provincial technical committees reporting to MinTECHs can play an important role in enhancing national government support and strengthening monitoring mechanisms.

Some specific issues emerging are discussed below.

6.6.1   MinMECs are limited in their ability to deal with the horizontal aspects of concurrent powers.

For example, both human settlements and EA regulations require active roles to be played by a range of national and provincial departments and it is not clear if MinMECs are able to effectively broaden participation beyond the core national coordinating department, and Provincial delivery department to ensure that processes are coordinated to address both vertical inter-governmental, as well as horizontal, issues. Alternatively, there may be a need for MinMECs and clusters to feed into each other on certain issues where both horizontal and vertical coordination issues require action.

6.6.2   There are relatively low levels of agreement amongst participating DGs on the following three MinMEC roles:

a)   Development of minimum norms and standards for concurrent functions and reaching consensus on these.

b)   Discuss the performance in the provision of services in order to detect failures and to initiate preventive or corrective action when necessary.

c)   Consult provincial governments and, if appropriate, organised local government on the coordination and alignment within that functional area of: Strategic performance plans; Priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local governments.

It is not clear if the level of coordination taking place in MinTECHs and MinMECs regarding the coordination and alignment of strategic performance plans; priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local governments is adequate and if the ability of MinMECs to fulfil this role needs to be strengthened or not.

Regarding the participation of provincial governments in MinMECs, the fact that there are differences in provincial portfolios/departmental structures, as well as ministers who are sometimes responsible for multiple portfolios creates challenges for provincial MECs who need to

attend multiple MinMECs and can therefore become over-burdened, thus negatively impacting on attendance at MinMEC meetings. Presumably this issue can only be addressed at provincial level.

Recommendations:

R24   MinMEC structures must confirm whether the scope of consultation in the context of the IGRA precludes or allows MinMECs to make decisions pertaining to national policy/ legislation. A specific issue was raised by the Health Minister that the Health MinMEC is enshrined in legislation, unlike some other structures and so has the power to take decisions.

R25   Coordination structure ToRs should clarify when issues need to be referred between MinMECs and clusters. This should also look at how to address the three above-mentioned roles (see previous point 2).

R26   In addition, MinMECs' TORs need to clarify their role in the coordination and alignment of strategic performance plans; priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local governments.

R27   It may be appropriate to establish an economic development MinMEC.

R28   The Presidency should undertake a feasibility study into the use of video conferencing (as happens for clusters between Cape Town and Pretoria) to reduce the direct and indirect costs of such meetings, e.g. using Tele-presencing technology (including a brief review of the experience with this in Australia by the COAG structures).

6.7   Specific recommendations for IFs not covered in the general recommendations for all structures

6.7.1   There is a need to further clarify selected IF roles through the provision of detailed guidelines for fulfilling selected roles:

IFs do not seem to be clear on their role in unblocking bottlenecks, although 83% of DGs regard this as a realistic role and the same % of DGs also see the formation of special working groups to address bottlenecks as realistic. However 44% of DGs do not see this role as being clear. The lack of time allocated on IF agendas to address blockages, has been mentioned as a key constraint on the IF's ability to effectively play an unblocking role.

Recommendation:

R29   The Presidency needs to ensure that IF's understand the role in their TORs of unblocking bottlenecks, including guidance for the formation and functioning of special working groups to address specific bottlenecks, as well as for the referral of certain matters to working groups/ task team as well as to clusters. The establishment of stronger secretariats mentioned previously will assist greatly.

6.7.2   IFs need to follow up on the focusing of indicators, and quality of reports:

Concerns were raised by key informants that the level of detail in the PoA reports is too great and that Cabinet takes a hands-off approach when reviewing PoA reports and that a more hands-on approach is needed whereby Cabinet takes resolutions per outcome. IFs need to focus on a smaller set of high level outputs and indicators (see earlier recommendation) and good quality reports which focus on the areas that need unblocking.

Recommendations:

R30   IFs need to explicitly address the following issues by taking specific decisions: :

    a) The relationship between the PICC's Management Committee and the Outcome 6 Technical and Ministerial IFs (for example, should the Outcome 6 Technical IF support the PICC Management Committee, is the Outcome 6 Ministerial Forum needed in addition to the PICC Management Committee?).

    b) Lack of clarity in some cases as to what departments should fall under what outcome, with a specific examples relating to Outcomes 4 and 5 and 6.

    c) The roles and responsibilities of provincial governments with respect to DAs and the achievement of targets need to be clarified and confirmed.

Annexes

Annex 1:   References

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Annex 2: Glossary

Term	Definition
Accountability	A social relationship where an actor (an individual or an agency) feels an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct to some significant other (the accountability forum, accountee, specific person or agency) (Gutto, 2007).
	Obligation to demonstrate that work has been conducted in compliance with agreed rules, standards, and targets set and report accurately on work done(DPME, 2013).
Coordination	A process in which two or more parties take one another into account for the purpose of bringing together their decisions and/or activities into harmonious or reciprocal relation' (Kernaghan and Siegel, 1987, p. 263).
	'the development of ideas about joint and holistic working, joint information systems, dialogue between agencies, process of planning and making decisions' Perri (2004:106).
	The all-important duty of interrelating the various parts of the work (Gunlick, 1937).
	'The instruments and mechanisms that aim to enhance the voluntary or forced alignment of tasks and efforts within the public sector. These mechanisms are used in order to create a greater coherence and to reduce redundancy, lacunae and contradictions within policies, implementation or management' (Bouckaert et al. 2010).
	The sharing of information, resources and responsibilities to achieve a particular outcome (New Zealand State Services Commission. 2008. Factors for Successful Coordination).
Culture	The ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a particular people or society (Oxford Dictionary).
	An integrated system of learned behaviour patterns which are characteristic of the members of a society and which are not a result of biological inheritance (Hoebel 1966).
Departmental-ism	Hood (2005: 22-23) refers to Departmentalism - the tunnel vision, mutual export of problems and preoccupation with defending institutional turf in what has been termed 'vertical silos'.
Delivery Agreement	A negotiated agreement between key partners who will work together to deliver on an outcome. The lead coordinating department will provide the leadership and will be assisted by all key role players (Presidency, 2010).
Effectiveness	The extent to which objectives are achieved or expected to be achieved, against predetermined and stated objectives.
Evidence	Signs or indications of something (www.oxforddictionaries.com):
Harmonisation	make consistent or compatible (www.oxforddictionaries.com).
Horizontal Management/ Coordination	The coordination and management of a set of activities between two or more organizational units,[which] do not have hierarchical control over each other and where the aim is to generate outcomes that cannot be achieved by units working in isolation (Halligan, 2012).
Impact	The medium to long-term results of achieving specific outcomes.
Indicators	Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of an organisation.(DPME, 2013)
Input	The financial, human, and material resources used for the delivery of outputs. (DPME, 2013).

Term	Definition
Integrated Service Delivery	The process of bringing, and fitting, together government services in order to provide seamless services to citizens (Kernaghan, 2005).
Joined-Up Government (JUG)	A group of responses to the perception that services had become fragmented and that this fragmentation was preventing the achievement of important goals of public policy….It is based on the view that important goals of public policy cannot be delivered through the separate activities of existing organisations, but neither can they be delivered by creating a new 'super agency'. It therefore seeks to align the activities of formally separate organisations towards particular goals of public policy." (Ling, 2002, p. 616).
Joint programme	A national development priority, the planning and implementation of which requires the involvement of various organs of state either within a particular sphere of government, or in different spheres of government. a) Programmes that require a cross-departmental involvement in the planning, budgeting and delivery of services. b) A number of departments are often responsible for a specific aspect of the programme, but none is responsible for it in its entirety. c) Programmes that require integration rather than mere co-ordination. (DPSA, 2006).
Law	A law sets out standards, procedures and principles which must be followed.
Leadership	A process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal (Northouse, 2007). Organising a group of people to achieve a common goal (Wikipedia),
Logical framework	Management tool used to improve the design of an intervention mostly at project level. It involves identifying inputs, outputs outcomes, impact, indicators, and assumptions and risks that may influence success or failure
Negotiation	Discussion aimed at reaching an agreement. Negotiating is the process of getting the best terms once the other side starts to act on their interest (McCormack, 1997). Negotiation is a field of knowledge and endeavour that focuses on gaining the favour of people from whom we want things (Herb Cohen, 1982).
Organisational culture	A basic definition of organisational culture is necessary to provide a point of departure in the quest for an understanding of the phenomenon. Martins and Martins (2003, p 380) state the general definition of organisational culture as "a system of shared meaning held by members, distinguishing the organisation from other organisations".. In relation to the above definition, Arnold (2005, p 625) indicates that "organisational culture is the distinctive norms, beliefs, principles and ways of behaving that combine to give each organisation its distinct character". These two definitions suggest that organisational culture distinguishes one organisation from another organisation. Therefore, organisational culture is to an organisation what personality is to an individual (Johnson, 1990).
Oversight	"In the South African context, oversight is a constitutionally mandated function of legislative organ s of state to scrutinise and oversee executive action and any organ of state. It follows that oversight entails the informal; and formal, watchful, strategic ,and structured scrutiny exercised by legislatures in respect of the implementation of laws, the application of the budget, and the strict observance of statutes and the Constitution. In addition and most importantly, it involves overseeing the effective management of government departments by individual members of Cabinet in pursuit

Term	Definition
	of improved service delivery for the achievement of a better quality of life for all citizens" (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa: Undated).
Performance indicators	A pre-determined signal that a specific point in a process has been reached or result achieved. The nature of the signal will depend on what is being tracked and needs to be very carefully chosen. In management terms, an indicator is a variable that is used to assess the achievement of results in relation to the stated goals/objectives.(DPME, 2013).
Performance measurement	A system for assessing performance against stated goals and objectives (DPME, 2013).
Performance Targets	Quantifications of desired goals. They describe what specific inputs and activities should achieve over a specified time period. They are specific quantitative or qualitative goals against which actual outputs or outcomes will be compared. (DPME, 2013).
Performance standards	The minimum acceptable or expected level of performance (DPME, 2013)
Policy	A policy outlines what a ministry hopes to achieve and the methods and principles it will use to achieve them. It states the goals of the ministry. A policy document is not a law but it will often identify a need for new laws in order to be able to achieve its goals.
Policies, strategies, programmes and projects	Statements of what government seeks to achieve through its work and why. Strategies are sequentially structured descriptions of how these policies will be enacted. Programmes (outside of the budgeting context) are high-level, big-picture plans showing how strategies will be implemented. Projects are specific conceptually-linked sets of activities intended to achieve particular results that will lead to the achievement of programme goals.
Programme Management	The co-ordinated organisation, direction and implementation of a portfolio of projects and activities that together achieve outcomes and realise benefits that are of strategic importance.
Silo Mentality	Page (2005:141) gives a lengthy exposition of silo mentality-It refers to a position where policy problems are defined, processed and handled on the basis of the intellectual and physical resources of the particular organisation that is handling it (see also Mulgan, 2005).

Annex 3: Detailed Methodology

Each of the methodological components is elaborated below.

A3.1   Analytic Framework and International Case Studies

The analytical framework was developed to guide the evaluation of government coordination systems. This framework identifies key enablers and factors which support effective coordination. The framework provides a coherent tool to focus the evaluation process on the most salient and pertinent coordination issues in government. The framework drew from best practices and lessons, as well as the ToR for this evaluation.

The international case studies sought to identify lessons learnt with respect to coordination generally, and specifically coordination structures, in relation to coordination enablers and success factors. The case studies examined the coordination experiences and selected structures from Brazil, United Kingdom, and Australia.

A3.2   Key informant interviews:

The key informant interviews targeted at key officials who participate(d) in the clusters, implementation forums and MinMECs. These officials were mainly Director Generals, Ministers, and Outcome Managers/ Facilitators from DPME. The DPME selected these officials and Ministers using criteria that included those who had been participating in the coordination structures for a significant period of time as well as those who had strong views about the functioning of the structures.

Table 11 below summaries the key informants approached and successfully interviewed in this evaluation as well as the number of targeted and successfully completed interviews:

Table 11: Key informant interviews conducted

| Structure	Outcome	Target interviews	Number conducted	List of respondents interviewed
Economic cluster/IF	4: Employment	4	7	Outcome 4 Facilitator X2 Minister of Tourism DG National Treasury Chief Director Mineral Resources DG Economic Development DG Trade and Industry
Economic cluster/IF	5: Skills	4	2	DG Science and Technology Outcome 5 Facilitator
Economic cluster/IF	7: Rural Communities	4	1	Outcome 7 Facilitator
Economic cluster/IF	10: Environment	4	3	Outcome 10 Facilitator DG: Environmental Affairs MEC Agriculture: Gauteng
Education IF/MinMEC	1: Education	5	5	DG: Basic Education Outcome 1 Facilitator Deputy Director General: Curriculum Director: LTSM Chief Director: Further Education training services
Health IF/MinMEC	2: Health	5	2	Minister of Health DG Health Outcome 2 Facilitator
Human	8: Human	5	2	DG Human Settlements

Structure	Outcome	Target interviews	Number conducted	List of respondents interviewed
Settlements IF/MinMEC	Settlements			Outcome 8 Facilitator
G&A cluster/IF	12: Public Service	5	5	DG Public Service Commission DG: COGTA Outcome 12 Facilitator DG Public Service and Administration Head of Branch: Outcomes
Local Governance IF/MinMEC	9: Local Governance	5	0	
JCPS cluster/IF	3: Safety	5	3	Minister of Home Affairs DG Justice Outcome 3 Facilitator
Infrastructure cluster/IF	6: Infrastructure	5	3	Minister: National Planning commission Outcome 6 Facilitator DG Public Enterprises
Rural MinMEC	7: Rural Communities	5	3	Western Cape MEC: Agriculture and Rural Development Western Cape Acting DDG Agriculture Gauteng MEC: Agriculture and Rural Development
Environment MinMEC	10: Environment	5	2	DG: Environmental Affairs Gauteng MEC: Agriculture and Rural Development
TOTAL		**56**	**38**	

A3.4   DG Survey:

A survey was conducted with Director Generals who attended at a previously planned FOSAD workshop held in August 2013 (in order to enhance response rates). The survey questionnaire was printed on paper and all the DGs present were asked to complete the survey. The DGs who were absent from the meeting were sent the questionnaire electronically. The questions in the survey covered roles and responsibilities; participation, decision making and structure meeting management issues.   Figure 14 shows the distribution of the DGs that participated in this survey across 5 clusters.

Figure 14: Clusters respondent participates in

A total of 34 out of 48 DGs complete the survey The highest number of DGs was in the Governance and Administration cluster with 10 respondents; followed by the social cluster with 9 respondents. The least number of representatives was in the infrastructure cluster, with 2 respondents.

Figure 15 shows the representation of implementation forums among the DGs that participated in the survey. The highest number of DGs was in the Outcome 4 – Employment with 8 representatives whilst the least was in health outcome with just one representative.

Figure 15: Implementation forum the respondent participates in

Note: Some DGs participate in more than one implementation forum.

A3.5   South African Coordination Case Studies

As part of the broader review of the government coordination systems, outcome facilitators were asked to state the areas within their clusters/implementation forums /MinMECs where coordination was either handled well or poorly.

The **purpose** of the case studies is to:

    i.   Better understand in some depth the specific coordination roles played (or not played) by the 3 coordination structures in practice;

    ii.   Inform an understanding of the impacts of the coordination structures (i.e. what kinds of benefits could be linked to a coordination issue being resolved, or costs of not resolving a coordination issue) in terms of either ensuring an issue requiring coordination is dealt with well or poorly;

    iii.   Inform potential improvements to the coordination structures (triangulating the case study information with the key informants, coordination survey, and coordination structures review of meeting minutes data).

The following 6 case study issues were identified by the Presidency: DPME in consultation with Outcome Managers/ Facilitators:

Figure 16: Selected SA Government Coordination Case Studies

Issues involving coordination	Issue dealt with by Cluster Structure	Issue dealt with by MinMEC	Issue dealt with by Implementation Forum
Dealt with well		1. **Textbook challenges**, set up well functioning monitoring system (Contact Thabo - HeadCom, Council of Education Ministers) 2. **Accreditation of the Metro's with the Housing Function**: Complex vertical transfer/assignment of the function to six metro's negotiated through a horizontal arrangement of the 4 affected provinces and their metro representatives. (Contact Ahmedi)	3. **Finalisation of EIA process** (Contact Mohlago) 4. Regulation for creation of independent power producers (Cluster – contact Mahesh
Dealt with poorly	5. **Establishment of the Border Management Agency** (contact Joy) 6. Industrial relations in mining and agriculture (contact Rudi)		

A3.6   Coordination Structure document review

This review included structure meeting attendance registers, structure meeting minutes and other documents such as Terms of Reference for the Clusters.

i.   Attendance register analysis

Structure meeting attendance registers were analysed for all the meetings held between 2012 and 2013. Graphs of the number of DGs in attendance were constructed. These results have been triangulated with other data sources in relevant sections of this report.

ii.   Structure meeting minute analysis

The minutes from the structure meetings were requested from relevant structure secretariats. The number of decisions made in these structures were analysed by type and presented in graphs. These results are also presented in relevant sections throughout this report.

A3.7   Capacity building

This evaluation was also instrumental in building capacity of young and emerging evaluators. One young evaluator from DPME was trained in analysing structure meeting minutes. Another official from the Presidency was trained and he assisted in analysing attendance registers from the cluster meetings. The service provider team also had a young African researcher who actively participated in the whole evaluation exercise. In addition, two of the senior researchers on the team were PDIs.

A3.8   Limitations and Challenges

The following are some of the limitations and challenges experienced:

- Some requested data sets could not be obtained for security reasons as well as availability issues (for instance JCPS cluster meeting minutes and Ministerial Cluster minutes);

- Some interviews could not be secured despite several requests and follow ups (e.g. DG for Rural Development and the following Ministers; Economic Development, Rural Development, Justice, , Education) due to the busy schedules of Ministers and senior officials.
- Gaps in information requested e.g. some coordination structure meeting minutes not available.

Case studies were limited in depth due to limited access to information on what discussions happened within the coordination structures, as well as conversations outside of these structures between Ministers and senior officials. The case studies required access to confidential information contained in minutes of coordination structures, as well as Cabinet committee decisions (which were not made available to the researchers), as well as input from Director Generals participating in the coordination structure meetings and who were difficult to access due to their busy schedules. Case studies are vitally important with respect to evaluating the effectiveness of coordination structures due to the difficult in obtaining data on successful coordination and is an important area warranting further research in future.

The process of obtaining minutes (which the Presidency facilitated) of the coordination structures was laborious as it took about 3 months to obtain some of the structure minutes, and even then many of the requested minutes were still not obtained before the project research deadline. We received access to a limited number of minutes from the following structures: Infrastructure cluster/IF, Local Government IF/ MinMEC, Environment MinMEC; and no access to minutes from Human Settlements IF/ MinMEC, Rural Development MinMEC, and Justice, Crime Prevention, and Security cluster/ IF. This situation may be indicative of the lack of a centralised efficient knowledge management system and/or secretariat function, especially for MinMECs and is an area which requires further attention by the Presidency.

One of the challenges of surveying senior government officials (in this case DGs) is that they may be weary of confidentiality issues and therefore of providing overly negative comments or responses. Despite the DGs survey questionnaire stating that responses would be treated both confidentially and anonymously, we believe that the responses may have erred on the less critical side, especially regarding the "agree-neutral-disagree" questions and DGs selecting "neutral" instead of "disagree" or "strongly disagree". It may therefore be more appropriate not to use the "neutral" category when there is the possibility that respondents may be wary of providing negative responses. It may also be important for researchers to personally re-assure respondents regarding confidentiality and anonymity, as opposed to relying on respondents reading this on the questionnaire form.

Annex 4: Detailed Lessons from United Kingdom, Australia, and Brazil

Table 12: Lessons on coordination mandates from UK, Brazil and Australia

Coordination Enablers	United Kingdom	Brazil	Australia
Roles/ Responsibiliti es : Legislative / Alternative	Outcome- focused delivery agreements, such as PSAs, can play an effective role in linking budgets to civil service reforms as well as encouraging officials to develop innovative solutions designed to impact on outcomes. Nevertheless, many challenges exist with respect to ensuring that such agreements contribute meaningfully towards improved coordination and accountability.	Horizontal coordination between national departments is a major challenge in Brazil partly due to national Ministers being appointed from different political parties due to political dynamics in the country. In Brazil ministerial positions are politically allocated based on the necessity of the Brazilian president to build political coalitions (Armijo et al. 2006). This leads to horizontal fragmentation and lack of any sustainability of any attempt create horizontal coordination policies. Nevertheless, in this context, the Presidency as well as NGOs can play an important horizontal coordination role. Where municipal and provincial levels of government have strong constitutional mandates to deliver certain services (e.g. health, education), the national government sometimes has to use its fiscal power as a policy alignment coordination mechanism in the form of conditional grants and funding conditionalities to link funding to, for example, common approaches to minimum standards (e.g. school staffing attendance). In terms of vertical/ intergovernmental coordination, because the central state is relatively weak it has to rely on a combination of political negotiation as well as legislative mechanisms to promote coordination. Some intergovernmental/vertical coordination forums have a legislated mandate / role to formulate sector plans. This is a similar mandate to South Africa's MinMECs which require national government to consult with Provincial, and where relevant municipal, government with respect to the coordination and alignment of strategic performance plans and priorities, objectives and strategies. The	The centre of government plays a strong pro-active and capacity-support coordination role in Australia, in part through the Cabinet Implementation Unit (CIU) which plays the following roles and which improves coordination through stronger policy development processes as well as implementation: a) Monitoring of outcomes b) Capacity building and sharing of knowledge regarding improving implementation, in part through networks c) Advice to Cabinet specifically regarding implementation plans and risk management plans d) Pro-active involvement with agencies e.g. to provide advice early on in policy development processes. The COAG is an overarching governing and alignment structure for all intergovernmental mechanisms in Australia. The effective functioning of COAG as an inter-governmental coordination mechanism is supported by legislation governing inter-governmental financial transfers which make provision for certain types of transfers to be conditional on achieving progress with outcomes and outputs which have been identified to take forward an over-arching reform agenda of key national priorities and which also help to focus the work of the

Coordination Enablers	United Kingdom	Brazil	Australia
		legislative mandate for some of the Intergovernmental Forums provides for decisions and agreements reached in these structures to be binding on all levels of government which in all likelihood contributes towards their effectiveness.	Ministerial Councils reporting to COAG. Linking coordination structures to financial incentives and inter-governmental transfers enhances their effectiveness in reforming the regulatory environment.
		Unlike South Africa's MinMECs which have a common standard mandate outlined in the IGRA, the intergovernmental fora differ widely in terms of their mandates which are derived from legislation. In health, the mandate is a narrow one focused on developing health plans. In education, the mandate is far broader: to develop the education system. It is not clear whether having a broad or a narrow mandate makes a difference in the ability of the forum's success in improving coordination in the sector.	There should not be a one-size-fits-all approach for coordination structures. The nature and design of the structure should be informed by its purpose and the tasks that it has been established to perform. At the same time, mandatory systematic reviews by structures can help to ensure that such structures do not adapt and change to the changing environment and remain relevant and focused.
		The sectoral chambers that promoted horizontal policy coordination achieved mixed successes, with active participation by the President in some of these structures being directly linked to their degree of success.	Inter-governmental structures (Ministerial Councils) of different types have been established for different purposes including structures which have a defined time span to deal with issues which are reform-focused and legislative and governance structures which oversee responsibilities set out in legislation, inter-governmental agreements (IGAs) (similar to South Africa's MinMECs).
		The social chamber promoted intergovernmental coordination and aligned implementation of social programmes by creating a special project, coordinated by the centre of government, to ensure a package of social programmes reached the poorest parts of the country and were implemented jointly by government and local civil society.	Ministerial Councils also play a role in formulating policy reforms as well as developing Regulatory Impact Assessments (guided by a Best Practice Guide) to assess the likely impacts of new regulations required by COAG decisions and enhance the capacity of Cabinet to take informed decisions.
		These chambers were terminated when there was a change in government. This was easier to do given that they did not have a legislated mandate. It is not clear what impacts their termination has had on horizontal policy coordination (e.g. through lack of continuity).	The use of specific criteria can be useful in ensuring the time spent in structure meetings is well-spent and that coordination issues are
		The national level has taken the initiative to establish a vertical coordination structure (CAF) to work directly	

Coordination Enablers	United Kingdom	Brazil	Australia
		with municipal government using task teams to address specific issues of conditional grants and funding conditionalities to link funding to, for example, common approaches to minimum standards (e.g. school staffing attendance) issues. There may be issues where coordination structures are needed to address matters of direct national-municipal importance and which exclude provinces/ states. The social chamber promoted intergovernmental coordination and aligned implementation of social programmes by creating a special project, coordinated by the centre of government, to ensure a package of social programmes reached the poorest parts of the country and were implemented jointly by government and local civil society. These chambers were terminated when there was a change in government. This was easier to do given that they did not have a legislated mandate. It is not clear what impacts their termination has had on horizontal policy coordination (e.g. through lack of continuity).	dealt with at the appropriate level and delegated to senior officials to deal with outside of the structures where appropriate. The effective functioning of task teams to take forward time- bound coordination issues has been enhanced through the Prime Ministers Department taking administrative responsibility for these.
Leadership	The active support of the Prime Minister for structures responsible for developing cross-cutting policies and Strategies greatly enhance the policy/ strategy development process. Having the Head of a cross-cutting strategy/ policy development structure report to Prime Minister can secure appropriate cooperation from multiple departments (including securing sensitive information). Also, the location of cross-cutting policy/strategy structure in centre of government Also, the location	Political dynamics and coalitions can greatly constrain Government's ability to promote coordinated behaviours between departments and spheres and the coordination effectiveness of coordination structures.	Whole-of-Government approaches have been prioritised by leadership and linked to a range of reinforcement mechanisms including recruitment HR practices which include competencies for co-operation and negotiation; induction and training programmes which build the competencies required for negotiation, ensuring staff development includes obtaining exposure/ participation in coordinated initiatives, awards the celebrate whole-of-Government work; and a web-based knowledge platform which shares research on whole-of-Government approaches and initiatives. Nevertheless, Haligan noted in 2008 that "The obstacles to inculcating cultural change however remain substantial. The imperative

Coordination Enablers	United Kingdom	Brazil	Australia
	of cross-cutting policy/ strategy structure in centre of government facilitates access to the Prime Minister when high level unblocking assistance is needed.		of the functional principle and the rigidity of organisational boundaries still loom prominently. There is of course no single formula for balancing agency requirements
Clear Vision	A new term of office and government leadership can highlight the importance of JUG/ coordination and create excitement around a vision involving improved coordination which can energise the civil service to better support coordination initiatives and structures. However, it can be difficult to sustain this energy and for this to overcome traditional barriers to coordination.	Broad agreement on the social development strategy improved the willingness of representatives on the social chamber to act in a coordinated manner. Agreement at a strategy level can therefore support more effective coordination.	A clear transformation agenda guides the focus and priorities of COAG and its ministerial councils.

Table 13: Lessons on coordination systems and processes from UK, Brazil and Australia

Coordination Enablers	United Kingdom	Brazil	Australia
Accountability/ Performance Mechanisms incl. Monitoring and evaluation	There is a tension between performance management and coordination. Individuals and organisations have become more focused on meeting their own individual and departmental performance targets. Unless cross-cutting targets are given equal status, coordination is likely to remain on the margins (Pollitt, 2003:42). Agreeing on clear outcomes and targets is a useful mechanism to clarify priorities and focus Government attention. However, substantial energy is required to develop and refine supportive information management systems and performance management systems if these are to play a meaningful role in supporting real improvements in coordination and performance. The involvement of communities in citizen monitoring and the use of "open data" approaches for assessing progress is becoming more common as internet and IT barriers and costs continue to fall.	The creation of National Forums and Policy Conferences (which can be supported at a regional level), and which are provided with support resources from government, is one mechanism to strengthen civil society participation and inputs into national policy processes. Conditional grants sometimes need to be used by national government to enforce compliance with national norms and standards (e.g. education and health).	Vertical inter-governmental mechanisms have used a range of cascading formal agreements from the outcome level down to the project level to define roles, responsibilities, and outputs and to ensure clear implementation plans exist which can be monitored and which improve accountability. The three-yearly process of conducting an economic impact assessment of the policy and regulatory reforms which COAG has achieved provides a quantified understanding of the broader economic benefits of the COAG coordination structures. There is a strong emphasis on transparency and accountability of the COAG structures by, for example, ensuring that all records of meetings are made available to the public on the internet.
Meeting management / sufficient resources	No clear lessons.	Some intergovernmental forums meet as often as monthly.	A set of clear guidelines informs the way that Secretariats support the operations of COAG structures. These Secretariats also have policy analysis capacity and the capacity to ensure agendas are strategic and which reflect issues which can only be handled by the structures. The frequency of COAG ministerial council meetings is flexible and can be decided on by each ministerial council, with meeting frequency depending on the issues being dealt with by each council. The costs of intergovernmental structure

Coordination Enablers	United Kingdom	Brazil	Australia
			meetings (which involve representatives from across the country) are managed by the availability and use of a TelePresence system which stimulates a live meeting environment. The effective functioning of task teams to take forward time- bound coordination issues has been enhanced through the Prime Ministers Department taking administrative responsibility for these.
Integrated Planning	The centre of Government can play a role in ensuring that policy development processes include a wide range of relevant stakeholders who are selected on the basis of specialised expertise to ensure that policy development is informed by a wide range of relevant perspectives, including relevant departments. Policy action teams (or task teams) reporting to a unit located at the centre is one mechanism to achieve this.	Agreement on broad strategy in cluster type structures by all role-players has made it easier cooperate and plan in an integrated manner.	

Table 14: Lessons on coordination behaviours from UK, Brazil and Australia

Coordination Enablers	United Kingdom	Brazil	Australia
Organisational culture, shared values, relationships of trust	Even with a strong drive from the top of government to develop a whole-of-government culture within government, it is extremely difficult to change in-grained, departmental-based, ways of behaving and operating.	The social sectoral chamber involved much negotiation between ministers in order to reach consensus. It is not clear if this negotiation took place at meetings of the social sectoral chamber, or outside of these meetings.	.
Skills, competencies, participation, representation	It is recognised that there may be a need for the centre of Government to possess high level analytical and strategy skills to support departments to design and facilitate coordinated strategy and policy development. It is also recognised that government needs to find ways to facilitate policy and strategy development processes which do not only rely on technical inputs and advice from departments, but also solicit these from other external sources (e.g. academia etc.). The use of Policy Action Teams for this purpose, and reporting to a senior government official in the centre of Government who had reported on progress to the Prime Minister was a useful mechanism in the UK.	The recruitment / appointment of senior officials by departmental Ministers can result in the weakening of the required technical skills for effective horizontal and/or vertical coordination being available in departments. Representation on sectoral chambers (similar to Cluster structures) is flexible depending on what issues are on the agenda. This allows for a diversity of inputs and views to inform the discussions at sectoral chamber meetings. The creation of mechanisms, such as Councils, by the centre of government, is one way to facilitate partnerships with civil society and the private sector which can develop and pilot innovative programmes (i.e. incubate innovation) and which leverage the resources of social partners. The Presidency appointed an operations executive to ensure the coordinated implementation of a package of selected social development pilot programmes and which were spatially targeted at the country's poorest areas.	The CIU has played a pro-active role in building skills and competencies needed to support effective coordination. The CIU supports networks across the APS which focus on implementation and delivery. One such network is the APS Policy Implementation Network (APS PIN) which, with Deputy Secretary Membership, draws on members' experience to share knowledge and helps to develop a culture of collaboration on implementation and delivery.

Annex 5: Detailed Theories of Change for Cluster, IF and MinMEC systems:

Cluster - Horizontal Coordination of National Departments - Theory of Change

ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND CHANGE MECHANISMS

- There is accountability for poor performance as well as implementation of decisions made by structures
- Mandates/ roles of the 3 cluster levels (technical, Ministerial and Cabinet Committee) / structures are clear, understood, realistic, appropriate and do not contradict the mandates/ roles of other structures or conflict with other legislated mandates .g. DG responsibilities as Accounting Officers).
- The relationships between IFs, Clusters and, where relevant, MinMECs are effective and supportive of their mandates/ role.
- It is possible to improve policy and programme implementation coordination by decision-makers at the DG and Ministerial level Cluster structures.

MANDATES / OBJECTIVES/ STRUCTURE ROLES

Clusters do not have a Statutory Mandate.

The Clusters try to improve the implementation of the Programme of Action and the achievement of cross-cutting government objectives and play the following roles:

i. Improve cabinet decision-making processes
ii. Harmonise the work of departments through promoting inter-departmental planning, collaboration and coordination
iii. Produce quarterly reports on progress with the implementation of the PoA to increase implementation pressure and transparency
iv. Coordinate and oversee implementation of the PoA including identifying and resolving implementation blockages.

Clusters which are Implementation Forums are also responsible for overseeing implementation of the relevant Outcome(s).

- Departments effectively implement Cluster (Ministerial and Cabinet Committee) decisions in a coordinated manner
- That Ministers and DGs have sufficient time outside of the Cabinet Committees to deal with, and delegate, cross-cutting policy issues
- Progress report presentations at meetings only take place for items where coordination challenges exist.
- Only those relevant departments and level of decision-maker that are necessary to support effective decision-making attend the meetings and there is the necessary continuity in attendance
- DGs and Ministers see attending cluster meetings as a good use of their time/ beneficial.
- The Agenda focuses on issues of Strategy and Policy, as well as issues requiring harmonisation across departments, with operational issues being dealt with by individual departments and issue-based cluster sub-structures as far as possible.
- Sufficient meeting time is available to take effective decisions.
- Cluster meeting management processes allow for sufficient work and preparation to take place in between meetings to support effective reporting and decision-making at Cluster meetings
- Secretariat plays an effective role in exercising quality control over meeting documents and presentations, as well as document management and circulation, in advance of meetings.
- The PoA reflects the outputs, indicators and targets contained in the DA.
- DPME plays an effective support role in assisting the IF to monitor improvements made with regard to the implementation of the DAs
- Clear operating rules and procedures guide the functioning of clusters

CHANGE MECHANISMS / PROCESSES / ACTIVITIES

- Cabinet Committees receive quarterly reports from the IFs/ Clusters which highlight what decisions need to be made to address implementation of the PoA and / or harmonise the work of departments.
- Technical Clusters meet at least monthly and Ministerial Clusters meet at least quarterly to review planned actions and progress with PoA
- Monitoring of the PoA progress reports should highlight areas where implementation is weak, where the activities and outputs are not contributing to the outcome as planned, and should prompt an evaluation of why things are the way they are and propose actions regarding what is needed to improve performance. .
- Cabinet member responsible for cluster convenes Ministerial Cluster meeting and determines the agenda.
- Clusters may establish technical support structures if there is a need for formal technical support to the Cluster.
- Clusters should adhere to the DPME TOR for Implementation Forums where the cluster is an IF.

Implementation Forum – Vertical or Horizontal Coordination of Outcome - Theory of Change	ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND CHANGE MECHANISMS

MANDATES / OBJECTIVES/ STRUCTURE ROLES

IFs do not have a Statutory Mandate. The IFs will facilitate collaboration, and agree on interventions where required to ensure delivery stays on track and blockages are removed towards achievement of the outcome and priority outputs by contributing towards the following:

 i. Improve cabinet decision-making processes

 ii. Promote policy coherence relevant to the Cluster

 iii. Inform and to execute Cabinet decided priorities relevant to the Cluster

 iv. Promote active collaboration between Ministries and departments

 v. Ensure effective implementation and monitoring of **Delivery Agreements (DAs)**

- There is accountability for poor performance as well as implementation of decisions made by structures
- Mandates/ roles of the 3 levels (technical ad Ministerial IF and Cabinet Committee) / structures are clear, understood, realistic, appropriate and do not contradict the mandates/ roles of other structures or conflict with other legislated mandates .g. DG responsibilities as Accounting Officers).
- The relationships between IFs, Cluster and, where relevant, MinMECs are effective and supportive of their mandates/ role.
- It is possible to improve policy and programme implementation coordination by decision-makers at the DG and Ministerial level and IF structures.

CHANGE MECHANISMS / PROCESSES / ACTIVITIES

Once DAs have been completed, these are monitored and refined:

- DAs are revised annually using monitoring and evaluation data/ results from implementation of the DA.
- Information on DA implementation progress will form the basis of regular meetings between the President and the Minister.
- Ministers enter into and enforce performance agreements with DGs which reflect the DA outcomes and outputs, in addition to the other key performance areas of the Department. These agreements state that "Suitable indicators must be developed, and targets set and reported on, in this regard".
- National/ Provincial Departments/ Municipalities amend their Annual Performance Plans, IDPs and budgets if required and implement their responsibilities in the DA and work in collaboration vertically/ horizontally as required.
- The IFs will table short progress reports to Cabinet (to the Cabinet Cluster Committee) on a bimonthly basis. IFs will provide administrative data that will allow oversight on progress at an activity level. In addition, The Presidency will triangulate this data with budget expenditure data and output level indicators, where available.
- IFs will identify lack of sufficient progress, and/or implementation challenges, with outputs and decisions will be identified and made and allocated to responsible departments for action. The results of such decisions and actions will be monitored and reported back to the IF. Such decisions could include escalating issues to a higher level structure (e.g. Ministerial IF and/or Cabinet Cluster Committee).
- The Outcome Facilitator can independently identify progress / implementation issues and submits a report to the DPME DG, who reviews and approves the report before submitting it to the DG in the Presidency and the relevant Minister as well as the Cabinet Committee.
- OFs work with coordinating departments to facilitate implementation of the DA (e.g. the development of focused monitoring tools).

- Outputs identified in the DAs are priority outputs impacting on achievement of the Outcome
- The President will meet regularly with Ministers and Ministers will be held accountable for performance against their DAs and there will be consequences for both good and poor performance.
- Ministers will enter into performance agreements with DGs which reflect the DA outcomes and outputs, in addition to the other key performance areas of the Department and meet regularly with DGs to review performance against the PA and that there will be consequences for both good and poor performance.
- Cabinet Committees make decisions to address issues raised in quarterly reports incl. issues raised by DPME if differences of opinion.
- That decisions regarding policy and implementation coordination issues can be made in the IF without impinging on the departmental and legislated responsibilities of Ministers and DGs/ DDGs.
- That departments provide relevant data to allow oversight of DA progress with implementation of outputs.
- DPME plays an effective support role in assisting the IF to monitor improvements made with regard to the implementation of the DAs and DAs are accordingly revised annually using results
- The IF Agenda focuses on strategic DA implementation challenges and sufficient meeting time is available to take effective decisions to address these.
- Relevant departments and level of decision-maker attend the technical and Ministerial IFs and there is continuity
- IF meeting management processes allow for sufficient work and

MinMEC - Inter-governmental Relations - Theory of Change

MANDATES / OBJECTIVES/ STRUCTURE ROLES

MinMECs have a statutory mandate defined as follows in the Intergovernmental Relations Act No. 13 of 2005 as follows

A consultative forum for the Cabinet member responsible for the functional area for which the forum is established:

i. Raise matters of national interest within that functional area with provincial governments, and if appropriate, organised local government and to hear their views on those matters
ii. Consult provincial governments and, if appropriate, organised local government on:
       b. The development of national policy and legislation relating to matters affecting that functional area
          c. The implementation of national policy and legislation with respect to that functional area.
          d. The coordination and alignment within that functional area of:
                i. Strategic performance plans; and
                ii. Priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local governments; and
          e. Any other matters of strategic importance within that functional area that affect the interests of other governments; and
3.   Discuss the performance in the provision of services in order to detect failures and to initiate preventive or corrective action when necessary.

CHANGE MECHANISMS / PROCESSES / ACTIVITIES

- The MinMEC/ TechMEC may coordinate an appropriate implementation protocol (which should be informed by the Implementation Protocol Guidelines contained in Government Notice 696 of 3 August 2007 as promulgated by the then Minister of Provincial and Local Government). Where the implementation of a policy, the exercise of a statutory power, the performance of a statutory function or the provision of a service depends on the participation of organs of state in different governments, those organs of state must co-ordinate their actions in such a manner as may be appropriate or required in the circumstances, and may do so by entering into an implementation protocol
- Two or more MinMECs may meet jointly when necessary to discuss and consult on issues which are inter-sectoral in nature.
- Suggestions for inclusion in the agenda for a meeting may be submitted to the relevant Cabinet members in terms of a framework to be determined by that Cabinet member.
- Cabinet member responsible for cluster convenes MinMEC meeting and determines the MinMEC agenda.
- MinMECS may establish technical support structures (TechMECs) if there is a need for formal technical support to the MinMEC.
- MinMECs and TechMECs must adopt rules to govern its internal procedures including: chairperson functions, procedures for its functioning, frequency of meetings and the manner in which meetings must be convened, procedures for the adoption of resolutions or recommendations, procedures for the settlement of inter-governmental disputes (which the Minister may issue by notice in the Gazette)
- Department of the relevant Cabinet member is responsible for providing administrative and other support services to the MinMEC

ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND CHANGE MECHANISMS

- There is accountability for poor performance as well as implementation of decisions made by structures
- Mandates/ roles of the 3 levels (technical ad Ministerial IF and Cabinet Committee) / structures are clear, understood, realistic, appropriate and do not contradict the mandates/ roles of other structures or conflict with other legislated mandates .g. DG responsibilities as Accounting Officers).
- The relationships between IFs, Cluster and, where relevant, MinMECs are effective and supportive of their mandates/ role.
- It is possible to improve policy and programme implementation coordination by decision-makers at the DG and Ministerial level and IF structures.

- Decisions are implemented and progress monitored.
- Decisions regarding policy and legislation issues can be made in the TechMEC/ MinMEC without impinging on the constitution incl. the powers and duties of the 3 spheres
- Agendas focus on strategic policy and legislation issues requiring coordinated MinMEC decisions by all/most participating departments / spheres and that sufficient preparation prior to the meetings, as well as time in the meeting, is available to support effective decision-making.
- Departments/ spheres are motivated and able to submit items for inclusion in the TechMEC/ MinMEC agenda.
- Only those relevant departments, spheres and level of decision-maker that are necessary to support effective decision-making attend the TechMEC and MinMEC meetings and there is the necessary continuity in attendance
- DGs and Ministers see attending TechMEC / MinMEC meetings as a good use of the time/ beneficial.
- The relevant minister has defined internal rules and procedures to govern the MinMEC and these are complied with (participants are aware of and understand these).

Annex 6: Functions of the National Health Council MinMEC as per the National Health Act

23   Functions of National Health Council

(1) The National Health Council must advise the Minister on-

> *(a)   policy concerning any matter that will protect, promote, improve and maintain the health of the population, including-*
>> *(i)   responsibilities for health by individuals and the public and private sector;*
>> *(ii)   targets, priorities, norms and standards relating to the equitable provision and financing of health services;*
>> *(iii)   efficient co-ordination of health services;*
>> *(iv)   human resources planning, production, management and development;*
>> *(v)   development, procurement and use of health technology;*
>> *(vi)   equitable financial mechanisms for the funding of health services;*
>> *(vii)   the design and implementation of programmes to provide for effective referral of users between health establishments or health care providers, or to enable integration of public and private health establishments;*
>> *(viii)   financial and other assistance received from foreign governments and intergovernmental or nongovernmental organisations, the conditions applicable to Cabinet receiving such assistance and the mechanisms to ensure compliance with these conditions;*
>> *(ix)   epidemiological surveillance and monitoring of national and provincial trends with regard to major diseases and risk factors for disease; and*
>> *(x)   obtaining, processing and use of statistical returns;*
> *(b)   proposed legislation pertaining to health matters prior to such legislation being introduced into Parliament or a provincial legislature;*
> *(c)   norms and standards for the establishment of health establishments;*
> *(d)   guidelines for the management of health districts;*
> *(e)   the implementation of national health policy;*
> *(f)   the national and provincial integrated health plans contemplated in section 21 (5);*
> *(g)   an integrated national strategy for health research; and*
> *(h)   the performance of any other function determined by the Minister.*

(2) The National Health Council may determine the time frames, guidelines and the format for the preparation of national and provincial health plans.

(3) The National Health Council must strive to reach its decisions by consensus but where a decision cannot be reached by consensus, the decision of the majority of the members of the National Health Council is the decision of the National Health Council.

(4) The National Health Council may consult with or receive representations from any person, organisation, institution or authority.

(5) The National Health Council may create one or more committees to advise it on any matter.

(6) The National Health Council determines the procedures for its meetings.

(7) A quorum for the National Health Council is at least half of the members plus one.

(8) The Minister or his or her nominee contemplated in section 22 (2) (a) must convene the first meeting of the National Health Council within 60 days of the commencement of this Act.".

The <u>Minister</u>, after consultation with the <u>National Health Council</u>, may make regulations regarding-

> a) anything which may or must be <u>prescribed</u> in terms of <u>this Act</u>;

> b) the fees to be paid to public health establishments for <u>health services</u> rendered;

> c) the <u>norm</u>s and standards for specified types of protective clothing and the <u>use</u> cleaning and disposal of such clothing;

d) the development of an essential drugs list and medical and other assistive devices list;

e) human resource development;

f) co-operation and interaction between private health care providers and private health establishments on the one hand and public health care providers and public health establishments on the other;

g) returns, registers, reports, records, documents and forms to be completed and kept by the <u>national department</u>, provincial departments, district health councils, health care providers, private health establishments and public health establishments;

h) the functions of persons who render voluntary, charitable or similar services in connection with a <u>public health establishment</u>;

i) the rendering of forensic pathology, forensic medicine and related laboratory services, including the provision of medico-legal mortuaries and medico-legal services;

j) <u>communicable disease</u>s;

k) notifiable medical conditions;

l) <u>rehabilitation</u>;

m)emergency medical services and emergency medical treatment, both within and outside of health establishments;

n)health nuisances and medical waste;

o) the import and export of pathogenic micro-organisms;

p) health laboratory services, including-

    i) the classification, accreditation and licensing of health laboratories; and

    ii) setting, monitoring and enforcing quality control standards applicable to health laboratories;

q) <u>non-communicable disease</u>s;

r) <u>health technology</u>;

s) <u>health research</u>;

t) the national health information system contemplated in <u>section 74</u>;

u) the processes and procedures to be implemented by the <u>Director-General</u> in order to obtain prescribed information from stakeholders relating to health financing, the pricing of health services, business practices within or involving health establishments, health agencies, health workers and health care providers, and the formats and extent of publication of various types of information in the public interest and for the purpose of improving access to and the effective and efficient utilisation of health services;

v)the processes of determination and publication by the Director-General of one or more reference price lists for services rendered, procedures performed and consumable and disposable items utilised by categories of health establishments, health care providers or health workers in the private health sector which may be used-

    i) by a medical scheme as a reference to determine its own benefits; and

    ii) by health establishments, health care providers or health workers in the private health sector as a reference to determine their own fees, but which are not mandatory; and

w) generally, any other matter which it is necessary or expedient to prescribe in order to implement or administer this Act.

Annex 7: Purpose of clusters: Presidency 2009 Terms of Reference Presentations

Cluster	Purpose of cluster for terms of reference (2009)

Economic	**Approach and strategic focus of the cluster**
	• The approach of the cluster will centre on developing a programme based on the overarching decent work and sustainable livelihoods vision and key commitments in the electoral mandate
	• To this end the cluster will;
	   – Ensure that policies and programmes are aligned to this electoral mandate
	   – Strengthen coordination and policy coherence across government, between departments, and with state institutions and state owned entities (SOEs) by identifying and leveraging synergies.
	   – Identify key priorities, and advance its work in a phased manner, focusing on deliverables within 100 days; by next Lekgotla; and beyond Jan 2010 to long term.
	Approach/strategic focus I - developing and aligning policy
	• Build coherence in policy and link macro, sector and micro policies.
	• Adopting a new approach and not a repackaging of old 'silo' based programmes of departments.
	• Avoid ad-hoc policy development in many different sites within the state – policy coherence the new focus.
	• Create appropriate platforms, or use existing ones, inside and outside government, to engage in this process.
	• Build consensus with key economic actors
	Approach/strategic focus II - coordination
	• To strengthen coordination and policy coherence the cluster will;
	   – Identify linkages and complementarities with other clusters around areas like infrastructure, skills, spatial policies, and global economic strategies.
	   – Capacitate new departments/ministries, including Economic Development, Rural Development and Land Affairs.
	   – Strengthen modalities to work with provinces and local government through coherent spatial economic development.
	   – Develop strong partnerships with organised labour and business, including through social pacts, capacity building and a stronger Nedlac.
	   – Integrate state entities and SOEs and their work and governance into the new vision.

Governance & Administration (G&A)	**Main functions of the cluster** • Ensure integrated planning across all spheres of government. • Promote policy coherence and alignment on the work of government. • Promote integrated service delivery on the cross-cutting programmes of government. • Ensure effective Cabinet decision-making processes. • Improve integrated approach to performance monitoring and evaluation of government programmes. • Promoting active collaboration with provincial clusters to implement government's PoA.
Infrastructure	**Main functions:** • To improve Cabinet decision-making processes. • To promote policy coherence. • (3) To help inform the planning commission of infrastructure priorities and assist in • monitoring the implementation thereof. • (4) To facilitate execution of Cabinet priorities. • (5) To promote active collaboration between ministries, departments, state owned

Cluster	Purpose of cluster for terms of reference (2009)

	• entities, the three spheres of government and ensure the implementation of government's PoA.
	Purpose of the infrastructure development cluster
	   • To approve, prioritise, coordinate and monitor implementation of infrastructure plans, including those of public utilities.
	   • This will be done in partnership with the Planning Commission and Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation Ministries in the Presidency.
	   • To ensure vertical and horizontal coordination, between national government departments, provincial and local governments, state owned enterprises and public entities that will be represented in the infrastructure development cluster (IDC).

Justice	• Role of JCPS cluster
	   – To intensify the fight against crime and corruption.
	   – Preserve and enhance national security.

Social	• Ensure coordination and alignment of government-wide priorities in PoA. • Facilitate and monitor the implementation of priority programmes (PoA). • Provide a consultative platform on cross-cutting priorities and matters being submitted to Cabinet.

International Cooperation, Trade and Security (ICTS) Cluster	The main purpose of the cluster system can be encapsulated as follows;
	   • [enable an] Integrated and coordinated approach to policy formulation and coordination.
	   • Combat a silo approach to governance.
	   • Build a collegial approach and shared perspective on government priorities;
	   • Ensure that departments align their detailed activities with overall government priorities.
	   • Enable clusters to drive the implementation of the government's PoA as mandated by the Cabinet Makgotla.
	   • Identify disjuncture in policy, arising out of implementation, and review such policies.
	   • Monitor and evaluate the implementation of the PoA.